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

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MULTITUDES IN THE VALLEY

CHURCH AND CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

BY **DENIS BALY**

The inability of the peoples of the Middle East to understand each other and the West because of differences in tradition and in ways of thinking has made an uneasy peace the normal condition of their lives. Unless we understand this fact and something of the historic background of their attitudes, and our own as well, says Denis Baly, we shall not be able to mediate effectively in this situation but shall stand by powerless while the Middle East moves toward a world-engulfing disaster.

To this end, Mr. Baly analyzes each of the three main groups—Jews, Arabs, and Westerners—the religious and political backgrounds of their thinking, and the reactions of the common man. He considers such factors as the "controls" which influence them; the form nationalism takes in each group; the complicated organization of Christianity in the area; the stresses within and between the countries which make a high degree of tension inevitable in the Middle East.

The book also demonstrates how, in this prolonged torment, the judgment of God

Multitudes in the Valley



Multitudes, multitudes in the valley
of decision:
for the day of the Lord is near in the
valley of decision.

Joel 3:14 (Hebrew ~Joel 4:14)

can be seen at work. One of the most important chapters discusses what the judgment expressed in these events of human history really means. The author believes that this is a crucial question because, while theologians recognize God's working through history as the ever-present theme of biblical revelation, Christianity has lamentably failed to recognize it in the Middle Eastern scene. Four world movements are simultaneously pressing in upon the Middle East: Islamic absolutism, scientific humanism, nationalism, and Communism. Each is challenging the Christian Church, and each will thrive until rendered unnecessary to the divine purpose. In a final chapter the author deals with the task of the Church in a situation where justice is no longer possible and reconciliation almost beyond achievement.

Denis Baly is rapidly becoming known as an authority on the Middle East—a man who has spent nearly twenty years working and teaching in Jerusalem, Haifa, and 'Amman and who speaks both Arabic and Hebrew. Now visiting lecturer in political science at Kenyon College, he is also the author of *Challenge and Decision, Chosen Peoples,* and *The Geography of the Bible.* His *Multitudes in the Valley* is the result of years of reflection on the complexities that are the warp and woof of life in the Middle East—complexities with which he has lived in the day-to-day struggle to advance the cause of sound education and the Christian faith.

The author's objective viewpoint and approach and his forceful presentation of the issues in the Middle East should arouse all men of good will.

MULTITUDES IN THE VALLEY

Church and Crisis in the Middle East

BY

DENIS BALY

GREENWICH · CONNECTICUT · 1957

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Preface

In these days one should offer a new book on the Middle East to the public only with humility, almost with diffidence. Too much, far too much, has been written on the subject already. Nevertheless, while some aspects of the problem have been dealt with *ad nauseam,* there are others to which less attention has been paid, though they are not unimportant. Among them is the question of attitudes. So many different groups are involved, so profound are the emotions which every event stirs in their hearts, so gigantic are the issues, that the world holds its breath when any part of the structure is shaken and watches anxiously even when a young king in one of the smallest of countries quenches a revolt. But the people who are involved in these events do not understand each other and are so estranged in their outlook that almost every incident has a different meaning for each group. Why this should be so is one of the basic subjects of this book.

My justification for presuming to write on this aspect is that I have now lived and worked among a great many of the peoples most intimately concerned, among both the Arabs and the Jews—in Palestine and Transjordan in the old days and in both Jordan and Israel since the fighting—and also in all the three Western countries most involved, Britain, France and the United States. My connection with the Middle East is a long one, for though I first set foot in it twenty years ago, my brother was there long before me. I have also had the good fortune to visit and talk to the people of every country in Western Europe, except Portugal, and all the countries of the northern shores of Africa, as well, of course, as traveling extensively in the Eastern Mediterranean area. Thus I hope that I may have begun to learn something of the thinking of the Arab World, of Israel, and of the West, and to have perhaps a little which I may share with the reader.

However, what people *think* is happening is only part of the problem; what *is* really happening is another matter. It has long been part of the Christian Faith that political events are not always what they seem. The New Testament writers, for instance, argue that in the first century A.D. events of quite cosmic importance took place in Palestine, within the framework of the day-to-day history of that country, but that the Palestinians of the time were quite unaware of their significance. The same idea also is to be found continually in the Old Testament, that the events of history are the material of God's handiwork, even though the people who partake in these events may be quite oblivious of their meaning.

This may seem to be a subject rather for the theologian than for one whose training has lain more in the fields of geography and international relations. Unfortunately, many theologians are more concerned with God's activity in history two thousand years ago and appear to pay scant attention to the possibility that He might still be at work now. Thus, in the absence of expert guidance, there have developed two popular theories of the Christian's concern in Middle Eastern affairs: (a) that there, as in any international problem, we must establish moral values and (b) that the birth of the State of Israel is the fulfilment of prophecy. To neither of these theories can I subscribe. Not to the first, because I cannot convince myself that "moral values" are what either the Old or the New Testament is primarily talking about, and not to the second, because it would seem to be the lesson of the New Testament that it is a prime mistake to look for a *political* fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy.

Yet if we cannot see the work of God at all in the Middle Eastern crisis, it probably means that we should have to say that He is not to be discerned anywhere in the events of our time. Therefore, it seems necessary that somebody should at least start the discussion, and I offer this book in the modest hope that when he has finished tearing me to pieces, the reader may find, perhaps, that some of the ideas were not without value to him. I cannot expect everyone to agree with what I have to say. No one who writes on the Middle East can ask for that. But at least I hope they may be interested.

My thanks are due to the Rector and Vestry of St. George's Episcopal Church, New York City, who first

invited me to come to the United States, and under whose auspices I once set forward the early part of this book in the form of lectures, to the editor of the *Ecumenical Review* for permission to use again material which earlier appeared in that journal, and to Harper and Brothers for permission to use the photograph of the Wailing Wall, which first appeared in *The Geography of the Bible*. Also to Dr. Peter Berger, the Rev. C. T. Bridgeman, Professor J. C. Hurewitz, the Rev. and Mrs. Frederick Neumann, all of whom have been good enough at various times to read parts of the manuscript and give me very valuable advice—though they must not be blamed for anything in the book—and to Mrs. Coonse for assistance with the typing. Finally, to all those many, many people on both sides of the Armistice Line, former students, government officials, missionaries and other friends, whom I have been privileged to know, and whose hopes and fears are the basis of so much of this book.

DENIS BALY

Kenyon College,
June 10, 1957

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Multitudes in the Valley

"This is an important, really very much needed book, a significant contribution to the understanding of matters very little understood by most Americans . . . (It enters) into the thinking and attitudes of the people on both sides of the line in Palestine better than anything else I have seen. Baly has observed keenly, thought seriously, and expressed clearly without fear or favor all sides of the horribly complicated and tragically messed up situation in the Holy Land."

—MILLAR BURROWS,
Author of *The Dead Sea Scrolls.*

CHAPTER I

The Religious Background of Israeli Thinking

CERTAIN things have to be made clear from the beginning. First, it is quite impossible, within the limits imposed by a book of this nature, to set forward anything more than a few headlines, a few pointers towards constructive thought. Second, this book will be dealing throughout with what people think in the Middle East, and rather particularly with what the ordinary people think. This will not necessarily appear to us to be either reasonable or attractive. Indeed, it may often seem irrational, emotional, insecurely based in fact, and at times, perhaps, either plain silly or quite incomprehensible. Yet what people think is itself a fact, even though

NOTE: Almost anything can happen at any time in Middle Eastern politics. The reader is therefore asked to remember that the manuscript for this book was finished on June 10, 1957, and does not take account of any developments since that date.

they may think wrongly, and even though what they think may not itself be based in fact. We must never try to explain it away, or to direct our own thoughts and actions by what we imagine they ought to think, rather than by what they do think. Third, the Middle Eastern problem is extraordinarily complex, and especially the question of Israel. At times it would seem that the one completely true statement about Israel which can be made is that no single statement about it can be true. Not merely must it be qualified immediately, but often a diametrically opposite statement must be set up by its side, and the serious student must be asked to keep both in mind continually. The observer of the Palestinian scene peers, as it were, into the bubbling recesses of a cauldron. Every now and again he sees some apparently solid fact rise to the surface, but before he can seize it, it is sucked down once more and shredded to pieces in the hidden depths. At the very best he can state only what seems to him to be significant and beseech the reader to bear in mind the fragmentary and inadequate nature of all that he has to say. This is the kind of warning which the reader so frequently skips, or reads and immediately forgets, that it has to be underscored. It is quite basic to the whole argument of this book.

It might well be argued that the most significant single fact in the Middle East is that Israel exists. It is inescapable and ever-present, whether one lives next to the Mandelbaum Gate in the divided city of Jerusalem, by the banks of the Nile, or within the deserts of Arabia. This would be agreed by all, whether they regard this fact as a promise of hope for the future or as heavy with the menace of imminent disaster. Therefore, no excuse

is needed for beginning in that place and for examining the background of Israeli thought, before going on to consider the thinking of those neighbors whose minds have been shaken and disturbed by this fact for which they were so little prepared. With both the Israelis and their Arab neighbors we shall study first the religious background of their thinking, next the political background, and then we shall turn to consider what the ordinary man in the street thinks and how he reacts to the events which give him so little peace.

Some people would instantly deny that there is a religious background at all to Israeli thinking. They would point to the fact that very few of the *kibbutzim* have a synagogue, that the town of Haifa almost prides itself upon its freedom from the trammels of religion, and that the great mass of the younger people dissociate themselves clearly, and sometimes even emphatically, from the faith of their fathers. The very word "religious" is kept for the Orthodox Jews, i.e. those who attempt to keep the Law in all its details, and is associated in the minds of most with an Eastern European way of life with which those who did not know it in the past have very little sympathy.

Yet this judgment would be false. Israel may strike the casual visitor as being extraordinarily secular, but that is partly because the primary meaning of the word "Jew" for the Western Gentile is that of a man professing the Jewish religion. Therefore, when visiting a Jewish state, he expects the religion to be more immediately manifest than it would be in a Western state, which he regards as a purely national phenomenon. Yet, for a vast number of Jews today, whether in Israel or else-

where, to be a Jew means primarily to be a member of the Jewish *nation.* The emergence of the State is for them a manifestation of the *nationhood* of Judaism and not in the first instance a fact of religious significance. This double meaning of the word "Jew," in fact, bedevils a vast amount of thinking on the whole Israeli question. Very few people, and one would be inclined to say, least of all the Jewish people themselves, can keep the two meanings separate in their minds, and they switch from one to the other in the course of a conversation or a newspaper article without ever realizing that they have done so.

A great many Israelis could perhaps best be described as "post-religious" in the sense in which much of Western Europe today has been called "post-Christian," but, of course, the religion through which they have passed is Judaism and not Christianity. Even though they do not practice it, it commands respect because it is undoubtedly the religion of the Jewish people and of none other. In just the same way as among the "post-Christians" of Western Europe, their thinking is determined by the religion which they once held and which is still in some undefined measure "their" religion. Naturally, the factors which determine their thinking are different, and it might perhaps be suggested that some of the chief controls are: the Promises of God, the Messianic Hope, the Sense of the Community, the Rabbinic Method, and the Absence of Theology.

THE PROMISES OF GOD

The promises of God, of course, are those which concern the land of Palestine. Jewish thinking is more

strongly conscious of the covenant relationship than Christian thinking tends to be. It is perfectly true that part of the Christian claim is that in Jesus there has been a new agreement, and that this is the meaning of the prophecy in the thirty-first chapter of Jeremiah, but this idea of an agreement having been made with God is not normally very much to the forefront of the minds of the Christian laity. It is otherwise with the Jew. For him the promises have not yet been fulfilled, and therefore the agreement made at Sinai has in no sense been abrogated. It is, in fact, drummed into him by his teachers that what makes Judaism different from other religions is just that it is based upon a contract. Whereas we, who are Christians, celebrate in our feasts the Incarnation, the Resurrection, the Ascension and the Coming of the Holy Spirit, they in the Passover celebrate the deliverance of their nation, and the purpose of that deliverance was that this contract of Sinai might be made. Even the most secular observance of Passover seldom entirely obscures this fact. The feasts of Pentecost and Tabernacles likewise emphasize that God kept His word and that He will continue to keep it. It is, indeed, for them of the nature of God that He is faithful, and that promises made by Him will never be either broken or forgotten. This has burned down into their thinking, and it colors much of their emotional reaction to the State of Israel. Even the least religious of them conceive of Palestine as in some way theirs by more than historic justice —it is theirs by divine right. This helps to explain their horror at the British limitation of immigration into Palestine after 1939. Their natural revulsion at what they were bound to regard as a crime against humanity, for

the Nazi persecutions were then in full spate, was intensified; and they saw it also as a flouting of providence. They could not conceive of anyone doing such a thing except as the result of a really devilish and deliberate wickedness. From much of the writing and conversation of Jewish people at the time one had the impression of men who were aghast at an impious evil and expected, as it were, the stars in their courses to turn against the authors of it. There was an unmeasured ferocity in their attacks on the British which the British themselves could never understand. Those of us who lived in Palestine at the time, and were fortunate enough to draw our friends from the many groups of which that varied population was made, could not but be conscious that we entered another thought world as we passed from conversation with a British official to the house of some Jewish friend. In fact, no small part of the tragedy of Palestine has been these invisible, but almost impenetrable, walls which destroyed communication and made one group speak and think in terms which the others could not comprehend.

THE MESSIANIC HOPE

This has been a flame that has seldom been entirely extinguished in the whole of Jewish history. It is perhaps necessary to point out to Christian readers that Jewish religious thinking did not come to an end at the time of the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. Ordinary Christian people are far too inclined to think of the Jews as being in a state of suspended animation from that date until they surged to life again in the nine-

teenth century. They know vaguely of the Talmud, but that is as far as they can go. They would even be hard put to it to say when it was written and what it contains. It is noteworthy that the ordinary school textbook of history contains almost no mention of the Jews, save by some glancing reference to them here and there. Yet they lived and thought continually, and in their thinking they did not entirely lose sight of the figure of the Messiah. It is true that at times the Messianic Hope was not consciously to the forefront, but it did not disappear altogether, and often it burned like a magnesium flare.

In part, of course, it is connected with the continuing consciousness of the promises of God, but what gave it from time to time its extraordinary fervor was the recurrent misery in which so much of Jewish history has been passed. The minds of the Jewish people could not be accommodated to the present, which refused to accommodate them, and so were catapulted into the future and into the distant, but to them inevitable, time when wrongs should be righted and God's justice vindicated. This surely explains the visionary character of much of Jewish thinking. They are by long tradition conditioned to visualizing a future when everything shall have been perfected and when obstacles shall have been miraculously overthrown. They are thus quite capable of envisaging an Israel in which deserts have ceased to be and the present fact that half the country is a wasteful and recalcitrant wilderness hardly enters into it. Neither the British nor the Americans are normally given to this type of thinking—witness the extraordinary feebleness of our own eschatology—and we find it difficult to comprehend the brightness with which it sometimes shines

among the Jews. It is true that the fact that at bottom they believe their own visions has enabled them often to work miracles; but we are forced to ask ourselves whether it does not lead them into extravagances. There is a sense in which it is true to say that, whereas for the Western world politics has been the science of the possible, it has tended at times to mean for the Jew the bringing to pass of the impossible. That they have achieved so much, which the rest of the world often declared visionary, is a fact of history which the most virulent of Israel's critics should not forget, but some things remain impossible. There is a limit, for instance, to the number of people which a particular piece of land can support, but a great deal of Israeli writing suggests that the authors are quite unaware of it. One wonders at times whether the Jewish people are not in danger of becoming victims of their own propaganda.

THE SENSE OF THE COMMUNITY

There is probably no group of people in the world which is so conscious of being a community, scattered though they have been over the face of the earth. This amazingly persistent sense of oneness stems from two things—from the experience at Sinai, which colors all their thinking as no other event in their long history has ever done, and from the historic pressure which tended at all times to drive the Jew in upon his own fellows.

The agreement at Sinai was made with the nation and Judaism does not forget the essential unity of the Jewish people. There has been a corporateness about Jew-

ish thought which is in sharp contrast to so very much of post-Reformation thinking. It is noteworthy that the first explanation that a young Episcopalian gives in his catechism is that he was made at his baptism "a member of Christ and a child of God." This answer is quite foreign to the Jewish approach. The young Jew is taught rather to think of himself as "one of the people of God." This has been displayed both in the quite amazing generosity which has been shown by Jews for Jews and in the fact that Jews are found everywhere who accept the existence of a Jewish responsibility for Israel, though they may differ upon what that responsibility involves in the way of active participation.

The historic pressure, driving the Jew in upon his community, has come from the Christian nations among whom the vast majority of the Jewish people had their home. At no time until the relatively modern period did these nations accept the Jews as a part of the community of which they themselves formed the majority. There was no community other than the Jewish community itself which would accept Jews, and hence their paramount need was to form a people who would be both *Jewish* and a *Community,* and this need remained unchanged throughout the centuries. It did not begin to weaken until the growth of Liberalism, when the acceptance of the Jews by the Christian nations first made assimilation into those nations appear as a practical pattern of Jewish life. The development of this possibility for the first time in history was one of the springboards of Zionism, because it was seen by many to be a threat to the true Jewish way of life. To be assimilated, or so it appeared to the early Zionists, would be to lose

this vivid sense of oneness with the rest of the Jewish world and to lose the sense of oneness was to cease, effectively, to be a Jew.

One may doubt whether in fact this happened, for it would appear that even those Jews who were most assimilated (always excepting, of course, those Jews who definitely rejected their religion and were converted to another) did not lose this corporate sense, or forget that they were really one with Jews from every other country and they have usually responded to the cry for help from fellow-Jews less happily placed than themselves.

On the other side of the picture there is a striking failure to grasp the principle that it may be necessary for an individual to stand out against his own community. Jewish people can be, and indeed they very often are, amazingly individualistic, and perhaps there would be many Gentiles who would be tempted to single this out as the most vivid characteristic of those Jews whom they happen to know. This is not entirely surprising, for they come of a people who have always had to fight for their way in the world, and the upbringing of many Jewish boys has been that of a friend of mine who once said to me, "All my childhood my mother told me to strive for my own good because if I did not help myself there was no other person who would help me." It is the thought of Hillel, "If I am not for myself, then who is for me?" from the Ethics of the Fathers, and it is almost obligatory for a persecuted people. Nevertheless, it is often accepted as axiomatic that in the end the individual must go with the group. One may, and one should, make one's protest, but it is in the deepest sense unnatural to act contrary to one's own people, even in

what to a western Christian would appear a "righteous cause." I have come up against this attitude again and again in my dealing with Jewish students in the Middle East, and have constantly found it a matter upon which, though they have always politely listened to me and have discussed the question frankly, they have never finally accepted my arguments. Again it is a difference of approach based upon very deep seated memories. Christianity would never have come into existence in the first place if a handful of individuals had not been prepared to stand out against their fellows, but this is not an experience which is part of Jewish history.

THE RABBINIC METHOD AND THE ABSENCE OF THEOLOGY

It is impossible really to separate these two, since they belong together. They are so utterly and entirely contrary to all Christian thinking that it requires a real effort of the mind for us to see any validity at all here in Jewish categories of thought. To see where they diverged, we must go back to the first century A.D. when both Christians and Jews were flung out of their homeland, the Christians by the Jewish opposition to their new teaching and the Jews as a result of the destruction of Jerusalem. It was for the Christians a new experience, but for the Jews a repetition of something that had happened before. The Christian development was conditioned by the fact that they had been pitch-forked, as it were, into a world which thought entirely differently from that to which they had been accustomed and which had rejected them, and into a world, moreover, which

they felt called to persuade to accept their message. They were thus forced to think out more clearly what they believed, and this necessity was intensified by the fact that they were constantly absorbing into their own community members of this different world. There ensued some four centuries of struggle against heresy, and the establishment of the creeds. The fact that their missionary zeal never ceased to bring them in contact with people to whom they had to explain their religion continued to keep theology in the forefront of their religion. Rules of conduct, on the other hand, once the hurdle of whether Gentiles should be asked to keep the whole Jewish Law had been passed, tended to drop into second place. They became urgent only when it was a question of whether a given action contradicted their belief, e.g. burning incense to the Emperor. "Love God and do what you like" is not only a rule of life—it is also an accurate summary of Christian thought. This explains why Christians have been ready to go out again and again to do the seemingly quixotic, such as working among lepers, which has been well-nigh a Christian monopoly, and why at home their actions have so often lagged behind their avowed standards. It has been notoriously easy for opponents of the Christian Church to find examples of this failure. Torture and slavery, for instance, continued for centuries even with the blessing of the leaders of the Church, and it took a long time for nineteenth century Christians to grasp that the poor had bodies to be saved as well as souls. The healing of lepers, and indeed the whole missionary outreach, is the bursting into action of a passionately held faith, but the second characteristic is the result of an inherited

tendency on the part of Christians to fail to examine their own actions.

The Jew, however, had already been forced by contact with a different world to clarify his beliefs some six hundred years before, when in Babylon he had really come to terms with what he thought about idols and about God. The new crisis in A.D. 70 meant, not that the Jews were face to face with a world which *believed* differently—that, by this time, they were quite used to —but with a world which *behaved* differently. Moreover, while Christianity was bursting out at the seams and struggling to grow, Judaism found itself struggling rather to continue its existence and to avoid being swallowed up in the world around it. In a sense the struggle had already begun in Palestine in the face of first Hellenistic, and then Roman pressure, and was the struggle against assimilation which was again to become acute in the modern period. The answer then, as now, was that the Jews must be a community apart. Today, with the confusion of peoples and the breaking down of barriers between communities by the development of modern means of communication, the possibility of remaining within another country, and yet a community apart, seems to the Zionist not to exist. It appears to him that the only hope is that the Jews should have a separate country wherein to establish the community. In Roman times what is today the Zionist solution was then itself the impossibility, because the Romans had driven them out of the country which they had. The only hope in those days was to create what is the impossibility today, the community apart within another country. This was done by what we have called the Rabbinic method.

This concentrated on conduct, and was constantly dealing with the problem of how the Jews could continue to express their "Jewishness" as part of a real community when the physical criteria of community were denied them. It was done, moreover, not by imposing a way of life from above, but by people who shared the life of the community and knew at first hand the practical problems of living the Jewish life they were attempting to work out for their fellow-Jews. "The *talmid hacham,* the Jewish sage, the scholar and rabbi, whoever he might be—the *rov* of a townlet or the Gaon of Vilna —did not live on the periphery of his society, but at its vital center; he was not respected because he was *different* from his fellows, but because he was *more* of what they all were." [1] This was true even of the greatest of the scholars. Leon Roth says of Maimonides, that the significance of much of his work cannot be grasped until it is realized that "Maimonides, too, like his father, was not a mere scholar or a mere philosopher . . . but a man occupied ceaselessly with questions affecting the practical lives of whole communities." [2]

The basis of this community was the Law, but the Law could not be broken or done away with—that was axiomatic. Therefore it was expounded and interpreted according to a system which often seems to Christians to be absurd and at times to amount to nothing more than hair-splitting, but it always had the idea of making the life of the community as Jews possible. It is symptomatic of the importance which this expounding of the Law plays in the Jewish community that the thirteen exegetical principles of Rabbi Ishmael are printed as part of the morning service in the prayer book.

It must not be thought that in any sense the Jews conceived of the Law as burdensome—far from it. It was the Law which enabled them to live as Jews. "The purpose of all its (i.e. the Torah's) commandments, whether in general or in particular, was the well-being of man and not the lading of him with a heavy yoke." [3] The Sabbath regulations, for instance, which are apt to arouse the amazement, and even merriment, of Gentiles who do not understand their purpose, made possible intercourse between the people while maintaining the God-given prohibition of work. Thus, one may see at the entrance to towns in Israel cords stretched across the road. These are held to represent the doors of a house, and it is therefore possible to move about within the town, as within a house, and not break the Sabbath. I have discovered among my Gentile pupils, and rather particularly among those who have had what might be called "a good Christian upbringing," a firm and almost ineradicable conviction that even religious Jews think of the Sabbath as burdensome and intend it to be burdensome, but, in fact, "Queen Sabbath," as the Rabbis often called it, is a day to be looked forward to and a day to be enjoyed.

This conception that the Law must be meant for man's well-being and not for his suffering has been taken very seriously, and has had the most important results in the Jewish conception of right conduct, both between individuals and in the treatment of the individual by the community. "The Rabbis had another important principle, namely that no action could be traced to the Torah which could cause even the slightest injury to the individual or still less to the community." [4] It followed, therefore, that examination by torture and excessive

punishment for small offences were abhorrent. The writings of the Rabbis are full of instructions to the judges, who are counselled to strain the Law in favor of the accused. Even a criminal's death (where this is felt to be for the good of the community at large) must be as little painful and humiliating as possible. It must be admitted that the Jews in their ghettoes were far in advance of the Christian nations in this.

The conception extended even to small matters, as the following will make clear. "Formerly when they used to bring food into the house of mourning (for the first meal after a funeral, called 'meal of consolation' and prepared by a neighbor—note by translator) the rich would bring theirs in baskets of gold and silver and the like, so that the poor felt embarrassed. In consideration of the feeling of the poor it was ordained that all should bring it in baskets of (pealed willow) twigs." [5] This is one of many such enactments and although there must have been those who fell short of the standard set, the climate of opinion thus created cannot have been without its effect. It is part of the tradition of Judaism, and it has been one of the causes (we shall have to examine others later among the non-Jewish groups) of the relative absence of frightfulness, apart from isolated incidents, in nearly forty years of the Palestinian conflict. There will be those, of course, who will probably deny this statement, and the grim name of "Deir Yasin" will spring to their lips. They must be asked to be patient until this question is dealt with in its place later in the book.

This concentration upon the interpretation of the Law in terms of conduct, coupled with the absence of any outside stimulus given by contact with the non-believing

world, has resulted in a great weakness of theology. There has been no need for them to be constantly rethinking their beliefs in terms of modern thought. This was particularly true of the Orthodox Judaism of Eastern Europe which developed in towns that were sometimes as much as ninety-five per cent Jewish. Now it so happens that the Jewish religion in Israel is represented almost solely by these people, and the Liberal and Conservative Judaism of America and Western Europe has no foothold there. Indeed, the Israeli Rabbinate has set its face against their admission and the "rabbi" who is called upon to officiate at weddings, Bar Mitzvahs, funerals and the like is not in Israel the counterpart even of the modern Orthodox rabbi of the western world, hardly distinguishable in outward appearance from a Christian clergyman. He is still the rabbi of the Polish ghetto. This has meant a double problem. There is a tremendous cultural gulf which has to be bridged before most Israelis can find solace in their religion, and the "religious" Jews in Israel find themselves perplexed and unable to answer the questions of their own people, now that they are thrown back into the world from which they have hedged themselves off for centuries. Accustomed to devising means of maintaining the Jewish people intact within a foreign nation, they have been unable to adjust themselves to the existence of a Jewish nation living within its own country and called upon by the nature of its new existence to come to terms with other nations. Moreover, they have no answer to give to the vast number of young Jews who have been exposed to the modern scientific world and are troubled by all the intellectual doubts of the West.

Thus it is that the vast majority of Jews in Israel have turned their back upon a religion which seems to have no help to give them. One cannot accuse them of being materialistic, as so many visitors are inclined to do. There is, it is true, much justification for this label: the fantastic rents which are demanded—and paid, the perfectly enormous black market which grew up during the period of great shortage, and so on. Yet there is a very real desire upon the part of very many to serve something other than themselves, and this "something" is the Land of Israel. Courage and enthusiasm are not the monoply of the "halutzim" or pioneers. The ordinary man in the street is ready, when called upon, to give and to give until it hurts, both of his strength and his possessions, on behalf of his country and its way of life, though he himself may not live to see its fruition. Nevertheless, this "something" remains something less than God, whom the majority hardly acknowledge. It must, of its very nature, fail its devotees. Even already the signs of disillusion appear in casual conversation and yet, in the midst of this, Orthodox Judaism finds itself in the tragic position of needing to re-create the ghetto in Israel itself in order to make the kind of environment within which it can exist.

Son of man, can these bones live? And I answered, O Lord God, thou knowest.

CHAPTER II

Zionism: The Political Background of Israeli Thinking

THE Zionist claim is essentially a simple one. They argue that Palestine is theirs by divine promise, by historic justice and by common humanity. That it should be a sovereign state, and not a "national home" within another state, they say is both a national right and a political necessity. The basis of these claims and some of their present implications will be the subject of this chapter.

Zionists do not now normally put the promises of God in the forefront of their political arguments, but deep down inside themselves they still believe them, as we have already seen. The *Tanakh*—what Christians would call the Old Testament—is part of their national heritage and they read it as literature, even if its commandments sit lightly upon them. It is the foundation and the source-book of their language, for modern Hebrew

is a deliberate return to the Hebrew of the Bible, rather than a popularization of the medieval Hebrew which developed during the Dispersion. The *Tanakh* is full of promises that the Jewish people shall return to the land of Palestine and such promises pose a difficult question for Christians to answer, for the books of the Old Testament are also read and revered by Christians, and Zionists have not been slow to demand of Christian nations that they should act in accordance with these promises and not contrary to them. In fact, the support which the western nations have given to the Zionist Movement has been due in no small measure to the remembrance of these promises, with which the western Christians had become familiar from their earliest childhood. There were, indeed, Christians who advocated the resettlement of the Jews in Palestine many years before the present Zionist Movement had taken shape.

The argument from the Promises of God is less used today as a political claim, partly because the people of the Christian nations of the West are very much less well acquainted with the Old Testament than they were in the past, and partly because there have appeared upon the international scene nations for whom the promises have no significance at all. Nevertheless, the fact that the promises are there remains for the Zionists a part of their political creed. It continues to color much of their thinking, even though they themselves may be only vaguely aware of it, and it explains much of their impatience with their opponents and critics, because they are tempted to think that no other claims to the country can possibly have validity in face of a claim so securely based. This kind of argument appeared again at the time of

the Israeli action in the fall of 1956, when certain Israeli spokesmen, Ben Gurion himself among them, claimed that Sinai was theirs because it was there that God had given them the Law. Those who reject the Zionist claim may, in their turn, be tempted to be impatient with those who base their demands upon such unrealistic premises, but the demands cannot be dismissed in this fashion. As we have seen above, what people think is itself a fact and cannot be annulled by saying that they should not think like that. Indeed, as we shall come to see later, part of the Arab claim to the country is rooted in the supernatural and the student of international politics finds himself attempting to assess the political validity of arguments which are really beyond politics. The difficulty lies in deciding whether the fact that the arguments are "beyond" politics means that they are outside it or above it.

The chief argument, however, that the Zionists use is the historical one, and this argument is stronger than their opponents normally credit. It is that from somewhere about 1325 B.C. to A.D. 70 the Jewish people lived in Palestine, except for a break of some seventy years after 587 B.C. and that for most of this very lengthy period they governed the country or, at any rate, part of it. Even when Palestine was under a foreign government they claim that they never acquiesced in the rights of that government to exercise control over a country which they felt rightly belonged to them.

In the years succeeding A.D. 70 they were, of course, driven out and it has been said by many that this disposes of their claim. However, they reply (a) that they never ceased to look forward to their return and (b) that the Jewish people never lost contact with the country.

The famous cry of hope, "Next year in Jerusalem," which year by year is uttered at the feast of the Passover is not the only expression of this longing for return. Three times a day, at the morning, afternoon and evening services the following words are spoken, "Sound the great horn for our freedom; lift up the ensign to gather our exiles, and gather us from the four corners of the earth. Blessed art thou, O Lord, who gatherest the banished ones of the people Israel. Restore our judges as at the first, and our counsellors as at the beginning; remove from us sorrow and sighing; reign thou over us, O Lord, thou alone in loving-kindness and tender mercy, and justify us in judgment. Blessed art thou, O Lord, the King who lovest righteousness and judgment. And to Jerusalem, thy city, return in mercy, and dwell therein as thou hast spoken; rebuild it soon in our days as an everlasting building, and speedily set up therein the throne of David. Blessed art thou, O Lord, who rebuildest Jerusalem." [6] Nor are these the only occasions. Running throughout the liturgical services, like one of the threads of which the pattern is made, is this earnest longing and hope, and this certainty that the day will come in which the hope will be fulfilled.

Equally impressive is the unbroken contact which the Jews of the Dispersion maintained with the land of Palestine, and that not only as a place of pious pilgrimage, but as a continuing center of Jewish life. The Jewish community in Palestine was not always numerous, was from time to time in severe straits of poverty and privation, and on occasions was kept in existence only by the timely charity of their fellow Jews in other lands. Yet the gifts that in return went out from them to the Jews

throughout the world were such that it would be true to say that had they not been given, then Judaism as we know it today would never have been. From Palestine in the grim period after the destruction of Jerusalem came the Mishnah and from Palestine also, some five hundred years later, came the Massoretic text of the Hebrew Scriptures, the sole authority for the Hebrew text until the dramatic discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls in the bloody twilight of the Mandate. The contribution of Tiberias to the development of the Talmud takes second place to the work of the Babylonian scholars of the time, but it has its place in that development. These three things, the *Tanakh* or Old Testament, definitively edited by the Massoretes, the Mishnah and the Talmud, are the foundation and the basis of the Jewish way of life, and if Judaism had no other debt to Palestine than that two of them had taken shape there, the Dispersion would still have had to own that Palestine was their mother.

The Jews in Palestine continued to maintain a precarious existence there throughout the succeeding centuries, surviving the massacres of the Crusades and the fitful intolerance, indifference, and magnanimity of the Muslim rulers. Left to themselves, they would probably have died out altogether or become merged in the surrounding Muslim flood, or have been preserved as a tiny fossil like the Samaritan community of Nablus. That this did not happen was due to the continual flow, irregular but never entirely ceasing, of Jews from other countries. Devout rabbis who wished to spend their final years in prayer and study in the Holy Land, desperate exiles fleeing before some new persecution, great

names like that of Nahmanides, lesser men whose names today are lost for ever—they constitute a fact of history to which the Zionists may rightly call attention. After the expulsion of the Jews from Spain the life of the Jewish community in Galilee was once again vigorous and effective. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, when religious life there was already on the decline, Safad had eighteen talmudic colleges and twenty-one synagogues. Joseph Caro, the author of the authoritative code-book of Jewish conduct, the *Shulhan Arukh,* lived for forty years in Safad, dying there in 1575. Isaac Luria, who through his disciple Haim Vital, a native of Safad, was to have a tremendous effect on the development of Jewish mysticism, came to Safad in 1570, though he was destined to live there for only two more years. These names, though the most important, are not the only ones. During their time, in fact, the Palestinian community was among the most dynamic sections of Jewry.

Historians may be inclined to offer the criticism that the Jewish hold on Palestine in the years between 1325 B.C. and A.D. 70 is less impressive than it normally appears in popular thought. They may well urge that it was not until just before 1000 B.C. that anything like effective control of the country as a whole took place and that it was destined to be spasmodic even after that. Philistia, Moab, and Edom were under Jewish domination only at intervals. The outlying tribes seem to have been swallowed up by the surrounding countries at an early date, Asher by Phoenicia and Reuben by Moab. In truth it was only the Plain of Esdraelon and the hill country of Samaria and Judaea which were firmly in their hands. Their hold over Galilee and Gilead was at times pre-

carious. Furthermore, for over a century and a quarter before 587 all the country outside the pocket-handkerchief state of Judaea was under the Assyrians. When the Jews returned from the exile, it was but to this tiny territory that they came. Indeed the "historic" rule of the Jews over the whole land of Israel is whittled down to a mere three hundred years with a brief resurgence in the greatest days of the Maccabees, so soon to die before the overwhelming power of Rome.

These are admittedly facts of history and it must be confessed that Zionists are inclined to skate somewhat lightly across them. Yet, on the other hand, the enduring continuity of Jewish contact with some part of what they believe to be their historic homeland is seen to be more impressive than it is popularly held to be. It is furthermore a fact that throughout what we may call the "Jewish Period" of 1325 B.C. to A.D. 70 no other power ever held the country with comfort. The constant maneuvering on the part of Rome to find some means of keeping Palestine under effective control is a curious parallel to the almost yearly commissions that came out from the British government for the same purpose. It is this enduring contact of the Jewish people with Palestine, together with the deep-seated religious and emotional ties with the country, which are the strength of the Zionist case. When in the nineteenth century the Jews began to look for somewhere to live in safety, Palestine was the only country which could stir the general interest. Other possibilities were suggested, in view of the persistent refusal of the Sultan to grant a charter to the Jews to settle in Palestine, among them Cyprus and the Sinai Peninsula. In 1903, at the Sixth Zionist Congress, Herzl, the Father

of Modern Zionism, made a determined effort to persuade the Congress to accept the British Government's offer of an autonomous territory under a Jewish Governor in East Africa on the grounds that the desperate pogroms which had broken out in Eastern Europe made an immediate emergency solution essential. It was presented but as a step towards the ultimate goal of Palestine, but the idea aroused the most furious opposition, especially from the Russian delegates, and ultimately came to nothing.

Palestine at that time was inefficiently governed as part of the decaying Turkish Empire. It was backward and underpopulated. The inhabitants were to all intents and purposes confined to the hill-country. Sharon, Esdraelon, and the Huleh Basin were malarial marshes, whose people, such as they were, lived in squalid villages around the edges on the slightly higher ground, riddled with disease and barely maintaining life. It was not until well past the middle of the nineteenth century that even Jerusalem started to extend outside the medieval city walls. It was not surprising that the cry should go up, "The land without people for the people without a land," and that little by little Jewish immigrants should begin to come and settle there. The story of their doing so is indeed a saga and even the strongest anti-Zionist among the Gentiles should not close his eyes to what they achieved and to what they endured. It is now part of the history—the arrival of a mere twenty young Russian Jews, the *Biluim,* in 1882 to found the settlement at Rishon-le-Zion; the disasters which attended these early attempts and the princely munificence of Baron Edmond de Rothschild which kept them going.

Then the Second Aliyah from 1905 onwards, the organization of the armed guards, *Ha-Shomerim,* to protect the settlements, the constant struggles with swamps and malaria, the wrestling with agricultural problems that were so strange to them. Then the First World War and the heroic tale of Sara Aaronsohn and the sudden rush of hope that came with the Balfour Declaration. After the War the establishment of new settlements, often in the teeth of Arab opposition, the defence of Tel Hai, and the grim background of Nazi persecution from 1933 onwards. In 1939 came the icy shock of the White Paper and the Second World War with its horrifying tale of deliberate extermination of the Jews in Europe. There were the desperate odysseys in leaky tubs, the secret landings of immigrant ships, the struggle that was waged even by boys and girls still at school to rescue *from the mouth of the lion two legs or the piece of an ear.* The very fact that they have done these things is now part of their claim. "Who else," they say, "has suffered so much for this country? Can you deny it to us?"

To those who deny the justice of these claims and, as we shall have to examine in a later chapter, there are some strong arguments against them, the Zionists claim further that somewhere to live was essential. Enlightenment had not come with the nineteenth century, and pogroms and persecutions continued. This had become clear to the Zionist leaders from the very beginning, and they had maintained with apparently some truth that no country in Europe could be trusted. Even they, however, had not foreseen the full scale of the Nazi terror and the horror of great darkness that it would entail. As it unfolded in all its unimaginable ghastliness they could

reasonably claim that they had been more than justified in their demands. Millions of Jews were being slaughtered in Europe and the situation was desperate. Time would not allow them to look for other places. Palestine was there. It had been promised to them under the Mandate, and they themselves were prepared to take the responsibility for the immigrants. They would pay for their transport and provide for them upon their arrival. By hook or by crook they would see to it that not one person who sought a place of refuge would become a cost upon any save themselves. This is what they said and this is what they meant, knowing that they had reason to trust the amazing generosity of Jews for Jews throughout the world. It was, therefore, maddening beyond measure to meet with obstruction and downright opposition. Only in Palestine, they felt, could Jews in this crisis of their existence hope to save their lives. It was theirs by common humanity.

To what extent the Zionists looked forward to the establishment of an independent political state from the very beginning is not easy to determine, partly because there has been an undoubted tendency to read back into the past those thoughts which are found to be compelling in the present situation, and partly because the Zionists themselves have spoken with double tongue upon this matter. They have been ready to soothe the fears of those whom Zionism alarmed by saying that what they wanted was somewhere to live and not somewhere to rule, and then have later said that what they had asked for all along and what, in fact, had been promised to them was a land in which they would be masters. The First Zionist Congress at Basle in 1897 adopted the for-

mula "the aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law" and the Sultan was urged to believe that the entry of the Jews into Palestine would serve to strengthen his dominions. Yet at the same time Herzl wrote in his diary for September 3rd, 1897, "The State is already founded in essence, in the will of the people to have a state." [7] The truth is probably that the leaders envisaged a state from the very beginning, but that they felt it politic to gloss over this at times, in view of the fears that this concept aroused among the Gentiles and also among their own people, many of whom were not prepared at that early date to go so far with them. There were probably a very great many among the more moderate Zionists who were ready to accept something less than statehood, if it would bring peace and safety to their people.

These, however, are by now questions of merely historic interest, because the pressure of contemporary events makes even the moderates speak as if they had called with one voice for an autonomous state from the first, so clearly has it proved to them to be the only solution possible. This pressure is the result of the general growth of nationalism throughout the world, which has strongly affected the Zionist movement, both from within and from without. From within it made them share the same pulsating enthusiasm which was causing such a throbbing at the temples in Asia, the Middle East, and many European nations. Here we have to remind ourselves that the Jewish people conceive of Judaism not only as a religion but also as a nationality, and that as the nations among whom they were scattered drank the heady wine of selfhood, so also drank they. It made them

say that they also were a nation and that it was only right that they also should govern themselves. Moreover, it was only safe.

This is where Jewish nationalism is different from almost all the others. Other nations demand the right to govern themselves that they may be free and untrammeled, and that they may decide their own affairs. The Jews alone demand this right that they may live at all. Nationalism has hit them from outside as well. They have seen even the most civilized of nations drunk with what we have called "the heady wine of selfhood" and have seen them, in the words of the prophet, *reel to and fro and be mad.* They have seen this fury turn upon themselves to destroy them and so they no longer feel safe within any nation—or so the Zionists say. For them the only solution is that they shall never again be a minority.

This, in brief, is the Zionist argument to support their claim that the existence of the State of Israel is morally justified. There are those who cannot go all the way with them and who see important weaknesses in their arguments. What they have to say we shall examine later, but for the moment there is little doubt that Zionism does present a challenge to the Christian Church and this challenge, I would suggest, is contained in their existence, in their nature and in the demands that the Zionists make upon their own people outside Israel.

Their very existence is surely a lash for the Christian Church. We may squirm and wriggle as much as we like, but we cannot escape the charge that Zionism would never have been if we had not persecuted the Jews. No one can study the history of the Zionist movement and

remain unconvinced of this. If Herzl had not found himself reporting the Dreyfus Case for the Vienna paper, the *Neue Freie Presse,* and if he had not been faced in carefree Vienna itself with occasional outbursts of anti-Semitic venom, he would possibly have remained an assimilationist to the day of his death. It is a strange fact that the man who was able to write in his diary, "At Basle I founded the Jewish State," became convinced of the need for a Jewish state by no teaching of those who already held such convictions, but by the naked truth of anti-Semitism alone. It is a fact also that the Zionists could make little headway where the Jews were at peace. It was the pogroms and the persecution which convinced the doubters. Century after century has had its discrimination, its bloody massacres, its fantastic accusations, its hysteria. We may forget this tragic story, but the Jews never can. It is their story. Much of the persecution has been done in the name of the Christian faith, and almost all has been done by those who profess and call themselves Christian. And what have we to set against it? Some glorious stories of charity, of mercy to the refugees, of noble protest, it is true; but they are only pages in the whole book. Every discussion with the Zionists is determined by this history. It is a story which they cannot forget and we cannot escape.

Then the Christian is challenged by the nature of the Zionist movement and that in two ways. He must always be challenged by what they have achieved and must question whether the Church today can boast of such a vigorous record. It is folly to minimize the achievement, as so many do, and to pretend that it is less real than it is. It is perfectly true that the honest observer must con-

stantly be sickened by Zionist propaganda which seems bent on proclaiming triumphs that have not occurred and probably does more harm in the end to its own cause than good, but he must also ever be amazed at what has been done. Marshes have been drained and uncultivated land brought under the plough; the State itself has come into being in the face of those who foretold its immediate collapse; Jews from all over the world have been gathered in. Again and again the sober prophets of what was possible have been confounded. Israel is not, in common parlance, "everybody's cup of tea." The visitor may be delighted by what he sees there, or he may well be shocked; he may find much to praise and equally much to blame. Yet, he will not, if he is wise, deny the revolution that has taken place within its borders or refuse respect to those who have done it.

The second way in which the Christian is challenged by the nature of Zionism is simply by what it is. It is an extraordinary mixture. There is so much in it that is noble, so much devotion, so much self-sacrifice and with it so much cynicism, so much real evil. It is, after all, a nationalist movement, and withal a nationalism allied to all the brilliance, the concentrated genius, the science of which the Jewish people are capable. Whatever the Zionists have done they have done with their might. The Jewish State has not had an easy birth. It is only at the cost of much travail that it has come to be at all, and it would not exist today if the Jewish people had not been prepared to pay the cost. As one lived out the troubled years in Palestine amidst all the surging tumult with which the country was so often swept, it was utterly humbling to see the limitless devotion of even ordinary Jews.

There seemed to be no point at which men said, "That is enough. I have given all that can be asked of me." It was not only money that they gave, but labor, life, and love. That 46,000 children should have been transferred from Europe to Palestine between 1933 and the end of 1950 was only one practical result of this devotion and enthusiasm, displayed in the working of the Youth Aliyah Organization. Other examples would not be far to seek. This needs emphasizing because the critics of the Zionist Movement frequently fail to take this side of the movement into account. It is very nearly a truth to say that, whatever else may have marred the Zionist record, it has been almost free of the taint of personal selfishness and self-seeking.

Yet it has been marred. Together with the devotion and selflessness upon which I have just insisted there has been a singular ruthlessness. The use made of the plight of the Jews in Europe showed at times a cold-blooded ruthlessness which was utterly shocking. It must be granted that had it not been for Zionist enthusiasm and courage, many would have died who in fact were saved. It must be granted also that the Zionists passionately fought for the refugees and longed for their deliverance, but they had to be saved in their way. It was intolerable that the hands of those who battered at the gates of the Land of Israel should be weakened by even a minority who should dare to say that they did not want to go there, or perhaps it was intolerable that some people should not want to go there when so many had suffered so much to get them there. The minority were therefore silenced. I am well aware, of course, that this statement has been made in the past by others and that

it has been immediately challenged and denied. I can only bear witness that as my fortune took me about the countries of Western Europe from 1947 to 1949, I became convinced that intimidation was by no means rare.

One saw it also in Palestine. The terrorists were condemned, and yet so was every effort to control the terrorists. Henrietta Szold was rightly praised everywhere for her magnificent efforts with the Youth Aliyah, but even she could get almost no publicity for her work with Judah Magnes to bring about an understanding with the Arabs. Judah Magnes might be the president of the Hebrew University and a saint among men, but when Ben Gurion brought him to a meeting with Musa Alami, it was on condition that he did not open his mouth. Ben Gurion, as his biographer frankly says, despised Magnes.[8] This ugly streak is still there today. There are those in power in Israel—*not,* of course, all of them—who say with Macbeth, "For mine own good all causes must give way." Therefore one has that deliberate, planned violence which has caused the destruction of whole villages on the Arab side of the armistice line, and the inequitable law concerning Arab lands in Israel which shocked even Zionists themselves. And yet, it is these same people who are so really in earnest when they say they wish to make of Israel an example among states and these same people who would willingly give their lives to make their ideals a reality. It is a staggering paradox.

Finally, the Zionist demands upon their fellow-Jews in other countries. This is a great source of perturbation to those Jews in America and elsewhere who are quite happy where they are and do not subscribe to all the Zionist claims. The demand is briefly that all Jews

everywhere have rights of some form in Israel and therefore owe allegiance to that country. It is the working out in political terms of that corporateness which we saw in the last chapter to be a part of Judaism. Immediately after the formation of the State there were those who said that all Jews had rights of citizenship, but in the face of protests from those who feared they might become involved despite themselves in questions of dual nationality this has recently been dropped. Now the tendency is to insist on the duty which they owe to the State. "How can we touch the hearts of those who are happy in the Diaspora?" is the question which is asked, and the sense of this question is that the Jewish people have no right to be happy in exile. Israel is their home. There are, of course, a great many Jews, both in America and elsewhere who would deny these claims, and today the pressing problem of Israel is the drying up of immigration. Mrs. Golda Meir, the present Foreign Minister, addressing 850 young visitors to Israel in 1954, told them "that only they 'could solve the tragic problem of Israel, the first state in the world that needs and cries in vain for Jewish immigration.' She said that for two thousand years the Jewish people had yearned for a homeland, and when that homeland had been paid for with blood and sweat, no Jews were coming. Never in the past did such a thing seem possible, never did we think that we would have to plead with the Diaspora to come." [9] The insistence from Israel is undoubtedly that the State of Israel is the concern, almost the first concern, of Jews throughout the world, and it cannot but have some validity among a people brought up in a Jewish environment.

This claim has, naturally, been discussed again and again in books on Zionism, but its significance for the Christian world has not so often been made clear. It is surely no accident that there exist in the world today two philosophies which demand of their adherents a repudiation of existing national affiliations and a primary allegiance to a power which may reside in a country other than that in which the adherents live. These two philosophies are political Communism and political Zionism. These two philosophies are *not,* of course, the same, and it would be the completest misunderstanding to suggest that because they are coupled together here, they are intended to be equated. Yet they have this in common. They are neither of them Christian and as political movements they both idolize what is less than God. Yet in their different ways they may both have been prepared to be the Rod of God's anger. Political Zionism, like any other activity of man, must one day pay the price which God eternally demands of those who say, "by the strength of my hand and by my wisdom have I done it." Yet till that day Zionism is a witness against us that national sovereignty is a tradition of men and not a commandment of God.

CHAPTER III

The Israeli in the Street

IT IS important to grasp that the Israeli man in the street was probably not born in Israel. The "Sabras," as the native Israelis are colloquially known, are still greatly in the minority and a very large percentage of them are children. By far the greater part of the population are immigrants and most of them have arrived recently, well over half the present population of Israel having come to the country since the establishment of the State in May 1948. They have come from all over the world, from all the European countries, from French North Africa, from Persia, India, China and, of course, from all the countries of the Middle East. They have, alas, brought with them all their ancient prejudices. The Poles dislike the Germans and the Germans despise the Asiatics, and every group, from wherever they come,

have the tendency of nations all over the world *to trust in themselves that they are righteous and despise others.* This fact is often overlooked by commentators, whether friendly or otherwise, on the Israeli scene, but it is an ever-present problem which meets one daily in the café and in the street, and with it there is always the desperate sense of the shortage of time, the fear that at any moment some new trouble may afflict them. There is no time to lose. The nation must be united at once. Israel therefore has been well described as being, not a melting pot, but a pressure-cooker.

The binding together of these diverse elements is one of the most urgent problems in a State which seems at times almost to be made of problems. It is being attacked partly by the tremendous insistence upon the Hebrew language, partly by the common life which is involved in the lengthy military service, and very strongly also through the schools. Israeli children are often accused, and with some justice, of seeming blankly ignorant of anything outside their own frontiers, but it must not be forgotten that children have been pouring into the country from every corner of the globe. They have to be taken care of, taught a common language and welded together into one people, and the whole to be done in inadequate buildings and with insufficient staff. It seems to the teachers, therefore, imperative that, whatever else is not done, the children should be taught Hebrew and be given an understanding of, and an enthusiasm for, the country they have come to live in. Whether the loss is greater than the gain is a question which certainly needs to be asked, but for the moment it is essential to understand that the alternative to unity

in the next generation is too terrifying to consider. For the tensions within Israel are tremendous. In the last elections, for a population of somewhat over a million people, there were thirteen political parties, though there were once as many as twenty-one, and effective government must therefore be the result of a constant struggle to maintain an unnatural coalition between at least three of them. In this sense the failure of the Arab States to make peace is almost a benefit, for it is forcing unity upon a state which is under constant pressure to burst apart. "In political affairs no binding agent can compare with a common enemy." [10]

These strains and stresses are not merely a matter of differing nationalities, but of cracks and cleavages which strike across the community in every direction in which a community can be divided. No generalization about the people of Israel will do. They range from the highly sophisticated, almost over-educated Jews of Western Europe, through the Central and Eastern European groups, to the primitive immigrants from the Yemen, whose presence is causing something of a "color problem" to arise at Tiberias, where the wealthy visitors to the hot springs resent traveling in the same buses with them. There is the small contingent from the United States, reflecting the varied outlooks of that continental country, and there are the Jews of distant China. There are also those who wanted to come and those who came, as it were, despite themselves. Many of the immigrants are only too thankful to have reached the shores of Israel and are prepared to put up with almost anything now that they are there; but others, such as the Jews from India, feel that they have been brought on false pre-

tences. It appears probable that almost the majority of those who have come from Europe to Israel since the end of World War II would very much rather have gone somewhere else, for they feared that they would be exchanging one troubled country for another. At one refugee camp in Europe, out of over 12,000 persons questioned, less than 100 gave Palestine as their country of first preference.[11] It is true that this may have been an extreme case, but that there should have been such a case at all is suggestive. Israel is now having to pay for the pressure that was brought to bear by enthusiastic Zionists upon the confused and unhappy inhabitants of the European camps. Not only have there been the difficulties attendant upon the ingathering of such a number of persons who were in the disturbed psychological state of a refugee camp—that problem they must have known would have had to be faced in Israel—but there is the less immediately obvious problem of the subconscious resistance to assimilation of those who knew all the time that they were choosing Israel as a second best.

There is also often considerable friction between the "Sabras" and the new immigrants, who dislike the assumption of the Sabras that they are in a class apart. Both groups tend to be irritated by the attitude of the others and to make insufficient allowances for them. There is also a tendency of immigrants of longer standing to place the newcomers upon a lower plane since they came because they could not help themselves, whereas the old-timers, or so they feel, came of their own free choice. It is a similar tension to that which one often finds between the volunteers and the conscripts in an army.

Immigration into the country has taken place in a series of waves, or *aliyoth* as they are known in Israel. The First Aliyah at the end of the nineteenth century brought 25,000 and the Second Aliyah before World War I added another 40,000. The Third Aliyah, after the granting of the Mandate, brought some 36,000 and then there was a sudden jump with the Fourth Aliyah to 84,000 of whom more than 62,000 came in the three years 1924-26. The rise of the Nazis occasioned the Fifth Aliyah which produced over 164,000 immigrants in only four years (1933-36). During the war years there was naturally a drop, although over 112,000 came between the beginning of 1940 and the end of the Mandate. But then there was a sudden tidal wave of 300,000 in the first fifteen months of the new state, and over 200,000 in the next fifteen months. One result of this fluctuation of the immigration figures has been that each Aliyah has managed to establish some sort of roots, however insecure, before the arrival of the next one and, by reason of the innate tendency of all human beings to resent even their friends if they threaten their security, has tended to react in some measure against the members of the ensuing Aliyah. Some of these resentments are fortunately past history, but the recurrence of the Aliyoth, constantly increasing in size, has meant that there has always been a section of the population ready to react and another section innocently provoking it. Moreover, the scars of old wounds often remain. One of the most tragic remarks ever made to me was that of a Tiberias woman who had been born into that long-established Jewish community: "In the old days we were friends with the Arabs and now look what our own peo-

ple have made us become!" Another Israeli, an immigrant of long standing, admitted to me that he did not like the new State of Israel because the way of life was so different from that which he had known when he first came. "I must confess," he said, "that secretly I am grieved at every new house I see being built." One of the tragedies of modern Israel is that it is forced by the dynamic of its existence to demand that these Aliyoth continue and thus slash open with ever increasing frequency the wounds which cry out for repose if they are to be healed.

There is a great divergence between the way of life of the different sections of the community. In many ways the *élite* are still the *kibbutzniks,* the members of the communal settlements, who are rightly esteemed by all for their almost unlimited courage and enthusiasm. When one knows something of the hardships that they are prepared to undergo on behalf of the country they so passionately love, one cannot withhold one's admiration. The utterly comfortless little stockades in the Wadi Arabah, for instance, are a rebuke to those who are tempted to sneer at the *kibbutzim* and to minimize the devotion of their members. Yet, in truth, there is more than a little feeling among other people that they are rather too ready to say, *We are they that ought to speak; who is lord over us?* and the city dwellers are sometimes curiously unanxious to be mistaken for them. Yet the city dwellers themselves stir up resentment. "Every Tel-Avivi is a *shvitz* (a conceited bounder)" is a common judgment of those who live in other parts of the country and, indeed, as one moves about the country these criss-crossed lines of tension are

ever obtruding. It is only because they are overshadowed by the greater external tensions with the Arab world that they are being kept in check.

The second problem of the population is the very high proportion of Jews from Asia or the Arab world, whom for convenience we may call Oriental, though they include many who have come from French North-West Africa. These, in fact, form the great mass of those who have come in since the establishment of the State, and because of their relatively much higher rate of natural increase form an ever increasing proportion of the total population. They have already reached the half-way mark. The reasons for their coming are not far to seek. The Nazi slaughter had left but a few Jews in Central Europe (today they form a mere one percent in Germany) and the doors of Russia are closed for the three million who still remain there. The Jews of the Western world had little desire to leave the countries where they were established and happy for the problematic existence within the nascent state. There remained only the Oriental Jews and their situation rendered them more amenable to persuasion. As a result the fantastic situation developed in which people who did not particularly want to come were urged to do so by people who did not particularly want to have them. This is, of course, an oversimplification and requires instant qualification. The Israeli government did want them, because it wanted immigrants desperately and because they, with all the people of Israel, were governed by the desire to rescue every Jewish community from the fate of being a minority in a state which might some day turn hostile. Moreover, the people did want

to come. The life of the Iraqi Jews, by reason of the thrust and counterthrust of Zionist propaganda and Arab distrust and hatred of the Jews, was becoming daily more unsafe; the Yemenites, though not especially troubled by persecution, were moved by the agelong love of Jerusalem; the North Africans were worried by the rumblings of Arab nationalism and the fear of what might happen to them. The coincidence of desire to leave and desire to receive was greatest with the Iraqi Jews, for there the government was pressing the Jews to go within a limited period and said that after a certain date they would not be permitted to leave. In Israel so great was the power of the concept of unlimited immigration that the Israeli government had to promise that the Iraqis would be brought in within the stated time without cutting down the immigration from Europe already planned for. As a result there was a stream of 700 a day into Israel which was a miracle of organization.

Yet, when all is said and done, it was only because of constant pressure and prodding from Zionist spokesmen that so many Jews made up their mind to emigrate, and in French North-West Africa there is a notable lack of enthusiasm which is admitted by the Zionists there themselves. Moreover, in Israel, with all the undeniable passion for unlimited immigration and the sincere desire that all Jews everywhere should be spared the penalties of minority status, the kind of immigrant they got after 1948 would never have been their first choice. The post-mandatory Aliyah, in fact, has doubled the population of the country by adding to it a vast mass of people without skills, without means, without

education, without culture, marked by every feature which the earlier immigrants had held to be characteristic of the Arabs and from which they had claimed to be going to free the country. It is a great challenge to the Zionist movement and it is still an open question whether the last and greatest wave will ultimately prove to have submerged the State. It is difficult for Israeli leaders to refer to this problem openly, lest they seem to be introducing something of a color bar, which would truly be abhorrent to them. But it is this unresolved challenge which causes them to address such urgent appeals to the Diaspora of the West to come to the rescue of Israel in what they have rightly called "this crisis of the State."

The answer to the challenge has to be made now, as Zionist spokesmen have rightly seen, but in a sense the challenge itself has still to be made. These immigrants have come, it is true, and already form more than fifty per cent of the population, but they are still very unvocal. The present danger is that they may harm the vigor of the State by sheer numbers and by their inherited inertia, but they are in no mood to take active measures on their own account, and therefore the *effective population* of Israel may still be said to be that part of it which has come from Europe and the West. This is the third of the problems posed by the Man in the Street because a large proportion of this effective population, and almost the whole of the political leadership, has been drawn from Eastern Europe. Now, it is unfortunately a fact that extraordinarily few people can ever envisage a situation other than that in which they themselves have lived. The attitude of the schoolboy who

says of hazing, "It was done to me and so I don't see why I shouldn't do it to them," is true also in the world at large, and the rare person who says, "It was done to me and therefore it shall not be done to them," is almost as much of an oddity among adults as he is among schoolboys. The importance of this for Israel is that so many of the people—so very many—have grown up in a world where political double-dealing, pogroms, persecution, terrorism, and jobbery have seemed to them to be the normally accepted method of government. It is not surprising, therefore, that these things appear in Israel. It is rather surprising that they do not appear more often. There is at present often a great tension in Israel between the will and the deed. On the one hand there is a compelling desire to be a western state and, not only that, to be a shining example of what that kind of state should be. No consideration of Israel can possibly be just which does not take account of the fact that what we have called the "effective population" sincerely wants the country to be well-governed and to be a happy, united country, living at peace with her neighbors. They earnestly desire a state in which poverty and ignorance have been rooted out and war and violence shall be no more. *Rich men, furnished with ability, living peaceably in their habitations* is the picture they conjure up for themselves; and so strong was this expectation that in the immediate post-mandatory years an absurd and painful situation was created by the closing down of the prisons, apparently in the hope that they would no longer be necessary. The resultant overcrowding in the prisons when this did not prove to be true was a notorious scandal in the early years of the State.

Yet, on the other hand, there is the fact that most of them have not known what it is to feel loyalty to a government and they are struggling to acquire it with difficulty. The black market in Israel during the period of greatest shortages grew to amazing proportions and was used by very nearly every member of the population. So universal was it that the *Jerusalem Post* instituted an enquiry to discover whether it was indeed possible to live in Israel if one did not shop in the black market; and the Mayor of Tel Aviv declared that it was only by making use of the black market that he would be able to carry out the building program of the city and that therefore he proposed to do so.*

The black market is, of course, an excellent thermometer to the loyalty or otherwise of the ordinary person to the government. Just as the apparent tendency of Jewish people in London to make use of the black market had nothing to do with their being Jews, but reflected conditions in the countries from which they had come, so their brethren who emigrated to Israel brought memories of the same conditions with them. There is for this reason a persistent conviction on the part of many in Israel that a government, merely because it is a government, tends to be tyrannical and that its laws may legitimately be evaded and, in

* The danger in quoting the black market is that it may provoke the response from the unthinking, "Ah yes, just like the Jews. Isn't that just what happened in London?" Such a response would be grossly unfair and it perhaps should be countered with the remark of a man who had the handling of a large amount of American money in Israel. He admitted that he had been prejudiced against the Israelis before he went there but that, although he found the Israeli government pitiless in driving a bargain, he was forced to admit that he had never met a government anywhere so scrupulously fair in all its financial dealings.

fact, should be opposed—not, in the orderly British fashion, by "Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition," but by a resistance movement.

It is against this background that the thinking of the ordinary person must be set and against this background it is not surprising that he should be inclined to allow his thoughts to be governed so much more by his emotions than by his brains. The dominant emotion is fear. It can hardly be over-emphasized in any assessment of Israeli thinking, which is often dominated by a feeling that the sands are running out fast. At any moment—or so they think, and the newspapers will never let them forget it—the Arabs may attack again. At any moment a major world war may break out once more. At any moment this or that country may close its doors and the Jews left behind there may be trapped forever. So many Israelis have escaped with the skin of their teeth, so many have lost friends or family in Europe. They cannot forget that these things have happened and that they may happen again. Therefore, every occasion must be seized with both hands and every means of gathering in the exiles be pressed into service. There will be time enough to sort out the problems when they have got all the Jews to Israel. These and similar ideas beat on the Israeli consciousness like waves on the seashore—relentless and insistent. One may like or dislike the Jew and one may be hopeful or sceptical about Israel, but one cannot begin to understand its problems unless one is prepared to get underneath the burden of the fear that Belsen and Dachau may happen again, even before twelve months are out.

Hence their passion for unlimited immigration and

their intolerance of any suggestion that it might not be feasible. Hence their reluctance to condemn the organized attacks by military units on Arab villages across the frontier and, in the past, the growth of such wide-spread terrorism in the last years of the Mandate. The violence which marked the last five years of British rule was a curious feature of Jewish life in Palestine, because, although Zionism has always been characterized by a tendency to violence in some quarters, Jews as a whole are not normally violent people. However, at the time it seemed as if the one lesson which might be drawn from Palestinian history since World War I was the lesson that nothing except violence ever produced results. Secondly, the revelation of the full evil that had happened in Europe encouraged those who felt that it was incumbent upon them to fight for Jewish lives and rights. They varied from the extremists of the Stern Gang to the moderates of the Haganah, but, whichever group they belonged to, they were largely idealists, buoyed up by a strong sense of self-sacrifice and driven by the consciousness of the disasters which seemed to threaten their people. Even those who did not commit acts of violence took part in the whole organization and did things which demanded real courage. The scenes at the trials of the terrorists captured the imagination of the patriots, and even those who thought that the methods were wrong and were deeply troubled by fears of the misery which the Jewish people were bringing on themselves, could not but think such people were heroic and were never ready to hand them over to the tender mercies of the British Government. Almost all the youth of the country took part in some way or an-

other in activities which, from their point of view, demanded skill and daring and which were often not without a strong sense of humor (witness the capture of a British judge in full view of his court), and it is a measure of the normal reluctance of the Jews to use violence that, save for the religious fanatics, so few people should resort to it today. It is, in fact, an odd feature of Palestinian life that both in Israel and in Jordan, despite the persistent violence along the armistice line, public security within the two countries is excellent.

Then there is their enthusiasm. Israel is not a gay country, but there is a drive about it which should compel the respect of even the most prejudiced. It is an enthusiasm for the future, the revolutionary feeling that all time has begun with them. It leads them at times into a curious blindness to the importance of the past and a failure to grasp the personality of the historic country into which they have come,* but also into a readiness for self-sacrifice and denial of creature comforts which is not easily found elsewhere. When one considers the austerities of the life, the overcrowding, the rationing, the shortage of transport that they have endured, the good humor and the friendliness of the people are amazing. It is on the future that they pin their hopes. The past held so much that was dreadful; the present is a time of giving birth, but the future is

* I remember some years ago, during the rationing period, touring Galilee with a bus-load of members of the General Zionist party. Throughout the journey everyone was insistent that no delay should prevent the group from visiting Nazareth, but it was not until we arrived at the town that I understood why. As we drew in to the bus-stop the guide, who until that time had been extremely good, said succinctly, "This is Nazareth. It is possible to buy meat here without points!"

the millennium. The older people are content to admit that they will not see it, but they are determined that their children shall. They themselves have suffered so much and have lost so much that they are ready to deny themselves still further in order that their children shall be denied nothing.

Nevertheless against this one must put perplexity and disillusionment. This is strongest among the highly educated and intellectual German Jews, but it has been increasingly apparent among Israelis of other countries and among the Sabras. They are in a sense, the victims of their own propaganda, which has always been strident and overconfident. During World War II, when Palestine was thronged with British soldiers on leave, the Jews saw in them ambassadors for their cause to the British people, and therefore made every effort to win their approval and favor. These efforts were doomed to lamentable failure because they were so overdone that the soldiers returned pro-Arab almost despite themselves. The same reaction is now beginning to be apparent in the United States. The Jews themselves, of course, were less inclined to be critical of Zionist bombast because so much of what it said they wanted to be true, and yet the more objective among them cannot but be troubled. They had hoped so much. Israel was going to be the perfect state, and now it is so clearly not that they do not know where to turn next. It is a fact that recently the number leaving Israel has at times exceeded the number coming in, and amongst those who remain there is an unhappy questioning as to whether there is a future for them at all. Others, it is true, will tell you that this is not so. On such a matter a personal

impression is the only possible assessment one can make.

Then their thinking is determined by ignorance—ignorance both of the Arabs and of what is being done by their own people in their name. The ignorance of the Arabs on the part of the "effective population" is almost unlimited and extremely frightening.* It is a commonplace to anyone who gives the matter a moment's thought that the continued existence of Israel is dependent upon her relations with the surrounding Arab States. Sooner or later some *modus vivendi* must be reached. This fact is generally recognized in Israel and most people hope it will be "sooner." Yet the ignorance of the ordinary Israeli about even those countries which are immediately next door is appalling. That it is certainly equalled by Arab ignorance about Israel is perfectly true, but that does not excuse the Israelis. There are, indeed, some books published in Hebrew about the Arab States, and many newspaper articles appear purporting to give an account of them. However, there is almost no attempt to understand the Arab point of view or even to admit that they have one, and, as we have already said, the children in school learn quite surprisingly little about them. It is true that people generally

* It may properly be objected that those who were in Palestine in the days of the Mandate must have known the Arabs. Yet this was not always true. It is quite possible to live among a people and not know them, as indeed many white people in the south of the United States contrive to do. Moreover, in Israel there sometimes developed a strange, but deliberate, forgetting of the Mandate, delicately referred to as "the pre-State period." I have even had "Sabras" maintain to me quite seriously, though they knew I was not a recent arrival, that there were no roads in Israel before 1948, or that a big British army camp at Haifa had been built in its entirety by the Israeli government to house the immigrants. One should compare, perhaps, the Muslim tendency to disparage "the days of ignorance" before Muhammed.

agree that they must learn to "get on with" the Arabs, but the idea seems to be very widespread that this would be perfectly easy if only the Arab States would consent to make peace. That there is any deep-seated disharmony between the two peoples is quite beyond their comprehension.

Their failure to understand the Arabs extends also, alas, to the Arabs within their gates. Most of these live at Nazareth and in several villages round about, about 4,000 at Haifa, some at Acre, and another group at Lydda. They are not being absorbed into Israel as they should. Naturally, this is due to a variety of causes. First, the Arabs themselves are not always anxious for it. They resent the domination of the Jews whom they regard as ill-mannered upstarts. They dislike their hustling methods and their free relations between the sexes. They do not really want their children to go to Jewish schools and to learn Hebrew. The Jews on their side have always the fear that the Arabs form a potential fifth column in the event of further fighting, and they cannot bring themselves entirely to trust them.

Nevertheless, the Israelis cannot be entirely absolved of something of a *Herrenvolk* attitude to the Arabs and here, once again, they are suffering from the effects of their own propaganda. They have been maintaining to the world for years that the Arabs are of small account, because it would have exposed the weak side of their own case to admit that the Arabs had a case at all. Moreover, amongst themselves, they have so concentrated on Jewish affairs in their drive to build up Israel that the new immigrants arrive completely unaware of the condition and character of the Jewish people. Some arrive

believing firmly that there are none but Jews in the country. This was true even in the days of the Mandate when the Arabs formed three-quarters of the population, and it remains true today. Newcomers are sometimes so ill-instructed that they are afraid to set foot in an Arab area. Nazareth is depressed and neglected, and its public services lag far behind those of other towns. In part this is certainly due to the lethargy and lack of cooperation of the Nazareth Arabs themselves who are, for instance, much to blame for the failure to provide a more efficient water-supply, but one cannot be blamed for seeing in it also a not entirely conscious satisfaction among the Jews that this should be so. It is undoubtedly flattering to their self-esteem that there should be a difference between the "backward Arabs" and the "progressive Jews," and it is certainly an effective point on which to comment when showing round a group of tourists. However, it is a piece of self-deception they can ill afford, for the Arabs of Nazareth are almost driven into the arms of the Communists, feeling there is no one else left in the world to help them. No Westerner either can afford to be complacent about this situation, dismissing it as the result of characteristic Jewish arrogance, for a few minutes conversation with any group of Arabs on political questions would reveal a bitterness against the West which is like a blow in the face.

The Israelis are ignorant also about what is being done in their name, especially on the Armistice Line. Violence, as we have already seen, is not a normal feature of Jewish life and for this reason the Jewish people

find it difficult to accept the idea that Jews are guilty of it. Moreover, they have a high standard for their country and would hardly condone much of what happens, if they knew of it. So convinced are they of the ideals they hold for the State that it requires a definite effort to believe that their soldiers have descended from the standard set. As a result it is quite possible for an Israeli sincerely to deny the existence of such outrages. This is important to grasp, because so many people cannot credit that the Israeli man in the street is being sincere when he denies them, though the British, in particular, should find it very easy, because they are given to the same weakness. For it is a weakness and a dangerous one. There is violence all along the armistice line and much of it is Jewish, and it is an unhappy fact that the violence which comes from the Israeli side has more of a planned, deliberate nature. Provocation there certainly is—there is no point in denying it—but it is not by these means that peace will be brought to the Israeli people.

Perhaps the picture we have given of the ordinary Israeli may appear to the reader to be overly critical, but he is reminded that this chapter is merely part of the book. With all one's criticism of the Israeli people one must be left also with an extraordinary admiration for them. That there is much that is ugly in Israel cannot be denied. Yet these things are so much the result of circumstances that one has to ask oneself whether, if one were an Israeli, one would not be like them. Indeed, one must wonder whether one would triumph over circumstances as often as they do. Perhaps the real

criticism lies in the fact that Israeli thinking is so much centered on this world, and conceptions which are properly divine have been transferred to the earthly level. They are striving for a temporal goal and putting their trust in an earthly kingdom and yet investing this goal and this kingdom with the heavenly virtues. Zionists and their Gentile supporters hover constantly on the edge of saying that Israel cannot be wrong just because it is Israel and that what would be unworthy in others is transmuted in them because it has been done for Zion's sake. It is a country with a generous heart, and a pulsating life, but very little soul.

There has been left to the end one feature of Israeli life which may well be held to be the most alarming—the sense of claustrophobia. It is entirely understandable, for Israel is a tiny country. At one point near the middle there is a narrow "waist" which is only twelve miles wide, which means that the north and south of the country are joined by an isthmus no broader than the island of Manhattan in the City of New York is long. It is surrounded by certain enemies and possible attackers. It is impossible for the ordinary person ever to get out of it, even for a brief holiday, and the result is an overpowering sense of frustration. I have frequently had to take the train from Haifa to Jerusalem along the line which touches the edge of Jordan near the town of Tulkarm, and when the train has reached that point everyone in the coach has stood up to look out. There is almost nothing to see, for the view there is very restricted, but no one, it seems, can resist that glimpse of another country. It is, one must insist, completely natu-

ral and entirely fitting. Nobody could help feeling shut in. Yet, when all this is said, it is difficult to see how it can go on without leading to an explosion.*

* It so happens that I wrote the final paragraph of this chapter before the fall of 1956, when the explosion did take place. However, I have left it unchanged because the situation itself is in no way altered. This illustrates well the difficulty of the problem. The United Nations were driven to force Israel back behind her frontiers, if they were not to seem to condone aggression, and yet by doing so they were bound to make the same kind of explosion once more probable.

CHAPTER IV

The Religious Background of Muslim Thinking

BEFORE beginning this section, it is necessary to issue a series of warnings. First, we are about to set foot in a foreign world. Already, in the section on the rabbinic method, Christian readers will have found themselves moving somewhat uneasily among thought-forms that are strange to them and now they must be prepared to plunge still more deeply into *terra incognita.* One of the great problems in assessing the Middle Eastern situation is that Muslims, who form the great majority of the population of the Arab world, start from presuppositions so entirely different from those to which Christians are accustomed, and tend to think along lines so peculiarly their own, that communication between the two peoples is rendered at times well nigh impossible. When today the traveller obtains the special permission

necessary and passes across the broken pavement of the Mandelbaum Gate, he moves, not from one half of a city to another, but into a different way of life and a different world of thought. If he is acquainted with *Eothen,* he is irresistibly reminded of the contrast between the two parts of the city of Belgrade so vividly described in that book and there again, he will remember, the difference was between the Western (and therefore the Judaeo-Christian) and the Muslim world. The Arabs have a very strong instinctive feeling that somehow they do not appear to talk the same language as the great powers of the West, whereas the Jews do. They are inclined to ascribe this at times to the diabolical cleverness of the Jews, but all the time they feel at a disadvantage in argument and are therefore frequently unwilling to come to a conference table for fear that they will be outwitted, because they will not entirely understand what is being said. One must notice the same phenomenon among the Russians, who have a similar fear.

Second, it is quite impossible in the space of a chapter in a book of this nature to give in any real sense a picture of Islamic thinking. The best one can do is to pick out certain key ideas which would appear to have helped to determine Muslim peoples' reactions to the events around them and to emphasize, as one does so, that they are personal impressions. Other people might well interpret the Muslim faith differently. It must never be forgotten that the whole Muslim way of life has developed through the course of twelve centuries behind what modern jargon would undoubtedly term a "curtain." The interplay of Muslim and Christian

ideas has been relatively small, the Spanish universities and the Crusades notwithstanding, and therefore any attempt to interpret Muslim thought to the Western world in anything less than a lifetime of patient interchange of ideas is always inadequate.

Third, "Muslim" and "Arab" do not mean the same thing. "Muslim" is correctly used to mean adherents of the religion of Islam, whereas "Arab" describes a national grouping. Thus the Muslim World includes such utterly non-Arab countries as Iran, Pakistan and Indonesia, and within the Arab states there are clear minorities which profess other religions, Christians, Druzes and the rest. In Jordan, for instance, some 10 percent of the population are Christian and in Lebanon only about 50 percent of the people are Muslim. What "Arab" means is a very difficult problem and much unnecessary ink has been wasted over the question of whether the people who were inhabiting Palestine in 1918 were or were not Arabs. Some people have even said that they were so far from being Arabs that the Arab states had no right to urge that the problem had anything to do with them. Now, it is perfectly true that population of the Levant Coast is exceedingly mixed and contains remnants of every group that has ever marched across that narrow bridge between the Desert and the Sea, the true "Arabs" of Arabia being but one group among many, but this is merely one of those academic statements which have so frequently been brought forward to obscure an already complex problem. Politically, others must count as "Arabs" those people who consider themselves to be Arab, and such the Palestinians, in company with the vast mass of the people of the whole Arabian peninsula,

undoubtedly feel themselves to be. Thus, the Christians, almost throughout the Levant, are for the most part definitely Arabs, though they do not accept Islam. It is only certain minority groups, such as the Armenians, who are Christian, the Circassians, who are Muslim, and the Druzes, who have a religion of their own, that do not call themselves Arab.

With these preliminary warnings, therefore, it is now possible to do for the Muslim people as was done for the Jewish people of Israel and suggest certain basic controls. In this case they will be seven: (a) the Idea of God, (b) Predestination, (c) the Person of Muhammed, (d) the Quran, (e) the Conception of Ethics, (f) the Place of Women and (g) the "Millet" System.

THE IDEA OF GOD

The idea of God is paramount in Islam. He is essentially One and the fundamental confession of faith which is shouted aloud over the housetops several times a day is the famous sentence, *La ilah illallah wa Muhammedu rasul Ullah*—there is no God except God Himself and Muhammed is the Apostle of God. This is for Muslims their sole "creed" in the sense of a statement of belief which is known and recited at worship by everyone, and the oneness of God which it proclaims is in the forefront of Muslim thinking. The greatest of all sins, the sin which God will never forgive, is *shirk* or the making of someone equal to God. "Oh my son, join not other gods with God, for the joining gods with God is the great impiety"—(Sura 31:12, Rodwell's translation). This is the basic accusation which the Muslims bring against the

Christians, claiming that they have made Jesus into a god and have sinned against the glory of God in calling Jesus His son. This is mentioned more than once in the Quran, as in Sura 10:69, "They say, 'God hath begotten children.' No! by His glory! He is the self-sufficient. All that is in the Heavens and all that is in the Earth is His. Have ye warranty for that assertion? What! Speak ye of God that which ye know not?" God is almighty, eternal, all-knowing and transcendent, and yet is closer to man than his own neck-vein. It is true that He is regularly described as "merciful and compassionate" and that this description of Him begins every chapter of the Quran and indeed every Muslim document, but this mercy is entirely a matter of God's choice. It is doubtful whether a Muslim would be able really to echo the sentence in the Anglican communion service, "But thou art the same Lord whose property is always to have mercy," because he would consider it impious on his part to ascribe any property to God save that of being eternal. God is considered to be merciful because He always chooses to be merciful and not because it would be a denial of His nature to be anything else. This is an important distinction, since it leaves the door open to the possibility that God may on occasions not be merciful. That He will always be merciful to Muslims is certain, because the Quran is full of such promises and, as we shall see, the Quran is the direct word of God, but it is questionable whether the ordinary Muslim believes that God will *necessarily* be merciful to those pagans who have not heard His name. This question of whether God must of necessity be merciful was much discussed in the early Muslim period when the Mu'tazila protested

strongly against the current doctrine that God could do what He liked, whether it were good or evil, but they were overruled by the orthodox, and the conception of God as the absolute Potentate is today firmly established.

From the fact that God is held to be able to will either good or evil, it follows that He is not held to be "holy" in the sense in which Jews or Christians would use the word. Nevertheless, He does require of man a good life and will normally reward such a life with more joys than it deserves, though wickedness is punished only according to its strict deserts. "Goodness itself and an increase of it for those who do good! Neither blackness nor shame shall cover their faces! These shall be the inmates of Paradise, therein shall they abide for ever. And as for those who have wrought evil, their recompense shall be evil of like degree, and shame shall cover them—no protector shall they have against God." (10:27-8) Of course, there is really no sense in which man can be said to have "deserved" the rewards. He can only submit to God and, indeed, the word "Muslim" means one who has submitted.

Muslims are normally much more conscious of God than Westerners are, and this appears very much in their daily conversation. Devout visitors from the West are often shocked by the frequency with which God is mentioned in connection with the most trivial matters and have been known to reprove children for calling on God while playing in the street, but in this they misunderstand the extent to which God is a living reality to the Muslim. Every action is done "in the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate," and at a feast one constantly hears a person say after he has eaten some par-

ticularly delightful morsel, *El-hamdu lillah*—thanks be to God! The story of some wonderful sight that a man has seen will be greeted by his hearers with the words, *Allahu akbar!*—God is great!—and the common expression for hoping that one will be able to do something is *insha-allah* (if God wills).

PREDESTINATION

It follows that the will of such a God is absolute, and it is therefore impossible for a Muslim to talk about doing or not doing the will of God. He believes that everything has been predestined and that everything is, as he would put it, *min Allah* (from God). Everything in his view has been fixed from the beginning of time, and all a man's life has been determined before he was born. This belief is extraordinarily strong and is constantly coming to the fore in daily affairs. Thus a schoolboy who receives a low grade for some piece of work may well ask his teacher, "Why did you give me this grade? I wrote what I had to." By this he would mean, not that he had written what he had been told to write by the teacher, but what it had been ordained that he should write on that occasion. Similarly, the driver of a car will feel that care taken in going round a corner is in a sense wasted because it is entirely according to the predestined will of God whether or not there will be an accident at that particular corner at that particular time. Western Christians are apt to become incensed by this attitude, partly because they do not share it and partly because they do not really understand it. Consequently, when a European employer asks someone in his business, "Can you be

sure to have this report ready for me by tomorrow morning at the latest?" and receives the answer, *Insha-allah!*, he is tempted to think that the other person is being either lazy or impertinent, whereas the answer really means, "I will do my best to have it ready for you and shall have it ready, if it is according to the will of God." This does not mean that this idea is consciously to the forefront of a Muslim's mind on every occasion, but it is very definitely part of the background of his thinking.

On the one hand, there is no doubt, this has produced what we should consider an undesirable apathy towards removable ills, since there is a feeling that it is useless to try to improve upon what God has ordained. Hence the general failure to do anything about the refugees, which the West finds so incomprehensible, but hence also the fact that the refugees have not themselves deteriorated morally and mentally at anything like the same rate as refugees in Europe. They are used to thinking of their fate as being "from God," and so they have very much less sense of frustration at their present misery, though it must be admitted that they do not cease to be very vocal in blaming those whom they consider to be the authors of it. It would help also perhaps to explain that extreme attitude which says that nothing should be done about the refugees on the ground that it is better for them to die in the caves if they cannot return to their own lands. It would help to explain this attitude, but it cannot surely condone it.

The Muslims, like all other people who have ever held the doctrine of predestination, depart from it at times. The schoolboy who was mentioned above may feel that he himself was predestined to write that particular essay,

but he will seldom agree that the master is predestined to give him a low grade. The refugees, as we have just seen, are extremely bitter against those whom they consider to be the cause of their distress. Partly, it would seem that in some vague way they feel that those who do not accept the concept of predestination have in fact some measure of choice, though they would probably deny this idea if it was put to them in so many words. After all, the Quran makes it very clear that those who are outside the Islamic fold are to be punished severely for their unbelief. Partly also they cannot help themselves, not because they are caught in the grip of an immutable fate, but because they are no less human than the rest of mankind and it is natural for them to be angry and put the blame on others. Yet, when this qualification has been made, it remains true that, whatever they may think about others, they feel themselves to be predestined to suffer what they do and to take the actions that they do and, though they may blame other people for their actions, they do not normally bear malice. Their resentment at the faults of others is tempered by the feeling that all things are "from God," and so they do not keep their anger for ever. It is possible that here we have some part of the explanation of the same absence of "frightfulness" among the Arabs, which we have already noticed among the Israelis. In some measure Muslims undoubtedly feel that they must be merciful because God is merciful, but also they feel that a man should not be cruel to those who are, after all, doing only what they are destined to do. Thus among Muslims one may find neglect of prisoners and others, it is true, but very, very seldom wanton cruelty. Blood feuds seem to

stand somewhat outside this generalization, but in normal human relations this readiness to forget the things which caused them to be angry is one of the pleasant Muslim characteristics.

It may be that the strong conception of the authority of God and the belief in predestination have hindered the Muslims from accepting the Western interpretation of democracy, which certainly does not seem to find a comfortable home among them. Despite its long continued contact with the West, Egypt has reverted to military rule, which is the tendency also in Syria; Iraq, despite the forms of democratic government, displays instead the benevolent autocracy of Nuri es-Sa'id; in Jordan it is too early to say whether the wise paternalism of King Abdullah has been securely replaced by parliamentary government or not. Only in Lebanon, with its fifty percent Christian population, is there little sign of autocratic control.

THE PERSON OF MUHAMMED

Muhammed lived in the seventh century and the date from which Muslims count their calendar is 622, the year in which Muhammed accepted the invitation to go to Medina. He was an Arab from Mecca and the Quran was written in Arabic. These facts have had some very important effects on subsequent Muslim thinking.

Muhammed himself is revered as the last and greatest of the prophets, the man to whom the supreme revelation was made, and as an example of daily life. Although he is regarded as having been sinless himself and therefore as a person whose lightest words and actions must

set the standard for all later Muslim behavior, he is in no sense worshipped as Christians worship Jesus. For the Muslim the evidence for what the Prophet said and did does not normally come from the Quran, since he does not consider the Quran to be the words of Muhammed but the words of God Himself, Muhammed being the chosen instrument for the revelation. This is made clear in Sura 10 where it says, "But when our clear signs are recited to them, they who look not forward to meet Us, say, 'Bring a different Quran from this or make some change in it.' SAY: It is not for me to change it as mine own soul prompteth. I follow only what is revealed to me: verily, I fear, if I rebel against my Lord, the punishment of a great day." (10:16) And later in the same Sura, "Moreover this Quran could not have been devised by any but God: but it confirmeth what was revealed before it, and is a clearing up of the Scriptures—there is no doubt thereof—from the Lord of all creatures. Do they say, 'He hath devised it himself?' SAY: Then bring a Sura like it; and call on whom ye can beside God, if ye speak truth." (10:38-9)

Instead, there has developed the great collection of *hadīth* or traditions. That these have been possible is due to the fact that Islam was a "successful" religion from immediately after the death of its founder, and there ensued no long centuries of secret growth amidst persecution and martyrdom. Consequently, when, as was inevitable, people began to enquire about what the Prophet did on this or that occasion, it was possible openly to make most searching enquiries. As a result there grew up the *hadīth,* each one being a statement

about what the Prophet did or said in some particular instance and supported by its *isnād* or chain of authorities. According to whether the Muslims felt they had reason to trust the authorities or no, the traditions were grouped into *sahih* (sound), *hasan* (good), and *dha'if* (weak). It is admitted that there were a very large number of forgeries by people who wished to strengthen their arguments for their own ideas and it was for this reason that the traditions were sorted and classified. The earliest authoritative collection, which was made by Al-Bukhari in the middle of the ninth century, contains about 2750 "sound" traditions, but Al-Bukhari's biographer says that in making the collection he examined no less than 600,000. This collection, which is called *As-Ṣahīh,* remains today a standard work setting out how a true Muslim should live.

The fact that Muhammed lived in the seventh century means that Islam is the last of the great religions and claims to have succeeded both Judaism and Christianity. Muhammed accepted the Old Testament prophets and certain New Testament figures also, Jesus being the greatest of the prophets before himself, but the Quran accuses both the Jews and the Christians of having deserted the revelation given them by God. Therefore, for a Muslim to accept Christianity is—in Muslim eyes —a retrograde step, and for this reason their whole conception of religious freedom is different. They think that all men are born Muslim or Christian or Jew or Pagan according to the will of God and are surprised to be told that Christians hold that no one is ever born a Christian, and that those who are Christians today have all

become so at their baptism. Freedom of religion is therefore the right to practice one's religion without interference, and for a Muslim "interference" would include the interference of those who urge others to change their religion. That a man might, by the mercy of God, make the step forward of accepting Islam is always within God's providence, but that a Muslim should accept Christianity is wrong, retrograde and ridiculous. Missions to Islam have not unaptly been described as "the proudest man on earth being offered the thing that he hates by the man he despises."

Muhammed was an Arab who had himself led the armies in the battles of Badr and Uhud, and he is therefore a great national hero as well as a religious leader. The Quran was given to the Arabs and for their benefit in the Arabic language, as is made clear more than once in the Quran itself e.g. "An Arabic Koran have we sent it down, that ye might understand it" (12:2) and again "Now have we set before man in this Koran every kind of parable for their warning: An Arabic Koran, free from tortuous wording, to the intent that they may fear God" (80:28-9). It has set the standard for all Arabic literature, and to this day the quality of a speech in Arabic is judged by how near it is to the language of the Quran, almost more importance being attached at times to the purity of the classical language, from which the spoken language has diverged considerably, than to the ideas it contains. I have myself heard people say in all seriousness, "A very poor speech. I could understand every word of it." This has given rise to the conception that the Arabs are the Muslims *par excellence* and that

Islam is the national religion of the Arabs. Therefore, it is felt in a very real sense by many that it is disloyal and unpatriotic of an Arab to be anything else than a Muslim.

THE QURAN

The Quran is held to be the Word of God, transmitted directly from God Himself to the Prophet by the agency of the "faithful spirit," who is usually identified with the archangel Gabriel. It is regarded as having existed from all eternity with God and as having been delivered by God to His Prophet for men to read. It is pure and whole and perfect. No letter in it may be altered. It may not properly be translated, because the fact that it is in Arabic is part of its God-given nature which it would be impious to attempt to alter. All this, of course, involves the Muslim in a fundamentalism more thoroughgoing than any normal Christian fundamentalist's attitude to the Bible, and has involved him also in a sharp cut division between religion and science. The normal Muslim in the Middle East today finds it incomprehensible that a man should be both a scientist and a sincerely religious man. It is true that in the movement associated with the name of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the University of Aligarh in Pakistan one has seen a vigorous attempt to break down this division and to maintain the argument that if Islam is true, then there can be no contradiction between it and science; but these ideas are not as yet part of the consciousness of the man in the street in Jordan or Syria, or even in Egypt.

It is perhaps important to stress the place which both Muhammed and the Quran have in Muslim thinking. The slightest questioning of either is felt to be a blow at the very foundations of the Faith.

THE CONCEPTION OF ETHICS

This is not specifically worked out in the Quran, though, especially in the Suras revealed at Medina, there are many sections in it which deal with ethical questions, but during the early centuries of Muslim history there was a long period during which the theologians and jurists developed the Islamic ethical system by means of a careful study of both the Quran and the *hadīth.* It was because there are so many parts of daily activity that are not touched on in the Quran that such importance was attached to what the Prophet had said or done which might be held to throw light on the duty of his followers upon similar occasions, and that so much care was taken to eliminate the effects of those whose misguided enthusiasm for their ethical theories had led them to invent *hadīth,* or perhaps innocently to repeat *hadīth* based upon very poor authority.

The fundamental conception of Muslim ethics is that it sets limits on either side of what men may legitimately be allowed either to do or to leave undone, and these limits are determined by examining what the Prophet had advised or commanded should be done or not done, or had shown by his example was desirable. It is held as axiomatic that the actions of the Prophet can be taken as a certain guide because it is inconceivable that he would have ever done wrong. Thus, there are a large

number of neutral actions which are neither specifically encouraged or specifically forbidden, but on either side of these actions there are others which are held to be desirable and those which are undesirable. Beyond these again are the actions which are definitely commanded as obligatory upon all Muslims and those which are absolutely forbidden.

Such an approach lays great stress upon actions and very little upon intention, and indeed the Muslim would not ordinarily make much of a distinction between morals, ethics, and law. Thus, murder is a forbidden action but anger is not. The contrast with the ideas of the Sermon on the Mount is immediately obvious. It has also led to the laying of small emphasis upon what can be considered relatively abstract ideas, such as that of truth. One must, of course, tell the truth upon oath, but in normal daily life truth is merely desirable. In fact it is often seriously held that it is better to say what is agreeable to the hearer than to tell him the truth, if it should be unpleasant. This pervades all daily intercourse and leads, on the one hand, to that singular courtesy which is so characteristic of the Muslim and which adds considerable charm to human relationships in the Middle East, and, the other hand, to occasional confusion when the foreigner has not grasped this principle. It follows that Muslims do not necessarily share the American enthusiasm for "moral values" in international affairs, nor would they agree that there are certain ethical standards common to all religions.

It is possible also that we have here the basis for a point of view which has been expressed to me in conversation, to the effect that international treaties are mat-

ters of convenience and not absolutely binding. More than one of my Arab friends has maintained that especially the weaker party to a contract is quite justified in breaking it, if it should prove irksome.

THE PLACE OF WOMEN

This is rather a sore point with educated Muslims of today because they tend to resent the suggestion that Islam is inferior to other religions in anything, as indeed it is quite natural that they should, and yet to have a certain sneaking suspicion that perhaps the common Muslim attitude to women might be improved. The Quran pays considerable attention to the question of women, and is quite unequivocal about the inferiority of women to men and the rights which husbands have over their wives: "Men are superior to women on account of the qualities with which God hath gifted the one above the other, and on account of the outlay they make from their substance for them. Virtuous women are obedient, careful, during the husband's absence, because God hath of them been careful. But chide those for whose refractoriness ye have cause to fear; remove them into beds apart, and scourge them. But if they are obedient to you, then seek not occasion against them: verily, God is high, great!" (4:38) Women are entitled to only half the inheritance of men: "With regard to your children, God commandeth you to give the male the portion of two females." Moreover, a husband can divorce his wife for any reason at all, but a woman can never divorce her husband, nor can she obtain a legal separation from him. According to one school of law even a divorce uttered in jest is binding. It

must be admitted immediately, however, that all the countries of the Levant have introduced legislation designed to protect the wife and limit the powers of the husband, as, for instance, the new Jordan Law of Family Rights of 1951 which has very considerably improved the woman's lot, and it is safe to predict that this tendency will certainly continue.

Nevertheless, it remains true that the general attitude of the people is still that women are inferior to men and the effect of this is to be seen in daily life in a number of ways. It is notable that the educational provisions for girls lag very much behind those for boys; and where the finances of a family are limited, they will be used for the advantage of the sons and not for the daughters.

THE "MILLET" SYSTEM *

In some measure this owes its validity to the belief that all men are by the immutable will of God born Muslims or Christians or Jews or Pagans and for this belief there is definite support in the Quran: "Had thy Lord pleased he would have made mankind of one religion: but those only to whom thy Lord hath granted his mercy will cease to differ. And unto this hath he created them" (11:120) and, "But if thy Lord had pleased, verily all who are in the earth would have believed together. What! wilt thou compel men to become believers? No soul can believe but by the permission of God" (10:109) and again, "The

* It has been objected to me that historically the Muslims cannot be held responsible for the "millet" system. This may be so, but there is no doubt that it accords extremely well with the Muslim concept of the place of other religions.

East and the West are God's. He guideth whom he will into the right path" (2:6). This has involved the Muslim in the conception that there are definite and distinct groups, and that it is only just to give each group different rights within the state, according to the numbers of the group. Since, at any rate until very recently, it has been accepted that the law of the State is the law of Islam, it is recognized that in certain matters the other religious groups must be allowed to have their own laws. They cannot, for instance, be expected to keep the Fast of Ramadhan, though until lately non-Muslims in certain countries have been restrained from breaking the fast publicly, lest they tempt Muslims to do the same. For this reason each religious group has its own religious courts to deal with those matters that can rightly be regarded as outside the jurisdiction of Islam. There is, for example, no general law about divorce or marriage or the number of wives that a man may take. Where there is parliamentary government, as in all the Levant states today, each group has its own members of parliament according to the numerical strength of the group. It is therefore arranged that there shall always be so many Christian members of parliament and so many Christian ministers in the cabinet.

This conception is exceedingly strong and no Western government has ever changed it. Even in Israel it persists, with the result that those whom the government does not recognize as a "millet," such as the Hebrew Christians, are in a difficult position, because there is no civil marriage and yet marriages performed by a minister of their own community are not recognized by the State.

It has to be grasped that from the Muslim point of view the "millet" system is an extraordinarily generous one, because it guarantees very definite rights to what they cannot but regard as unenlightened and inferior minorities. A faithful Muslim can consider Christians and Jews only as second-class citizens of a state where Islam is the official religion, since the Quran very clearly rejects the Jewish and the Christian interpretations and insists that the supreme revelation of the Law of God is the Quran itself. Consequently, to grant rights at all within Islam to non-Muslim minorities is rather an act of mercy than an act of justice. It would sit ill on a Western Christian to accuse the Muslim of intolerance in this because, after all, the Western conception of tolerance is a very new one and it was not very long ago that Jews in Britain were permitted neither to become members of Parliament, nor to attend the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. In the Middle East the Christians are both riled by the system and also quite determined that it shall continue. In every Middle Eastern Muslim country where Christians exist today in any numbers they have by far the highest percentage of well-educated people and so they are frustrated by the limitations that the "millet" system places on highly qualified persons who are not Muslim, but they fear that if the system comes to an end they will lose any chance of preferment at all.

The "millet" mentality has had one unfortunate effect in that it has tended to make of nepotism a "desirable thing" in Muslim countries. When a man is confined within his own group to the extent that this is true in the Middle East, it follows that he will get promotion only through a member of his own group and that, if he

does get promotion, it then becomes his duty to assist the other members of his group in their turn, whether it be the family or the religious group. It must be admitted that this is unsatisfactory in its results since an employer is constantly pressed to assist a person because he is a Christian, or because the employer knows his family, rather than because he is necessarily a good person for the job. However, before one condemns this attitude out of hand, it is worth while considering whether there is not more than a trace of this attitude in the West—in countries, for instance, where if a member of parliament dies, his party have the right to nominate someone else, or where chairmanship of committees is determined by political affiliation or where education at a particular school gives a man the entrée to political position.

Before leaving Islam there is one characteristic that should be noticed and that is its dignity. No visitor to a mosque can fail to be impressed by the simplicity and cleanliness and the atmosphere of quiet reverence. The Haram esh-Sharīf at Jerusalem and the Great Mosque of Damascus are both places of breath-taking loveliness, but there is more to them than that. There are the schoolboys in quiet study in an alcove and the groups of older men in dignified discussion, and at the times of prayer there are the rows of the faithful "meekly kneeling upon [their] knees." Both the Sabbath Zealots across the armistice line and the unseemly disputes about the Holy Places are put to shame by the orderliness of Islam.

Finally, it must be emphasized that in this survey we have only scratched the surface. The Fast of Ramadhan has been mentioned only in passing and the Pilgrimage and almsgiving not at all. A vast number of other topics

also, without which a picture of Islam must be unbalanced, have been left quite untouched. The reader has had certain ideas only thrown in front of him in the hope that they may be of some help in understanding the Arab reaction to current events. To take them as more than that would be to get a false impression.

CHAPTER V

Arab Arguments

IT MAY well have been felt by those who espouse the Zionist cause that though the Jewish case had been presented convincingly, it had then been destroyed by the subsequent arguments and that what had been given with the right hand had been taken away with the left. It will have to be the same with the Arab arguments. The justification for this is that all political thinking and action is essentially human, and that it is therefore the same extraordinary mixture of good and evil that we find in all man's affairs. Any objective study should take account of this. An account of any political activity which presents it as entirely good or entirely bad is partisan and therefore to be distrusted. It is necessary to make this warning, because people on both sides of the armistice line resent their case being presented in any other manner than as flawless and they tend to think that if a

writer notices any weaknesses in their arguments, it can be explained only by saying that he is against them.

Now, the Arab case is even simpler than the Jewish. The Arabs maintain with perfect truth that they had been living in the country at the time of the first start of the Zionist Movement and that in 1919 they still formed some 93 percent of the population. They say that no one ever asked them whether they wanted to accept the Jews or not and that, whenever they got the chance to do so, they made it very clear that they did not accept them. They argue that Palestine was promised to them by the British, though they do not really accept Britain's right to promise it to anyone, before it was promised to the Jews. They claim they never accepted the right of the League of Nations to impose a Mandate and that the Mandate which was imposed was a violation of the principles of self-determination which were supposed to be paramount at that time. They point out that they never acquiesced in the right of the twenty-five commissions which visited the country in the course of the next thirty years to investigate the question and that they made this clear by refusing to give evidence before them. They say that they never admitted the authority of the United Nations to partition the country and that the result of this partition has been the disaster of very nearly a million Arab refugees. In response to those who tell them that they ought to have accepted the decisions of the League of Nations and the United Nations in the interests of international peace, they reply that no other people would have done so in their position. They argue that if it is to the glory of the Jews that they always resisted foreign domination when they lived in Palestine,

then the Arabs can hardly be denied the right to take the same line now.

That is their case in a nutshell. They feel that they have been betrayed and deceived by the West again and again, and that promises made by the British and French and Americans are a mockery. The Mandate was, in their view, "invalid and impracticable" [12]—an offense against both justice and ordinary common sense. They claim that the existence of the State of Israel can be justified upon no grounds at all, save those of expediency, and even then only by expediency at their expense.

In view of the fervor and conviction with which these views are held by the Arabs, it is necessary to examine the extent to which they are justified by fact. That the inhabitants of Palestine up to the end of the First World War were almost entirely people who must be considered politically to be Arabs, whatever their racial origins may have been, is undeniable. They felt themselves to be one with the people of the plateau east of the Jordan, of Syria and of Lebanon, and not the least irksome of their grievances at the establishment of the mandates was the fact that whereas in the past a man from Jerusalem could travel freely to visit his cousin who lived in Beirut, he now had all the problems of obtaining a passport and crossing a frontier. These Arabs of the Levant Coast had, in the years immediately preceding the war, become conscious of themselves as a people and were not unaware of the claims that had been made by the Allied Powers that those nations that had been under the heel of Turkey would be granted the right to determine their own future. The Palestinian Arabs therefore found

it doubly galling to be placed under a mandate and to find that in the Mandate they were nowhere referred to by name, although the Jews were. Throughout that document the Arabs are always spoken of as the "existing non-Jewish communities" or the "other sections of the population." They have some support then for their feeling that in the years immediately after the war their views had been passed over. This document was in striking contrast to the message from King George V which was issued on July 7, 1920. This was addressed to the "people of Palestine" who are spoken of as having been under the domination of the Turks and who are specifically distinguished from the "Jewish People," who are to be allowed the "gradual establishment in Palestine of a National Home" which shall not be allowed to affect their civil or religious rights or diminish their prosperity.

Their claim that the country was promised to the Arabs is based upon the correspondence between Sheikh Hussein and Sir Henry MacMahon during the years 1915 and 1916. Unfortunately, this is as vague as the Balfour Declaration and two diametrically opposite interpretations have been placed upon it. Sheikh Hussein had asked for British recognition of the independence of the Arab countries which included all those countries which are known to the Arabs as *Jeziret el-Arab,* the Arab Island, everything in fact between the present countries of Turkey, Iran and Egypt. MacMahon had at first tried to postpone defining the boundaries, but then told the Sheikh that the British Government had accepted the limits suggested subject to the following modification: "The two districts of Mersina and Alexan-

dretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded." [13] The Sheikh accepted this with the reservation that they would raise the question of the districts west of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo again after the war. Early in 1916 the British agreed to this. The British subsequently claimed that the districts excepted included what later became the country of Palestine and it is difficult to determine at this late date whether they had actually intended this to be so or no, though it is almost incredible that they should have been so vague if this had actually been their intention at the time. However, whether it had been intended by the British or no, it is quite certain that the Arabs never understood it to have any such meaning and they have every justification for claiming that it is only by a great stretching of the language that Palestine could be described as "west of Damascus." Thus the Palestinian Mandate began with the Arabs as firmly and justifiably convinced that the country had been promised to them as were the Jews.

Whether or not the Arabs were justified in their refusal to give evidence before the various commissions depends upon whether the commissions themselves had the right to make the inquiries. From the British point of view, of course, they had. The British felt that they had in fact been granted the Mandate to govern the country and it was their job to find out the reasons for the troubles with which it was beset and do their best to prevent the outbreak of similar troubles in the future. Yet it is impossible not to sympathize with the Arabs in

their arguments. No people can be expected to welcome the interference of an outside power in what they regard as their own affairs and especially when they feel that the purpose of the commissions is to further the interests of a people other than themselves. In that they almost certainly misinterpreted the intention of the commissions, but the fact that the British Government constantly found itself unable to carry out the proposals of the commissions only served to strengthen the Arab resolve to have nothing at all to do with them.

It is certainly easy to sympathize with the Arabs in this attitude, but it must be very much questioned whether it was wise. It was the one chance the Arabs had of seeing to it that their case was heard and they passed it over, with the result that it never dawned upon the general British public that the Arabs had a case at all until a bloody period of rebellion, which caused much suffering to the Arabs themselves, forced it upon their notice. By this time the rise of Hitler in Germany had made it infinitely more difficult to arrest immigration.

There seems little point in spending much time upon the question of whether the Arabs were the aggressors in 1948, except that it is an accusation which the Arabs themselves resent bitterly. Anyone who lived in Palestine during the last five years of the Mandate and had the good fortune to be intimate with both Arabs and Jews could not but be aware that both sides had every intention of fighting, *if necessary*. The Jewish preparations, as one might expect of them, were better organized, more thorough and more efficient, and had been going on for a longer time than those of the Arabs, who do not normally exhibit efficiency as one of their virtues.

For some time it had become apparent that arms were being collected by the Jews, particularly in the *kibbutzim,* and that the frequent youth group picnics which were reported as having been marred by the death or injury of some schoolboy who had picked up an unexploded bomb, left there by some previous wartime military exercise, were really disguised training for "the Day" and that the accident occurred in the course of that training. There were very few schoolboys and schoolgirls who were not members of either the Haganah or the Irgun Zwei Leumi. The Arabs were not unaware of this themselves, but their own preparations remained in the realm of talk until the United Nations decision roused them to action. As it was, the decision was one which gave the Jews at least one major point which they had been demanding—their own State, though the State was not as large as they could have hoped, but the Arabs felt that the independence that they were offered was but empty if half their number were to remain under foreign rule. In view of the passionate attachment of the Arabs to their land, any suggestion of transfer of population had no meaning for them.

In the event, therefore, the Jews have the advantage of being able to appear as accepting the arbitrament of the United Nations, while the Arabs must appear as having rejected it, which they certainly did. However, had the decision been such that the Jews had been given a mere token state because the Commission had been unwilling to place Arabs under Jewish government, it is inconceivable that they would have accepted it. In the mood in which they then were they would certainly have

felt justified in rejecting the decision and resorting to arms.

The supporters of Israel undoubtedly have a point, however, when they say that the aggression really rests in the fact that it was not only the Palestinian Arabs who fought, but the surrounding Arab States, who were therefore invading a territory that was not theirs. From the Jewish point of view, therefore, it is quite justifiable for them to speak, as they regularly do, of the "Arab invasion" of May 1948. Yet, it is important to grasp that the Arabs look at the matter entirely differently. They feel that it is just as reasonable for the Palestinian Arabs to ask the help of the other Arab states as it is for Israel to expect to have the advantage of the so-called "Jewish vote" in the United States. They cannot conceive of a question of "invasion" being in any way involved because, as they see it, the Jewish State was not yet in existence and the provisional government which was planning to take over there certainly did not have the support of some half of the population, who were Arabs and who had no desire at all to be divided from the Arabs on the other side of the intended frontier.

The extent to which the Jews are responsible for the creation of the refugee problem, as the Arabs claim, is a very difficult point to determine. In one sense part of the blame must be laid at the door of neither of them, but ascribed to the British, who left Palestine in such confusion that the Arabs had no authority in the country to whom they could look and were, therefore, much more easily susceptible to panic than they might otherwise have been. In all the tragic history of the thirty years of

British mandatory rule nothing became them so little as their leaving of it. It is certainly false to picture the years between 1918 and 1948 as being years of misgovernment or tyranny, as many have tried to do, but it is, alas, true that the government failed to perform the most important function of government—to keep order—and that at the end the British in Palestine seemed to have got themselves into that state of mind which is so sick and tired of worry and trouble that it does not care what happens so long as they themselves can get out. It is at least possible that the assignment was an impossible one and that the frustration was entirely natural, but it is difficult to view it from the Arab point of view as anything else but a betrayal.

Then the Arabs themselves are not innocent of blame. The Arab leaders certainly misjudged the probable course of the war, which they foresaw themselves as winning in a few weeks at the most, and the advice of some of them to the Arab villagers to get out of the way of the fighting in the certain hope that they would shortly be able to return to a country purged of Jewish domination proved to be disastrous as events turned out. Moreover, the more wealthy Palestinian Arabs had set a bad example by leaving the country for Egypt or Lebanon when it first became apparent that war was certain and this itself had a very unsettling effect on the others.

Yet it is a mistake to pretend, as some have done, that the present refugee problem is entirely the result of Arab folly and unnecessary panic. The panic ultimately had its basis in what the Arabs knew a certain section of the Jewish people to be doing. Acts of terrorism against the government were constant and frightening, and the

Arabs feared that when the government had gone these terrorists would turn against them, since they obviously stood in the way of what the terrorists wanted. These fears appeared to the Arabs to have every justification when they heard stories of brutality, of which the massacre of 200 Arabs at Deir Yasin on April 9, 1948, was the most ferocious and the most widely known. It must be granted that when the new Jewish government began to get control of the terrorists, about whom it had at first a certain hesitancy, it put a stop to such uncontrolled ferocity; but it remains true that even at a later date the Israeli army deliberately turned out the Arabs from certain areas, such as parts of Galilee, where their presence seemed a threat to Israeli security, and caused them to join the dismal trek to those regions which the Arabs still controlled. It is also true that very early in the State's existence the villages which the Arabs had once occupied were laid flat with the ground, so that today throughout the country only ruins proclaim what once were habitations.

The Arabs are not unconscious, of course, of the argument that the Jews made use of otherwise unproductive land, such as the swamps of the Huleh Basin, that the coming of the Jews meant a rise in the standard of living for the Arabs and that the land was bought and paid for by the Jews, often at high prices, from the Arabs themselves. Their answer to this is that they were never given a chance. For six hundred years they had been under a corrupt and inefficient imperial Turkish government. They had been encouraged to fight for their freedom in World War I and had, in fact, done so as far as they were able. They rightly point out that they suffered greatly

at the hands of the Turks because of their sympathy for the Allied cause. At the end of the war schools were just beginning to grow up and it would clearly take time to build up a population which would be capable of improving the country. This, they felt, was an argument for giving them the time and not for comparing them unfavorably with those who had all the experience of Europe behind them.

They may admit the improved standard of living, though they would probably argue about the extent to which it was due to the advent of the Jews. The question of what would have happened if something else had not happened is always difficult to determine, though it cannot be denied (and I have seldom found Palestinian Arabs disagreeing) that the shock of the Jewish influx certainly stimulated the local pupulation to more rapid development that might have happened naturally. However, whether Jewish agricultural methods are always an improvement is a matter which many have disputed. On the one hand one has to admit the natural conservatism of all farming communities, which may indeed be rather greater among the Arabs than it is elsewhere. One has to admit, also, the fact that the long-established inhabitants of a country are less challenged by the environment to seek new methods than the newcomers are. Thirdly, one has to admit that some areas of the country were undoubtedly less efficiently cultivated by the Arabs than they might have been and that under the Jews they have become more productive. These areas are the Huleh Basin and those other parts of the plains which tend to be marshy, such as the region round Hadera.

Against this one must put the fact that the Arabs made

fuller use of the hill country than the Jews appear to be doing and that they cultivated a larger total area in the Negeb than is being cultivated at the present. Israeli farming is essentially western and involves considerable use of machinery. Where the land is sufficiently level to permit this, they have been able to make a very effective showing, though it is very much to be questioned whether all their methods are in the best interests of the land. Where the hilly and stony nature of the land makes mechanical farming either wasteful or actually impossible, they have tended to fall behind the Arabs. The farming methods of the *fellahin* on the hills were in need of much improvement by means of more effective terracing, scientific manuring and so on, but they were fundamentally sound and were capable of development into very much more than mere subsistence farming. The very extensive planting of olives during the days of the Mandate by the Arab farmers, the improvements of terracing which are taking place in the Hebron area at present and the extension of fruit farming on the East Jordan hills make this very clear. The difficulty, however, as with the land in much of Switzerland and the French Alps and in large areas of the Mediterranean coastlands, is that the agriculture, however "scientific," must always be based on careful manual cultivation of small fields and in such agriculture the pace of improvement is always limited by the speed at which a man can work with his hands.

The same is true of the Negeb. In the days of the Mandate the Bedouin cultivated scattered patches throughout the Central and Western Negeb and cultivated them with such shocking inefficiency that the

poverty-stricken little crops aroused the scorn or pity of all who saw them. What has happened now is that the Bedouin have been driven off the land and some parts have been made to glow with a brilliant green which they never knew before. Yet by far the greater number of the patches which once the Bedouin cultivated are now untouched and desolate, and seem unlikely to come under the plough again, though there might have been a chance at one time of a slow and patient building up from the use that was then made of them to something more worthy of the name of farming.

Yet the question is not really whether the land was being better used then or now, or whether the Arabs could have made better use of it than in fact they did. The question is whether the fact that another people would use a certain region more effectively is a sound political argument for taking it away from those who live there at present and whether the Arabs ought to be expected to be moved by such material arguments as the desirability of an improved standard of living. Their usual reaction is that they are being asked to pay heed to arguments of a nature which we should undoubtedly condemn in our own countrymen. One finds the same riposte being made by the Cypriots when they are told that union with Greece would certainly mean a lower standard of living and that therefore they should not ask for it.

No amount of special pleading can cover up the fact that the Jews would inevitably have ousted the Arabs by reason of the pressure of their superior culture, their economic advantages, and the resources upon which they could draw more quickly than the Arabs could have de-

veloped the ability to resist by any other means than war. From my experience as a teacher both of Arab and Jewish boys, I am inclined to say that two generations are required and that by the third generation the Arabs are beginning to acquire sufficient background to enable them to hold their own. By that time there is amazingly little difference between the two peoples in their achievements at school. One can, of course, step up education and make it as widespread as possible, but one cannot manufacture the background which is the foundation of real education. This has got to develop naturally. One is required, in fact, to be patient for two generations at least, though in the third generation progress may well take a sudden leap forward. The question, therefore, is whether one can wait for that length of time or whether the urgency of the present situation is such that one is politically justified in handing over a country to those people who are in a position to make the progress immediately and who have no country of their own. It is a question which the Arabs cannot be blamed for thinking that there is only one answer and that any other suggested answers are indefensible and even wicked. It is only those outside who can see that there may be two possible answers and who have to choose which is the right one.

Those who support the Israeli cause clearly have a strong point in the fact that up till the end of the Mandate all the Jewish land was bought and paid for by the Jews themselves and that the prices they paid were often high. A very high percentage of this land, however, was bought from absentee landlords living outside the country and the farmers themselves had no say in

the matter and the Arabs felt very strongly that they were being discriminated against because other countries did limit immigration and did make land laws for the protection of those who were in difficulties. When at last they persuaded the government of Palestine to limit immigration and to exercise some control over the disposal of land, a howl of wrath went up outside the country among people who, the Arabs feel, would have done exactly the same if they had been in their place.

Such are the Arab arguments and they believe them fervently. It is entirely wrong to think of these claims being put forward only by a handful of wily politicians. They are the claims of the whole people and in them the Christian Church is again challenged—challenged by their misery, by their blindness, and their despair.

Do not let anyone pretend that their misery is either unreal or merely moderate. There are about 800,000 to 1,000,000 refugees living mainly in the most wretched conditions in the vast camps, often to this day so housed that one wonders how they stay alive, whole families crowded together in tiny rooms, mere cells, in the Old City of Jerusalem, or incredibly maintaining existence in caves and holes in the rocks. The condition of these people when the sleet and icy winds of winter sweep across the Judaean Hills is such that an U.N.R.W.A. official told me that shame would not let him wear his overcoat when he went to visit them, though he was frozen without it. Their ration is 1500 calories as compared with the 2500 estimated necessary for a normal life. They receive on an average rather less than one garment per year per person and even these come entirely from voluntary agencies.

Yet there are those who would maintain to the world that their condition now is better than it was in the days of the Mandate. Nothing could be more fantastic. These people were not Bedouin, though even Bedouin are happier than they. They were farmers, merchants, civil servants and the like, living, not in luxury, but in moderate comfort, able to send their sons to school and to clothe and feed their families. The conditions in which they live now should shock the conscience of any thinking man and are not to be compared with their lives before the fighting. It is folly to suggest that the Palestinian farmer was poverty-stricken and degraded. Burdened with debt it is true that he had been at one time, but part of the present tragedy is that by the end of World War II almost all the farmers were free from this crushing load and were looking forward to the untrammelled progress for which they longed. Their demands for education for their children and the efforts which they would make to see that their sons could get to school, and the planting of those many olive trees from which they could hope for no reward for at least eight years, show how strongly they were looking ahead and how untrue it is to say that their farming methods enabled them to do no more than eke out a bare subsistence. They are not, of course, alone in being refugees or in having lost their livelihood. The world is full of misery and parts of it seem even more charged with sorrow and despair, but to those who are wretched the vast size of the problem does not make it easier to bear and, whether there be a thousand or many millions, the Church must always be challenged for *the comfortless troubles' sake of the needy and the deep sighing of the poor.*

The blindness of the Arab leaders and of the people is a fact—an ugly, undeniable fact. There have been those who have grown rich by the sufferings of their countrymen and those who have been content to flee to lands where they could live in greater security and then pour scorn on the foreign nations for not giving that help which they themselves were not prepared to give. It cannot be denied, even by the most fervent admirer of the Arabs, that they have done nothing like as much to help their own people as the Jews have done to help theirs, nor can it be denied that their politicians have often callously used the misery of the refugees as a means to an end; that the very existence of the refugees is partly the result of Arab misunderstanding of the situation; that the Arabs have from time to time encouraged violence and hatred and have again and again refused to face self-evident facts; and that they have been far too unready to blame their unhappiness on anyone but themselves. One meets many of the Arab people who in private conversation are ready to admit these things and are deeply troubled about them. It is true, as we found with the Jews, that reasons can be found to explain these weaknesses, but reasons do not make black white, nor do they convert weakness into strength. These facts remain and they are a challenge to the Christian Church. We, after all, gave them their education. All the pioneering and the leadership in education in the Middle East has been missionary, British, American, and French. It is indeed no small contribution to have made, and its history has been marked by much devotion and truly selfless service. Yet we are judged by God, not because our education was not good, but because it was not good

enough. We were ourselves very seldom able to discern the signs of the times and to prepare those who passed through our hands to *withstand in the evil day and, having done all, to stand.* One of the most sombre thoughts which the Western churches must face is how much God is going to require at our hands.

Then the Church is challenged to consider yet again whether Christian service is ever to be determined by how much it is deserved. Far too much of the claims of those acquainted with the Middle East for the support of the Western churches for this side or the other has been on the grounds that such and such a people deserve to be helped because of what they have already achieved. One must respect achievement and admire those who strive. Yet Christians will deny their vocation if they ever forget for a moment that Christ died for men while they were yet sinners and that His followers can be prepared to do no less.

Then there is the challenge of their despair, perhaps the most sombre of the three. For vast numbers today that despair is absolute and they are as men without hope, hanging on desperately to the dream, which no one dares tell them is a dream, that they may return to their own homes. *There be many that say, Who will show us any good?* They feel betrayed by their own people, humiliated by the Jews, and deceived by the Western Powers. Their bitterness is a stinging rebuke. While we gather our strength in the West to resist the insidious attacks of political communism, what are we to say to those to whom even the Marxist message is a breath of hope?

CHAPTER VI

The Man in the Bazaar

I SAW the people scattered upon the hills like sheep without a shepherd. And the Lord said, These have no master, let them return in peace to their homes. By this Micaiah meant, and Ahab knew at once that he meant, the tragic consequences of military defeat. It is an apt description of the Arab people, most strongly true in Jordan, perhaps, but true also in the whole Levant, with the added tragedy that so very many of them cannot return in peace to their homes. They really have no master. They are a divided people, divided by frontiers, by politics, by religion and by wealth, united only by their unrelenting bitterness and hatred towards those things and those people whom they feel may be blamed for their present state. They could, for this reason, possibly qualify to be called the world's most difficult people to

help. Their resentment, their frustration and their confusion lead them again and again to close their eyes to their own faults and failings, to exaggerate every hurt done to them and to turn with savage fury, like some trapped and goaded animal, upon the very people who try to come to their rescue.

In such circumstances it is surprising to many that the Westerners who do espouse their cause do so with a fervor which is beyond all reason. Indeed, this is true of the supporters of both sides in this sorry debate. The outside observer who tries to maintain his balance and attempt to see the strength and weakness of both sides has often the feeling of being swept off his feet by the raging flood of his own people who have engaged in the defense of one side or the other. We have already seen some of the reasons which compel the pro-Israelis to be so wholehearted in their support. The explanation of the fervor of the other side is, it would appear, the essential helplessness of the Arabs. They seem like children with a sensation of having been hit by everything at once, and this fact arouses in their friends both a savage protective instinct, and also a pity for the underprivileged which can fairly be described as Christian.

The position is that the Arabs came out of a tunnel about thirty-five years ago. For some six centuries they had been under the domination of a government which was, to say the least, uninterested in their development, and their history had been one of neglect and backwardness. In the early years of the nineteenth century Ibrahim Pasha, the energetic son of Muhammed Ali in Egypt, had attempted to rouse the Arabs of Palestine to fight against the Sultan, but had been forcibly opposed by the

fellahin, not because they felt any loyalty to the Sultan —they did not—but because they resented any domination by an outside power and were as uninclined to be conscripted into an Egyptian army as into a Turkish one. At that time no such thing as a conscious Arab nationalism could be said to exist and all that moved the people was a deep-seated refusal to accept the exactions of a government to which they could feel no loyalty and which they knew had little desire to benefit them. This was not nationalism, but it was fertile soil in which the national consciousness could grow.

During the course of the century there began to develop that prerequisite of modern nationalism, an educated nucleus with ideas beyond their environment. That this should have become possible was in large measure the result of missionary activity, both Protestant and Latin,* which, though it undoubtedly started as a purely evangelistic activity with the hope of winning converts, developed into the giving of a full scale education as a piece of Christian service. Thus the English Diocesan Boarding School, which was the forerunner of the better known Bishop Gobat School, was opened in Jerusalem in 1847 and the Syrian Protestant College, which was later to become the American University of Beirut, in 1866. Schools were opened in many parts of the Levant, but the people who were most exposed to Western ideas were those of Lebanon; and it was there that the Arab cultural renaissance began to take shape, though politi-

* Throughout this book "Latin" is used in the normal Middle Eastern sense of "Roman Catholic," where the reference is to the work of the Roman Catholic Church in the Middle East. The phrase "Roman Catholic" will be kept for the work of that Church outside the Middle Eastern countries.

cal activity was more advanced in Egypt, which was free from the restricting hand of the Turk. By the turn of the century there could be no doubt of the reality of the Arab national consciousness. In 1892 the well-known Arabic paper, *al-Hilal,* was started; in 1904 the League of the Arab Fatherland was founded; in 1908 was formed the movement known as *An-Nahdah al-Arabiyah* (the Arab Awakening); and in 1913 there was held a conference in Paris under the auspices of the Young Arab Society which can rightly be considered a milestone in Arab development. In August of the same year the Young Turkish cabinet which had replaced the power of the Sultan after the Turkish revolution promised to grant some of the Arab demands for teaching in Arabic, freedom from military service and so on. Thus, at the outbreak of the First World War, the Arabs of the Levant were beginning to see the faint flickerings of a promise of something different from the situation in which they then were.

Yet they were very definitely still inside the tunnel and the light which they were beginning to see was but the earnest that there was a different world outside into which they might some day emerge. During the war the savage repression of the notorious Jamal Pasha, the death penalties inflicted on the leading Arab patriots, and the ghastly period of famine from which 150,000 are said to have died in Lebanon and which the government did nothing to relieve, were bitter reminders to the people of their continued subservience. But, quite suddenly, the Allied victory pushed them out of the tunnel into the blinding light of the modern world. They were, not unnaturally, dazzled and began to grope about with

a curious mixture of enthusiasm and hesitancy to find their place in this new world. Their confusion was not made less by the discovery that the victors were unwilling to grant them that independence which they had been led to believe they would get. The French treatment of Feisal and capture of Damascus and the terms of the Palestinian Mandate were very difficult for the Arabs to accept. It was at this time, while they were still trying to find where they stood, that the sluices were opened and there swept down upon them the full flood of the Zionist Movement, which meant a people who had come to stay rather than a foreign government which might some day be persuaded to withdraw. This was a shock which proved more than they could stand, and they have been staggering under the blow ever since.

It is not surprising, perhaps, that in this situation they also should tend to think with their emotions rather than with their brains and that the predominant emotion, once again, is fear. They can no longer think straight about Zionism, any more than large numbers of people in the West can think straight about Communism, and for the same reason, because they are afraid of it. Indeed, one of the reasons why the Arabs are often less distrustful of Communism than we are is because they are more afraid of Zionism. It is nearer at hand and they have had some experience of what it means to them.

Now those whose inclinations or outlook tend to make them look at Palestinian events from the Israeli side of the Armistice Line often have difficulty in accepting this idea. Zionism does not appear to them to be so aggressive. Therefore, we must remind ourselves again that what we are trying to do is to discover the way in which

a large number of Arabs think and not, for the moment, pass judgment on whether they ought to think like that. The Arabs are seriously frightened of Israel, both because of what they believe to be its military intentions and because of what they fear will be its effect upon their way of life and their economic structure.

Militarily they fear a further outbreak of hostilities and a drive eastwards of Israel to the Jordan, or even beyond. Their fears are in no sense quietened by Israeli assurances that they want only peace, because in the past they have heard other countries give similar assurances merely as a means of weakening resistance. Moreover, they have not yet forgotten the many Jewish claims to the whole of the country. Those who knew Palestine in the past remember the Jewish youths who used to go about the streets wearing badges with both Palestine and Transjordan shown in the Jewish national colors, and they recall condemnation by such people as Rabbi Stephen Wise of the separation of the Transjordan Mandate from that of Palestine as a "betrayal." They remember how, back in the days of the Twelfth Zionist Congress of 1921, Dr. Weizmann had spoken of the possibility of Cisjordan becoming so full of Jews that a way would be forced into Transjordan. At the Twentieth Zionist Congress in 1937, which discussed the proposed partition of Palestine, Ben Gurion is reported as having said "The Debate has not been for or against the indivisibility of the Land of Israel. No Zionist can forgo the smallest portion of the Land of Israel. The Debate concerned which of two routes would lead quicker to the common goal," [14] and at the same Congress Weizmann said that the inclusion of the Negeb in the proposed Jew-

ish area was not necessary because it "would not run away." At the time of writing, when Ben Gurion has once again become Prime Minister, he has clearly not given up his hopes that some day not only the old Palestine extending as far as the River Jordan but also the land east of the Jordan shall be included in the Jewish State. In an article published in the Autumn of 1954 he spoke of the Israeli army as having "liberated 80% of the western part of the land of Israel." [15] Such indiscretions are not limited to the pen or tongue of Ben Gurion, but appear in the Israel Government Year Book which has been known to refer to "that part of the Land of Israel which is so far under our control" and in other publications of similar authority. The persistence of this strain of thought among Zionists has meant that Arab fears of a further outbreak of fighting are kept alive throughout the Arab countries.

It is this that explains the frequent talk of a "second round." As the Arabs see it, the "second round" is coming anyway and they can do nothing to prevent it. The most that they can do is to parry it and to try so to arrange things that when the fighting at last does break out they will have a better chance of being successful than they were at first. They know quite well that they are in no state to resist Israeli pressure now, but they fear that unless they are careful they will have less chance of doing so in the future, because they see Israel as having behind her the whole strength of American and European technical skill. Therefore, they make a great talk of a further attack from their side as a kind of smoke screen behind which they can strengthen their own forces and which they hope may deter Israel from deliv-

ering the attack which they believe them ready to give at any moment. It is not always grasped by outsiders that the Arabs firmly believe that the attack on the Jordanian village of Qibya in November, 1952, and the massacre of the women and children while the men were in the fields was a deliberate Israeli attempt to provoke the Arab Legion to take action, because the attack was made when the Israeli army was on maneuvres and they regard this as proof that the Israelis have made up their mind to attack whenever it shall suit their convenience. The Israeli attack of 1956 is naturally taken as confirmation of their worst alarms.

The constant talk of further fighting from the Arab side naturally does nothing at all to allay Israeli fears, and consequently one has today the ironic situation of the ordinary people on both sides of the Armistice Line genuinely afraid that an attack may at any time be launched upon them from only a few miles away. It is a situation very similar to that "disease" noticed by Ian Morison of the London *Times* when reporting on the Punjab problem in 1947: "Each (side) suffers from a psychosis of fear, a terror that it is about to be attacked. . . . One of the symptoms of this disease is that each side passionately believes the other to be solely responsible. The outside observer studying this gigantic and terrible phenomenon wonders whether questions of 'responsibility' and 'blame' are not irrelevant. Either all parties concerned are responsible . . . or else there are certain cataclysms in human affairs in which men do not retain control over their destinies." [16]

The economic and cultural fears of the Arabs are just as strong and possibly more justified. The trouble is

that they feel at a constant disadvantage with regard to the Jews. They know that Israel is more westernized and that she can call on expert help from her own people in a wide variety of fields. They feel that every time they have tried to discuss anything with her they have been outmaneuvred. They think, for instance, that such boundary adjustments as have been made have worked to their disadvantage and they fear that any discussion they may have in the future will have exactly the same result. This has the curious effect of making them always agree to the last proposal but two. They never agree to the most recent proposal, because they are always afraid that there is something so devilishly clever about it which they have not been able immediately to discern that it is better to refuse it out of hand than to run any risk of being hustled somewhere they do not want to go. They do not make their own proposals, partly because they do not feel sufficiently sure of themselves, partly too because they do not feel any necessity for proposals to come from their side since they are genuinely convinced that they have done nothing except defend their homeland and that the trouble would stop if only the Jews would cease being so aggressive, and partly also because they feel that the initiator of negotiations is placed in a diplomatically weak position since the ultimate decision is placed in the hands of the party who has been approached. When a proposal is made, therefore, they tend to go back to some earlier proposal, which now appears to them to be less nocuous than they had at first thought it, and to say that they will agree to that. Thus, they tend to say now that they would accept the United Nations partition plan which at the time they

furiously rejected, but by this time, of course, the plan is no longer on the table because Israel has already got more than she was offered under that plan and is in no mood to give it up. This process of thought is one which can best be described as "discarding from weakness," and any card player knows what a disastrous activity that is.

It is the same kind of thinking which makes them say that they will never make peace with Israel, because they feel that when there is someone whom you believe to be both your enemy and also possessed of a Machiavellian cleverness, it is much better for you to have nothing to do with him at all. It led them also recently to reject a proposal which seemed to outside observers to be manifestly to their advantage, the proposal made in the United Nations in November, 1954, that the Armistice Line should be adjusted so that all the Arab villages which are now divided from their lands should have those lands restored to them. They almost certainly argued that the Israelis would demand—and get—territorial compensation for the land which they were losing and that when the agreement should be finally signed the Arabs would probably find that they had been deprived of more than they had bargained for. One finds this type of thinking also in the West in the resistance to any thought of co-existence with the Russians and amongst the Russians in their tendency to reject out of hand any Western proposal.

The Arabs also fear that if ever they did make peace and trade between them and Israel once more began to flow, prices would immediately rocket and that this would entail no little suffering. They find little comfort

in the argument that it would mean great prosperity for the farmers and ultimately for everyone, because they fear that the immediate results would be so sudden and so far beyond their ability to control that those townspeople who have to buy their food would find themselves unable to do so. It has to be remembered that Arab society, especially in Jordan which would be most affected, is such that it is impossible to exercise the same economic controls which can be effective in the highly organized and industrialized countries of the West.

Lastly, the Arabs fear for their way of life. This is apparently difficult for any Westerner to comprehend, though great play is made in the West with the necessity of maintaining the Western way of life, and it might be thought that they would therefore understand that other peoples would want to do the same. However, the present Israeli way of life is much more Western in its general characteristics than that of the Arabs, whom Europeans and Americans are inclined to dismiss as behind the times and even frankly medieval. The Arabs are aware of this and, therefore, resent the taking of pictures by tourists, especially of scenes which to the tourist may well be merely valuable illustrative material for Sunday School teaching, but which the Arabs fear will be used to show the difference between the "modern" Jews and the "backward" Arabs. It is true, of course, that they do greatly admire what they see in the advanced technological methods of the West and that they earnestly desire their countries to progress. However, they want it to be progress at their own pace and they wish to preserve whatever is valuable in their present existence. They fervently admire the tradition of Arabic culture

and have no desire at all to become merely "Western." Moreover, until they were shaken and disturbed by the turmoil of modern events, they had achieved an equilibrium in which they found much that was agreeable. The visitor from the West is shocked by the poverty of the people in many parts and is apt to exaggerate its effect. It is certainly true that much must be done to raise the standard of living and the material conditions of the mass of the people, but it must not be assumed that because people are poor, they are degraded as they would tend to be in the West. One may travel the length and breadth of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan and see much that needs improvement, but one will never see the degradation which characterizes parts of New York, for instance. The position of the refugees is tragic, as no one will deny, but a family crowded into a tiny room in the Old City of Jerusalem will receive a visitor, whoever he may be, with the same charm and courtesy that they would have shown in the house that they once owned in the fashionable suburb of Katamon. Nor would this be different if the visitor were in a Bedouin tent or merely calling at the local police station to fulfill some minor regulation. This is not to argue that picturesque poverty should be preserved because it is picturesque, or that the situation of a family forced to live in one little cell is in the very least desirable, but rather to insist that the Arab way of life is not a thing to be lightly destroyed. Nor is it only a veneer. It has a solidity which Arabs are right to feel is worth preserving. We have already seen that the Arab methods of cultivating the hill country has an essential rightness which requires development rather than replacement.

The Arab fears have been dealt with at some length because they are very strong and very real. The reader must decide for himself whether they are justified or not, and we must turn now to the second controlling factor, which, once again, is ignorance. The Arab ignorance of Israel is quite deliberate. They do know, of course, a great deal about the country and about Tel Aviv and the *kibbutzim* and so on because, after all, there are nearly a million Arab refugees in Arab countries who came from what is now Israel, but they have closed their eyes and ears to any news which has come out of it since. They strongly object to their children being taught anything about it in school, and they would very much rather pretend to themselves that it is not really there. The attitude of the schoolboy who told me once that the reason why he had not marked Tel Aviv on a map he had drawn was that he did not want to believe it was there is certainly extreme and has always roused the mirth of any class to whom I have told the story, but it is indicative of an outlook which does exist. The people are so conditioned to thinking of truth as being relative and to feeling that it is better to tell someone what he wants to hear rather than to upset him with the truth, that they tend to feel that it is better to tell *themselves* what *they* want to hear. Of course, we know this attitude of mind very well in the West—it is far from being a monopoly of the Arabs—but there is this difference. The ordinary Arab is less likely to think of it as a weakness.

The third control is their hatred of having to feel dependent. We in the West are apt to minimize this dislike or to think that it is undesirable. We expect other countries to be grateful for all that we have done for

them and for what we are often continuing to do, and we entirely fail to grasp that gratitude is an extremely humiliating virtue. It is not only more blessed to give than to receive, but it is also very often a great deal easier. It is easy enough, of course, to be grateful for some timely gift in a period of trouble, such as a famine or a flood, but it is extremely galling to feel that one is dependent upon such gifts, especially when one has more than a sneaking feeling that the gifts themselves are intended to produce that feeling of dependence. The Arabs, like a great many other people, do not make nearly enough allowance for the very real generosity which lies behind much of the help that comes to them from the West and are apt to take it for granted, even feeling that the Western peoples are doing no more than their duty; but we, on the other hand, are inclined somewhat conveniently to forget that no powerful country ever helps another country for any length of time if it is not their purpose to have that country firmly attached to their train. The West, after all, has often enough made it clear to their own people that they are bound to help the peoples of the East to prevent their passing under the domination of Russia, and the Arabs are therefore not slow to imagine that all the help that they receive is dictated by nothing more than self-interest.

The fourth control of Arab thought that has to be taken into account is their feeling of humiliation. They cannot escape the fact that their vaunted boasts of driving the Jews into the sea in a fortnight were a complete failure and, what is more, they cannot understand the fact. One of the weaknesses which characterize the Arabs is an inability to assess their own strength, and this has

the curious result that they find it difficult to realize when they are only moderately good at something. If you ask an Arab schoolboy whether he plays football, he will reply either that he does not play it at all or that he is very good at it. There seems to be nothing in between. The same outlook leads them to be quite sincerely surprised if they fail in an examination and it led the Arab people to be quite confident that victory must be theirs. In this they were certainly encouraged by many so-called "experts" who thought that their vastly superior numbers could not fail to do the trick, though it is difficult to understand how any person who knew both the contestants could so misinterpret the situation.[17]

One of the unfortunate results of the British and French adventure in November, 1956, was that it served to strengthen the Arab belief that the Egyptians were not inferior militarily to the Israelis, but had been defeated instead by the overwhelming might of the Western powers. It is only too likely, therefore, that they will soon start to dream once more of a "third round."

Like all defeated peoples the Arabs are reluctant to admit that their own cowardice and weaknesses were the reason for much of their failure, and they seek to place the blame elsewhere. It is only occasionally that one meets a person who is ready to say, somewhat wryly, "The difference between the Jews and us is that they were prepared to die for what they wanted and we were not." In Jordan especially vast numbers of people have lost almost everything they possessed, and the hopes which they were encouraged to have during the days of the Mandate for the education of their children and the development of their lands are now shattered beyond re-

pair. It cannot but be a humiliating and miserable position and, while one points out that much of the blame must lie with them, one has got to admit that much of the suffering is not their fault. They could not conceivably be expected to cope with the influx of a new and vigorous people at a time when they had not yet found their own feet. New wine will always burst old bottles. It is a commonplace of history.

The fifth and last control is that of division. The strains and tensions within the Arab world are different from those which we have seen to be so powerful in Israel, but they are likewise extraordinarily strong. In the first place it must be remembered that no country in the world can claim a longer history and a history, moreover, which has been one of almost constant strife, leaving wounds and scars which have never been allowed entirely to be healed. Palestine has known independence but temporarily in history and then only by the permission of the Great Powers. It has seldom known greatness for longer than half a century at a time. *The ploughers have ploughed upon my back and made long their furrows,* said the Psalmist and it has never ceased to be true of the land in which he lived; and it is no exaggeration to say that the resentments of centuries still live to weaken the structure of Middle Eastern society.

Then it is a fact, too little noticed in studies of the area, that much of it is composed of what might be called "regions of difficulty" which deflect the routes and compress them within well determined lines, leaving between them "islands of refuge" which are untouched by the passage of trade and culture or the tentacles of government. The compression of the routes between the

desert and the sea is well known and so is the Fertile Crescent between these two and the great mountain plateaus of the north and east, but within this Fertile Crescent itself the passage of trade and armies has been constricted still further by the presence of difficult mountain country and the rough, impassable basalt outflows. When the overflowing scourge of an invasion or the more beneficent flood of new ideas has swept across this narrow strip of cultivable land, these islands have often remained untouched, so that the people and the culture of a previous age are there preserved. Thus there are still two villages in Syria where Aramaic is spoken today, and in Lebanon the population has remained Christian behind their mountain wall. Similarly these islands of refuge have served for those whose ideas are out of touch with the thinking of the majority of the people, heretics and schismatics, such as the Druzes in the volcanic Jebel Druze, the Ismailis and Nuseiriyehs of the mountains north of Tripoli and the Yezidis of Jebel Sinjar. These tensions are still potent today.

Then there are the ancient family quarrels which play so much greater a part in Middle Eastern thinking than they do in the West, where the concept of the extended family has quite disappeared. This can be seen in the suspicion which the ruling family in Saudi Arabia entertain of the Hashemite family to which the kings of both Iraq and Jordan belong.*

There are, moreover, also those tensions which the Western Powers have created by their artificial divisions of the Levant after World War I. A generation has now grown up which tends to think of Jordan as separate

* But see below, Chapter XII.

from Syria and Iraq and governments and others have begun to have vested interests in the continuation of the existing frontiers. Each of these states has its own tensions within its borders. Thus Lebanon is divided roughly half and half between Christian and Muslim; Syria has to try to bind together an undue number of these "islands of refuge" with their historic traditions of opposition to the Damascus government, whoever it may be, to the extent, if necessary, of open revolt; Jordan has inherited the ancient division caused by the rift valley in its midst so that the people east and west of the river are even to this day uneasy yokefellows; Iraq has Assyria and Babylon within her limits and the wild mountains of Kurdistan; and Egypt, more than any of them, has the horizontal divisions of wealth. And over all this there still persists the most ancient struggle in all the world, the dispute between the people of the Nile and the people of Mesopotamia over who shall be the leader in the Levant and control the Fertile Crescent.

It is idle to demand, as so many Westerners are found to do, that these ancient prejudices be laid aside in a moment. That would be impossible. Yet the present crisis demands that they should be outgrown, and this is a problem of education. This is, of course, easy enough to say, but it will be an education fraught with danger. It demands that the teaching shall be in the hands of those who can see beyond the confines of their nation and their group, and it is hard to see where such men are to be found in sufficient numbers. Moreover, even the best of teachers knows how much of this work is wasted and how only a part of his teaching is absorbed. Teaching there must be if the people are not to fall a

prey to Communism or be destroyed in the midst of their unproductive quarrels and suspicions. Yet there is bound to come a time of great peril when the people are sufficiently educated to want to act and yet insufficiently purged of their ancient prejudices.

It may be objected that a very great deal too much of this chapter has been occupied in discussing politics, but it is difficult to see what else could be done. We had set out to consider the background of the thinking of the Man in the Bazaar. The reader can only be assured that he very seldom discusses anything else, at any rate for long.

CHAPTER VII

The Role of Egypt

THE present turmoil has thrust the Arab leadership upon Egypt to the immediate exclusion of all other claimants. This pre-eminence is almost unchallenged, though admittedly Nuri es-Sa'id would not be able to pursue his policy of cooperation with the West in the face of Egypt's strong opposition, if he had not some support in his country, nor would Lebanon be able to maintain its traditional independent role if the Lebanese people did not feel that this was to their advantage. Nevertheless, even in these two countries Egypt is admired, and elsewhere the crowd is often wholeheartedly pro-Egyptian. In some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, this is partly because the schoolteachers are Egyptian, but the real strength of the Egyptian reputation rests upon the fact that Egypt has done what so many of the

Arabs have longed to do: she has defied the West to its face and has triumphed.

It is difficult to find adequate words to express what this means to a world which has so long felt itself humiliated by having to exist from the West's bounty. Just as the Frontier concept, with its suggestion of rugged courage and endurance, still stirs the American mind, and the Sea thrills even the most lethargic Englishman, so the fierce independence of the *Badu* is the ideal of even those town-bred Arabs who would be miserable in a desert.

Against this there is a firm conviction in the minds of many that it is the inescapable duty of other countries to help the Arabs, whether this is expressed in the naive theory of a young man from Nazareth who told me, "Nazareth gave Jesus Christ to the world, and so now it is the duty of the world to help Nazareth," or in the argument of those who claim that it would actually be wrong for the Arab states to resettle the refugees since this would absolve the Western powers of what is clearly their duty. Naturally, this is in large part because they are quite convinced that policy of the Western world is the real cause of the refugee problem. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that any other people in the same position would argue so strongly that they had *no* responsibility in the matter. This conviction that other countries should—and therefore the hope that they will—help the Arab world is very dangerous since it leads the Arab people sometimes to place more trust than they should in the promises of foreign governments. One has seen the Arab hopes dashed by the undue reliance which they placed in the promises of first the British and then

the Americans, and now many of them are turning with the same unquestioning hope to Russia, believing, apparently, that perhaps this time they have found the country that will fulfil its destined task. That they will feel betrayed again is only too clear to those who look at the Middle East from without, but it will be neither to their advantage nor to ours that they should make the experiment.

That these two ideas of dependence and independence should coexist is very curious and not at all easy to explain, though I am sure that it happens.* It may be that this conviction that they should be the recipients of the world's charity springs partly from the Muslim environment: from their fatalism, the feeling that everything is "from God," which restrains them from themselves taking action to remove the disasters that have come upon them, since—if it is God's will—His mercy also will come from without to remove the misery; and from their custom of almsgiving, the absolute duty of the wealthy to help the poor, which is a very characteristic feature of Muslim life. Therefore, they find it easy to argue, "Now, *we* are poor and so the wealthy countries of the West must help us. Were they in the same plight, and we rich, then we should be bound by the Quran to help them." Finally, it has its roots in the Arab belief that the world owes them a return, since it is from the Arab world that culture has gone forth. They are

* Admittedly, one finds the same two ideas in Western Europe today with regard to help from the United States, but with nothing like the intensity one finds in the Middle East. It is perhaps entirely human both to demand help and to resent it, but with the Arabs these human tendencies seem reinforced by other sanctions, so strongly do they hold these views.

very conscious of the fact that all the three great monotheistic religions started in the Middle East, and even more conscious that the Arab world kept alight the lamp of learning when the West was in darkness. It is very difficult, for instance, to persuade an Arab that the Arabic language owes anything to outside influence or that the Crusades in any way affected Arab culture. In this he is encouraged by his school textbooks, which are often of Western origin and, for that reason, are more interested in Western culture and the effect which the contact with the Saracen world had upon that. Since he believes that in previous contacts with the West, it was the West which profited from the cultural wealth of the Arab world, he is tempted to think that it is time that the West paid something back. Nevertheless, though he is quite prepared to argue that the West *ought* to pay its debts to the Arabs, he finds it intolerable that he should have to accept the payment.

So the Arabs are frustrated, tormented by the desire to receive from the West's hands what they feel the World ought to give, and by the opposite desire to be true "Arabs," Bedouin of the desert, owning no man as leader except their own sheikh.* It is from this frustration that the Egyptian revolution seems to have delivered them. They see now a vision of the world reversed, of their poverty being relieved by the royalties from oil wells and of their freedom from Western, or any other, imperialism being achieved under Egyptian leadership. Once again, or so they are tempted to dream,

* It has often been pointed out that in Arabic the Bedouin are normally called "Arabs," *tout court,* even by other Arabs, because they still remain the Arabs *par excellence.*

the West will be dependent upon them (this is the insidious hope which the Communists hold out) and, since the West needs their oil, it will be they who of their bounty accord to the Western world the charity which the Quran commands shall be given to the poor. First, however, the West must realize both their poverty and their dependence, and if they do not, it will be necessary to hold them at bay until they do.

The other frustration from which the Egyptian revolution seems to have relieved them is the tension between freedom and oneness, for Charles Malik has well pointed out that "two things dominate the Arab mind in general: independence and unity. There is a deep seated mystical element in both of these feelings." Yet those who want to be united must admit that they are not independent of each other and this the Arabs have found difficult to do. So much of Arab history since the end of World War I has been the story of a search for something which would express their very real cultural, religious, and linguistic unity within a political framework which would leave each group entirely free to express its equally essential independence. Thus, there was the Greater Syria Plan of King Abdullah, Nuri es-Sa'id's scheme for an Arab federation, and the Arab League; but always it has been the unity which has tended to break in face of the demands for independence. Now, however, the concept of independence can find adequate expression in the effective defiance of the Western world which Egypt has made possible and so the Arabs feel themselves free to express their unity under Egyptian leadership. Thus the Iraqi policy of cooperation with the West is thought to be a triple betrayal,

for it seems to strike at the root of this threefold liberation. Since the relief of Arab poverty is clearly impossible without the oil of the Persian Gulf, the pursuing of an independent line by one of the oil-rich countries threatens Arab development; the adherence of Iraq to the Baghdad Pact seems to tie a large part of the Arab people to the power of the West from which others feel themselves to have been delivered; and the challenge thus given to Egyptian leadership breaks the unity of the Arab people.

It is paradoxical that the very state which is thus felt to have delivered the Arab world from foreign bondage, and to have given it the unity for which till now it had vainly longed, is herself very far from unified, and is, moreover, an entirely abnormal country, whose life is determined, to an extent which is unknown elsewhere, by things which happen outside her borders, and over which she has no control. Of course, the very fact that recent Egyptian history has so much been one of resistance to these external controls, and of resolve to have as great a management of them as possible has contributed to the rise of Egypt as a leader. Nevertheless, most of them are things which will remain outside her control and the question remains as to how far she will be able to come to terms with this fact.

These external forces enter into her life by way of the River Nile, the Suez Canal, the State of Israel, and her own peculiar strategic position. Of these the dominant question, which may occasionally put all the others in the shade, is that of the waters of the Nile, for Egypt owes her being to the Nile in a manner in which no other country in the world depends for its life upon one

single thing, though perhaps it might be possible to compare the dependence of England upon world trade, with the proviso that England's trade needs are extraordinarily complex, whereas Egypt's demands from the Nile are exceedingly simple in essence. The two are worth mentioning together, however, because the struggle with England has been that which has occupied the greater part of Egyptian attention for very nearly three-quarters of a century, and a large part of the difficulty and bitterness of this struggle has been due to the fact that each country felt that it was being asked to relinquish something upon which it was not too much to say that its life depended.

For Egypt the problem of the Nile is that if it were to cease to be, the country of Egypt would quite literally cease to be also, for its climate is one of absolute desert, and even on the Mediterranean coast the rainfall is sufficient for only the most marginal agriculture and that but along a very, very narrow strip. It follows that Egypt dare not consider for a moment the possibility of any part of the River Nile south of her borders passing into the hands of a power hostile to her, or even merely careless about her development, because water which for any reason is diverted from the Upper Nile becomes water which fails to reach her. This explains why the Italian occupation of Abyssinia was a threat sufficient to persuade the Egyptian government of the time—the Wafd party under Nahas Pasha—to make the 1936 treaty with Great Britain. It explains also why the Egyptians have always been so interested in the political future of the Sudan. They would greatly prefer the Sudan to be under their own government, or at least an independent

country in which they have the most favored nation status, but at all costs they do not want it to pass under the domination of another country, even as a dominion in the British Commonwealth. Even when they view Britain in her most enlightened moods, the Egyptians must fear that the policy leading the colonies along the path of self-government may cause her to build dams across the upper reaches of the Nile for the benefit of the Sudanese or the people of Uganda.

This is what has led the Egyptians into their attempt to dominate the politics of the Sudan and to bring it under their control. From their point of view the "unity of the Nile Valley" is a concept as vital to their security as the control of the English Channel is to Britain, but it has led the Sudanese on their part to reject the concept and to fear the domination of Egypt, who, they feel, will have every reason for not wanting them to develop their own irrigation schemes at all.

The position of the Suez Canal in international law is very difficult to determine. Article I of the Suez Canal Convention states that the Canal shall be open at all times to ships of every nation, without respect of flag, both in peace and war, to belligerent and non-belligerent alike, and it is this article which Israel claims that Egypt has been breaking, in refusing to allow the passage of Israeli ships, or of ships trading with Israel. However, Egypt claims the support of later articles which state clearly that the Canal is Egyptian territory, and particularly Article X, which entitles her to take any necessary measures for the defense of the realm and the maintenance of public order. It is possible that Egypt is here on somewhat insecure legal ground, though

it would be difficult to assert this definitely, and in any case it is hardly to be expected that she would look at the matter in the same light as other nations. The argument that Turkey did not stop Italian ships in 1911 is not really an argument at all, since Turkey was not then in effective control; and any British claim that she did not close the Canal in wartime is equally meaningless, since she was always able to prevent hostile ships from reaching the canal zone.

That Egypt undoubtedly profited from the existence of the Canal, and yearned to profit more, was itself a powerful motive persuading her into taking the step of nationalization. Yet what has been uppermost in Egyptian eyes has not been what she gets out of it, but the fact that the control has always rested with a foreign power, the Company in the hands of France and the military control in the hands of Britain. She has therefore strived for years to eliminate this control and to bring within her own authority what is certainly a great asset, but what she must also regard as a massive threat. Such an exceedingly valuable waterway is a tremendous temptation to any greedy nation, and should some great power once more gain control and then become involved in fighting, Egyptians know well that all the horrors of modern warfare might be launched upon her soil in an attempt either to gain control of the Canal or to destroy it.

However, it is precisely because it is such a valuable waterway that Britain felt that she could not entirely trust it to the protection of a country that was obviously militarily so weak as Egypt had proved herself to be in the Palestinian war. She finally did so with many mis-

givings, and her dramatic action in the autumn of 1956, though it was surely mistaken, must be viewed against this fact. It would sit ill upon any other country to accuse Britain of mere "imperialism" in this, for she has twice within this century been forced very nearly to her knees by an enemy who has cut off her supply of food, and she is bound to fear the possession by any other power of vital bottlenecks in the great trade highways.

The existence of Israel, with its strong connections with United States Jewry has meant that there also Egypt is faced with a potential threat to her existence and well-being, of which the sources and springhead are situated thousands of miles outside her control; for nothing will convince the Arabs that American Jewry is not a powerful influence in Israeli affairs. Admittedly, she had probably less need to be afraid of Israel than had Jordan, because there is a conveniently large strip of desert in between. Moreover, the Suez Canal lies between them and she had every reason to be sure that the Western powers would not permit Israel to threaten the Canal's security.* Nevertheless, if she is to be the leader of the Arabs, she must take the lead, not only against Britain, but also against Israel, for Zionism is the common "enemy." Moreover, the humiliation of her defeat at Israel's hands in 1948 was one of the chief causes of the revolution, and for the revolutionary movement to justify itself, it must, or so the Egyptians think, redeem this defeat. Certainly Israeli actions have not always been

* Part of the "mistake" of the British-French action lay, not in the wrongness of military action in itself, but in the attempt to use one action to achieve too many ends. By issuing a double ultimatum, Britain successfully obscured from the Arab world that she had any desire to protect the Suez Canal.

of a nature to reassure Egypt that she is in no danger of attack, and in any case, Egypt fears that the extension of Israeli power at the expense of any other Arab state would ultimately be a threat to her own security. However, even when this is faced, it is doubtful whether the attacks of the *fedayeen* from across the Egyptian border are as "justifiable" as the infiltrations from Jordan. They are of a more planned and deliberate nature, and, while they must be as thrilling to the youth of Egypt as the activities of the Irgun Zwei Leumi were to Israeli youth, they must surely carry the same condemnation.

The strategic position of Egypt is possibly her most infuriating problem, for this is a fact which she cannot hope even to begin to control, and which she can seek to evade only by an escape into "neutralism." She feels herself to be a pawn in the hands of the great powers, and every attempt that she has made to develop seems to her to have been crushed by some activity of the Western nations ever since Muhammed Ali's first rise to power, which led in course of time to the Anglo-Austrian blockade of 1839 and the Conference of London in 1840, by which it was made clear that Egyptian authority was to be confined to Egypt. She saw the establishment in 1878 of a Chamber of Notables with a British Minister of Finance and a French Minister of Public Works, and the events of 1881-82, which seem to her an almost exact parallel to the most recent events, save only that Nasser has succeeded where Arabi Pasha failed. At that time the Khedive Isma'il had agreed to the demands of the military leader Arabi Pasha and this led the European powers to fear that a revolt was intended which would result in the deposition of the Khedive. Britain bom-

barded Alexandria on July 11, 1882, and then defeated Arabi Pasha at the battle of Tel el-Kebir on September 13. Two days later the British troops entered Cairo and the first occupation of Egypt had begun. From that date the history of Egypt has been one of revolt and negotiation, interrupted by two world wars in which she has seen the Allied troops flooding her streets. She certainly profited enormously from these two wars, but it is equally true that the Egyptians fear that this pattern may not be repeated every time, and that her fate in a third world war might be to be annihilated.

Consequently, Egypt has struggled to become master in her own house, in order that the Arabs as a whole may be master in theirs. That she should be the leader in this great struggle seems to her entirely natural and proper, for both ancient and recent history seem to suggest this as her role. Arabs have a very vivid consciousness of history, for they have all around them—and especially in Egypt—the visible evidences of their greatness, both in ancient times and during the medieval period. Moreover, Arabic literature, and particularly Arabic poetry, dwells much upon the glories of the past and tends to keep them alive and vivid in Arab minds. However, they are often very impatient of history as a discipline and do not see it as something which they must study deeply in order to understand the great forces of the present. They may realize the value of ancient ruins as a tourist attraction, but they would often very much rather that the tourists photographed a modern bank or the latest school. Of course, they are as much involved in a revolution as the Israelis, and, once again, revolutionaries tend to think that the world has

begun with them and for that reason to take less interest in the past, but this is not the whole explanation. Perhaps the strong fundamentalism of the Muslim involves him in a literalistic approach, since his conception of the Quran is so firmly literal, and for this reason he tends to conceive of the great periods of the past being re-enacted in a literal fashion in the present. Therefore, Egyptians see nothing incongruous in the idea that they today are playing again the role of the Pharaohs. That circumstances may have changed is apparently irrelevant.

Modern history gives them stronger grounds for taking the lead. Egypt was the first country to become independent of Turkish rule and, however much Egyptians may like to speak of "slavery" to the British, has known a considerable measure of independence and of vigorous contact with the Western world for much longer than any other Arab country. Though the Arab renaissance began in what is now Lebanon under the stimulus of American and British missionaries, Arab nationalism for a long time could exist there only with difficulty and in the form of secret societies, whereas Egypt was free from the domination of Turkey, and newspapers and books could be published openly. Consequently, many of the intellectual leaders left Beirut and Damascus for Cairo, and to this day Cairo has remained the cultural center. Egyptian newspapers, Egyptian films, and Egyptian broadcasts are known throughout the Arab world to an extent which is not true of the products of any other Arab country.

Furthermore, in Arab thinking the "Arab World" stretches from the borders of Iran to the Atlantic coasts of Morocco, and of this world Egypt appears to be the

natural focus. It would appear to Egypt, therefore, that she has almost a God-given function to unite the Arabic-speaking community around this central core and to inspire those who have not yet cast off the shackles of foreign domination to do so. For this reason it becomes her "duty" to foment trouble in French North Africa and on the borders of Yemen and Aden, and the protests of Britain and France concerning these activities must seem to her the mouthings of "imperialists."

Nevertheless, Egypt is also set over against the Arab world, and it is only the remarkable success of her policy so far that has dazzled the Arabs so that they cannot see it. Egypt is engaged in a social revolution—this is, indeed, one of the most encouraging features of the present regime—but not all the rulers with whom she is allied have the same enthusiasm for reform, and it is possible that the kings of Saudi Arabia and Yemen even dread it. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the Saudi oil profits could be turned so freely to Egypt's purposes if they were being ploughed back into the development of Arabia in the manner in which Iraq is using hers. Moreover, Egypt has not been the only historic claimant to Arab leadership. Baghdad may not at present evoke the same enthusiasm as Cairo, but this is not to say that she will not be able to do so in the future, when the Iraqi government's careful schemes for the development of the country bear fruit, and when Iraq is able to rise to the same cultural level as Egypt. Indeed, it is possible that a time may come when there will be three centers of Arab culture, Baghdad dominating the Levant and much of the "Arab Island," a "Western Island" focussed on the Atlas region and pursuing a line of its own, and Cairo in the

middle, with her leadership accepted only by those closest to her. Without for one moment wishing to belittle Egypt's achievements, I find it difficult to believe that there will not be some time in the future a reaction against her present reputation. Once again Egypt finds herself in the vise from which she has so often longed to escape, with her policy dominated by a factor over which she has no control. As long as it is true that the main source of wealth in the Middle East is the overflowing oil of the Persian Gulf, so long is it likely to be true that the countries which possess this great wealth will call the tune. One at least of these countries, Iraq, is showing signs of being restive under Egyptian leadership, and as the others develop, so they are likely to be similarly irked. Egypt urgently needs to tap this wealth if she is to continue her vigorous foreign policy, but the sources of the wealth lie hundreds of miles beyond her frontiers.

In this ferment the Christian must find himself torn between two emotions. On the one hand there must be a deep and abiding sympathy for the Egyptian people, for that great mass of the underprivileged with whom those who bear the name of Christ cannot but be concerned. There is probably more grinding poverty in Egypt than there is in any other Arab country, and perhaps the severest judgment upon the British administration is not for what it did, though it is upon that the Egyptians tend to dwell, but for what it did not do. A very great deal of good was done, it is true, particularly under the benevolent guidance of Lord Cromer before World War I, and this is a thing which the Egyptians tend to forget. Yet when the British finally left Egypt, despite their long connection with the country, there were still 90% of the

population who were underprivileged and the great proportion of the land was still concentrated in the hands of the few. The social revolution which had taken place in Britain had not come to the Egyptian scene.

Of course, the British may well answer that this was the fault primarily of the Egyptians, and indeed the Egyptian leaders must bear much of the blame for concentrating overmuch on the struggle for independence and taking little interest in the misery within their own gates. In so far as they demanded independence, and in so far as little by little they wrested it from the British, so far they became responsible for their own affairs. Yet, until the end of World War II, the British were powerful in Egypt and were prepared if need be to use that power for their own purposes. They were ready to force the King to dismiss a pro-German premier during the war, and to threaten to depose him if he did not consent, but not prepared to insist so forcibly that he strive for the welfare of his people. In any Christian conception, after all, justice is something that is sought for other people and never for oneself, and it was this conception which the British government could not make their own.

It is idle to pretend that the British have not worked hard to raise the standard of living of the people whom they have governed and to prepare them to govern themselves, some would say too soon. Yet they have not displayed this same energy in Egypt. Perhaps it is because they were not "the government," and that it would have been better for them either to have taken over the whole authority or to have packed their bags and gone, and that as it was they were in the dangerous position of having power without the responsibility. Perhaps it is be-

cause any foreign power with interests in another country must dread revolution and must work to maintain the existing system, so that they find themselves unable to take the side of the downtrodden. Whatever may be the reason, the thoughtful Western Christian cannot be happy that a government of a so-called Christian country should have been so little concerned, and even more that the Christian missions of the country, which did such an excellent job of education and of caring for the sick and needy, were still not sufficiently moved to make open protest. If it be true that God cares for the fatherless and widow, then He will not be mocked by those who do not.

No Christian also can be unmoved by the frustration of the Egyptian position, by the urgent struggle to be free and the furious determination to break the bands which, since they are not within Egyptian control, cannot be broken. Americans, whose problems till this date have lain entirely within their own country, and have been such as they felt they could lick, should be especially sympathetic for those who have hardly ever had a problem that did lie inside their own country, nor one against which they could measure their strength.

Yet with the sympathy must go fear, and the disturbing sense that what is happening must surely lead to disaster. It has not yet been properly realized that there is as much sin in resisting imperialism as there is in imperialism itself, for both are essentially selfish. We have been far too inclined in the West—and it may be that the United States is especially given to this error—to adopt a modern theory of "justification by works." We are tempted to argue that imperialism is wrong; that

therefore imperialism must be resisted and brought to an end; and that therefore those who do resist imperialism are good people. With the first two parts of the argument no Christian at the present time is likely to disagree, but when it is argued that those who do take part in the struggle against imperialism and fight for the freedom of their country are thereby redeemed by what they are doing, then he must protest, for it is of the essence of the Christian Faith that all men are sinners, and that nothing that *we* do can deliver us from this bondage of sin, since redemption can be from God alone.

That this is true and not a fond invention of theologians surely appears when those who do become free display in themselves the same faults against which they fought in the past. Thus it is the tragedy of Israel that the nation which was brought into being to deliver the refugees should have produced yet more refugees, and that she dare not, since she feels her life to be at stake, gather in these refugees with the others. Naturally, the Arabs have not been slow to point out this essential contradiction at the heart of Israel, but what they have been less quick to see is the imperialism of Egypt. For imperialism it is. Egypt seeks not only to dominate the Sudan and to lead the Arab world, insisting that she, and not another, shall dominate the coming Arab Federation, but to extend her power beyond the confines of this world, to stir up trouble in Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda, and Nigeria.

This is said not just to condemn Egypt or to pretend that it is merely the fault of Colonel Nasser, which would not be true. Those in Britain who wish to bring about Nasser's overthrow gravely misjudge the situation. The

Arab world seldom produces a true leader in the sense of one who moulds the opinion of the mass, but rather one who is a product of the mass and expresses their opinions. For this reason, anyone who replaced Colonel Nasser would be forced to do what he is doing, or there would be another revolution.

To say that there is as much sin in resisting imperialism as there is in imperialism itself lays one open to the accusation that therefore one wishes imperialism to continue, because it is wrong to resist it. Nevertheless, one does not avoid evil by refraining from doing evil things. Imperialism must be resisted, but by those who appreciate the full danger of what they are doing, and even while they do what they feel that they must do, yet cry, *God be merciful to me, a sinner!* Any Christian interpretation of the world's crises must take full account of the fact that we cannot help ourselves, that we have all sinned and must needs continue sinning. Obviously, the Christian Church must call on all men to consider how far, in fact, this applies to themselves, but the fact that we should think more of our own faults than of the faults of others does not mean that the others are righteous. That would be as stupid as to argue that the only people who are in danger when a boat springs a leak are those who are sitting in the part of the boat where the leak is. We are all in this situation together.

As long as we persist in thinking that sin resides in actions, so long shall we fall into the error of imagining that for a Christian international problems are "moral" ones, and that we must act according to "moral values." We shall endeavor to solve the world's problems by applying moral standards and so try to discover who has

right on their side, that we may support that side. We shall believe that if only we could discover the right things we ought to do we would have to look no further. What we forget is that we are all selfish and that in the recent invasion of Egypt by Israel the reactions of every nation involved were selfish reactions. Since this conception of "moral" and "immoral" actions is particularly strong in the United States, we are tempted here to imagine that by at the very least holding back from taking direct action, the American government had a better chance of avoiding the kind of sin that the British and the French were committing, for the American people were convinced that both Britain and France were driven to take this violent action by their selfishness. What we forget was that the American refusal to take action was equally selfish, equally guided by the desire to snatch at something they wanted for themselves. Obviously, to take violent action for our private ends is wrong, and there can be only retribution for those nations who do so. However, we turn things upside down if we imagine that the wickedness resides more in force than in seeking our private ends. After all, if it is for our private ends that we refrain from action, it follows that if action, even violent action, should prove likely to be more effective, we should probably persuade ourselves that we would be right to take it. So it was that in November 1956, the overwhelming opinion of the American people was not to become involved. But as soon as the shadow of Russia fell upon the Middle East, they swung round to the idea of at least a threat of force, of making it clear that in the last resort force might have to be used, since it had be-

come clear that the American way of life might actually be endangered by restraint.

I am not at the moment arguing that force is either desirable or undesirable in this particular context. I am merely protesting against the argument that because an action is necessary it is "right," and that because an action is "right" we are righteous people when we take that action. An action may be necessary, may indeed be urgently needed, but we remain sinners all the time, and must realize that even while we do what is needed, we are doing wrong.

Naturally, this could lead either to paralysis or to pietism, to a failure of nerve or to a withdrawal from the world altogether, both of which would be a great mistake. The sinlessness of Jesus Christ obviously did not rest in his refusal to take any part in this world, for he was fully involved in it, and it is clear from the Gospels that he took a great many actions which other people certainly thought were sinful. It was not by avoiding action, therefore, that he avoided sin. If his actions lacked the taint of sin, it is because they proceeded from sinlessness and not because they were sinless in themselves. The explanation cannot be in the actions, but in something else, and what this "something else" is must be a matter over which Christians concerned with the world's affairs should seriously ponder.

CHAPTER VIII

Religion and the Westerners

THIS is a singularly difficult thing for a Western Christian to assess, because it is well-nigh impossible for him to put himself entirely outside his own background and see it with the eyes of a non-Christian. In the discussion of the Jewish and Muslim religious backgrounds the problem was so to enter within the religious thinking that one would not make the mistake of discussing it as if religion were a phenomenon that could be examined purely objectively. In this part of our study, however, we must beware of not being objective enough. The problem is really to produce a brief survey, of equal relative value to the surveys which were made in Chapters I and IV, of some of the factors which have determined the thinking of men who, like the author, come from a background of Western Christianity.

If we bear this in mind, we can then turn to consider, as we did for both Jewish and Muslim thinking, some of the "controls" which have given direction to the thinking of the people with this Western Christian background, even though they are no longer committed to the Christian Faith. It must be remembered, of course, that Christian thought has much closer affinities to Jewish than to Muslim thought. Inevitably, as in the two previous studies, we shall be concerned with those special controls which help to explain why Westerners react differently from those who have grown up in the Jewish or Muslim world, and the emphasis will therefore be rather upon differences than upon similarities. Nevertheless, though it is true that for very nearly the last two thousand years Christian and Jewish thought have developed to some extent independently of each other, yet Christian thinking is very largely a procession from, and development of, early Jewish thought and is constantly being checked by the standards of the Scriptures, all of which were written by Jews (or possibly, in the case of one or two books of the New Testament, by Gentiles strongly influenced by Jewish traditions). Muslim thought, however, though undoubtedly influenced quite considerably in its formative period by both Jewish and Christian ideas and claiming a definite relationship with the great figures of both the Old and New Testament, in part took the form of a protest against the Jews and the Christians, and has for much of its history developed separately and in opposition. Eastern Christian thinking, it is true, has often been strongly affected by the attitude of the Muslim world in which the Eastern Christians have been forced to live, as, for instance, by Muslim fa-

talism, but this has not been true of Western Christians.

One further warning is necessary and that is that those people who have come from the West to live and work in the Levant are fairly sharply divided into those who have come for religious and those who have come for secular reasons. There are those who belong to the schools, hospitals, convents, and other religious groups and those who work in the oil companies, consulates, commercial enterprises, and the various international organizations such as U.N.R.W.A. The first group of people tend to act upon their Christian presuppositions consciously, but the members of the second group, while starting from the same presuppositions, do so unconsciously and may therefore diverge quite considerably from the limits of Christian conduct. They see no necessity to relate their activity to their background in any conscious fashion, while the first group do. It is quite true, of course, that the same distinction can be drawn also for Muslims and for Jews, but there are certain important differences. The first is that the Western Christians in the Levant are more evenly divided between the two groups, for in Israel the great majority of Jews belong to the secular group, of those who are unconsciously influenced by their religious background, while in the Muslim world the majority still belong to those who are consciously influenced by their religion, though they may often be surprisingly ignorant of the full teaching of that religion. Moreover, both the Muslims and the Jews form the majority of the population in most of those parts of the Levant which at present they occupy; and they both feel strongly that they live in regions to which, in a very real sense from their point of view, they belong and

which belong to them, even though these claims may be disputed by others. The Western Christians have no such sense, although some of them may claim certain definite "rights" in the country. They are very clearly "foreigners" and they are very much of a minority. Admittedly, they have had an influence out of all proportion to their numbers, but the fact that they are only a minority, and a foreign one at that, has tended to obscure the difference between the two groups. It is interesting that in the days of the Mandate, when the British formed a much larger percentage of the population than they do in present-day Jordan, the Palestinian Arabs clearly made this distinction. The Arab Rebellion was directed against the British government and almost no objection was raised to the existence of missionary institutions, except on purely religious grounds. The Mufti's own family and relations, for instance, continued to attend Christian schools. However, now that the total number of British in Jordan has been reduced to a mere handful the distinction has become blurred. There has been a growing objection to the missionary institutions on the grounds that they are "foreign," and all the Westerners in the country are classed as "Christian," and Christianity is judged accordingly.*

A further distinction lies in the fact that, alone of the three "religious" groups, the Christians have come with the set purpose of influencing the people among whom they live. This was not true of either the pious Jews who have come to Palestine through the centuries or of the

* This distinction must not be pushed too far. There are undoubtedly many convinced Christians among the "secular" group and some, though probably not many, among the "religious" group whose attitude is essentially secular. However, in general, the distinction is sound.

Muslims, at any rate, for several centuries. There was, it is true, an active Muslim missionary group near Haifa in the days of the Mandate, but they were very small. This conscious purpose on the part of Christian missionaries has helped to sharpen the distinction between them and the "secular" Westerners.

With this in mind, it is possible to name some of the effective controls for those coming from a Western Christian religious background, and these may be said to include (a) the missionary compulsion, (b) the necessity of martyrdom, (c) the ideal of service, and (d) the redemption of the material. To these must be added (e) the tension between authority and liberty, where the "Catholics" and the "Protestants" have tended to be influenced in their thinking differently, and (f) the call to reconciliation which, while it is certainly part of the background of the whole Christian Church, has played a specially significant part in determining the thinking of English Christians.

THE MISSIONARY COMPULSION

One of the most strongly held convictions among the many which have characterized the Christian Church throughout the centuries has been the idea that they have been called to influence and convert to their way of thinking those who are not Christian. In the course of their long history Christians have naturally held this conviction with varying intensity, but, even when it has been weak in the thinking of some parts of the Church, it has been strong elsewhere. It seems to be true that there has been no period since Christianity began when

the Christian Church has not been increasing, and often increasing rapidly, in some part of the world, whatever it may have been doing in other parts.

This constant tendency to a missionary outreach has a variety of causes. In the first place Christians have felt that they have the direct command of Jesus Christ himself to have such an influence. The Gospel According to Saint Matthew ends with the words: *All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world,* and these words were felt to have especial sanctity as being the final words which Jesus addressed to his disciples while he was with them on earth. Moreover, scattered throughout the Gospels are such expressions as *Ye are the light of the world* and *Ye are the salt of the earth: but if the salt hath lost its savor, wherewith shall it be salted? It is thenceforth good for nothing,* and there is the example which Jesus himself gave in sending out first the Twelve, and later the Seventy, disciples to spread the Good News.

Then there is the part played by the conception of the Last Judgment. Again, this has weighed with variable pressure upon the consciences of Christians, but at times it has been extremely powerful, forcing upon them the urgency to go out and awaken the rest of the world to the peril in which they stood and tell them of the salvation achieved in the person of Jesus Christ. In this they were influenced partly by the thought that they themselves would be judged if they did not do what Christ had told

them to do and partly by that love for their fellow men which was enjoined upon them by their faith. It was clearly inconsistent with the demands made upon them if they stood idle and did not make known the Good News which they themselves had received.

Biblical criticism and modern scientific thought between them have, it is true, tended somewhat to weaken the force of these two arguments, since it is now held by scholars that the words at the end of St. Matthew's Gospel are probably not an authentic command of Our Lord, and the end of the world seems to have been rendered unbelievably remote by the findings of modern science. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that a large section of Christian people are either unacquainted with, or suspicious of, biblical criticism and are, therefore, unhindered by suggestions that certain passages in the Gospels may not be authentic. In any case the argument remains. Since Christianity rests upon the statement that through Christ the world was saved, it becomes necessary that the world be told.

Then, finally, the outreach proceeded from a cause which is unrelated to reason. Whatever explanation one may give of it, it seems to be true that Christians have frequently gone out to convert others because they felt driven by an inner compulsion which they could not explain, but which likewise they could not resist. St. Paul's words, *Woe is me if I preach not the Gospel,* have been echoed by countless lesser people since his day. Moreover, it would seem in some curious way to be true that a section of the Christian Church which does not continue to stretch outwards and gather in new adherents tends to wither. Conversely, Christianity has shown a

marked ability not merely to endure translation, but actually to require it and to flourish because of it. Not only has there been nothing comparable to the establishment of the Massoretic Text, or the insistence upon the inviolability of the Arabic Quran, to preserve the nature of Christianity, but the Scriptures have even seemed to demand translation in order that they might express their nature. The effect of the vast number of translations of the Bible in promoting new upsurgings of the Christian Church are a fact of Christian history which needs no emphasizing. It would probably not be an exaggeration to say that whereas other classics endure translation, the Bible alone thrives upon it. In this it differs from almost all other sacred writings which usually have very little influence in any but the original language.

However, the missionary compulsion is often resented and misunderstood by those who are not Christian. Rabindranath Tagore in India has spoken of a "Christian imperialism," and the same dislike of Christian missionary activity is manifest throughout the Middle East. Such a resentment is entirely natural, and both Jews and Muslims have argued that Christians have no right to try to persuade them to change their faith. The only answer that one can give to this is that Christians are missionary because they cannot help themselves, however much pain it may give to their friends. That their methods often leave much to be desired is another question.

The effect of this background of missionary compulsion can be seen not only in the establishment of missionary schools and hospitals in many places in the Levant, but also in the tendency of almost all Western

peoples to feel that they have a duty to persuade other people to accept the benefits of their particular form of civilization. All the three nations which have strongly influenced the Middle East have shown this tendency. Thus the French conception of her "mission civilisatrice" has led the French in their own colonies to educate the people to want to be Frenchmen, to value a knowledge of French for its own sake, and frequently to neglect the local culture. In the Levant the elevation of French above Arabic as the language of the élite was very noticeable in the countries under French mandate, and even today the children in mission schools taught by French people are encouraged to express gratitude to France for all that they have received from her. I remember, for instance, attending the commencement exercises at a French school some four years ago and hearing the senior student deliver an address, couched in quite admirable French, in which he extolled France as *notre mère* and the source of all the learning, wisdom, and culture by which the school was graced. Such a speech would have been quite impossible in any of the other foreign schools in the Levant.

However, this is not to say that the phenomenon does not exist among the British, with whom it has taken a different form. The British are ordinarily less vocal about their missionary efforts and are not, for instance, very enthusiastic about the activity of the British Council, whose budget is one of the first things which a British government is prepared to cut in times of financial difficulty. English is taught in the schools not as being in any way better than Arabic, but merely as having considerable utilitarian value in commerce and in higher

education. However, the English often seem firmly convinced that their method of government, their system of justice and their conception of education are unparalleled and that in some sense they hold them in trust for the rest of the world. They are prepared to encourage the development of local culture and language, but they tend to alter the system of government, justice, and education until they approximate to the systems prevailing in Britain. There is at present a reaction against this "missionary" fervor in Britain and even more strongly in France, as there was also after World War I. However, one must take a longer view than the immediate present. During World War II the British were in no doubt that they held something in trust for the rest of the world.

The latest manifestation of this missionary compulsion is the growth of the concept of the "American Way of Life" as a thing to be preached, and with the development of the American influence in the Middle East it is clear that the people are being subjected to yet another attempt at conversion.

In answer to this argument concerning the missionary compulsion it may well be said that Islam is also in many parts of the world a missionary religion and is in fact rapidly increasing at the present time, even growing at the expense of the Christian Church in the Middle East. This is perfectly true, but there is this difference: true Christian missionary activity (as opposed to the secular developments of it which we have just been discussing) frequently takes the form of evangelism through and despite persecution. Not only are the missionaries often aware that if they continue to preach, they themselves will be persecuted, but those whom they persuade to

accept the Christian Faith accept it in the full knowledge that it will mean persecution for them. Muslim missionary activity has not normally this nature, and those who embrace Islam in the Middle East at present tend to do so in order to escape discrimination.

THE NECESSITY OF MARTYRDOM

The point which has just been made about the nature of true Christian missionary activity brings us to the second of the controls, that of the necessity of martyrdom. It is not suggested, of course, that martyrdom and persecution are in any way peculiar to Christianity. In view of the bitterly tragic history of the Jewish people that would be mere stupidity. Jewish people have indeed often been inclined, and with good reason, to ask whether there be any sorrow like unto their sorrow and to speak almost as if martyrdom were peculiar to Judaism. What has been peculiar to Christianity, however, has been the *necessity* of martyrdom. Christianity has depended from the very first for her development and her existence upon the readiness of her adherents to embrace martyrdom, and upon the willingness of single persons to stand for their convictions against all the rest of the world even at the cost of their lives. Jesus told his followers that to be a Christian would inevitably mean persecution, and he even went so far as to warn them that there was likely to be something wrong with them if they were not being persecuted. He himself was killed and in the early centuries the Church spread in the teeth of opposition, and could even be said to have developed because of the opposition. "The blood of the

The Old Order. Though people in the West often like to think of Arabs in terms of picturesque Bedouin, it is a false picture. The kind of life represented by this old man in his tent is passing even in Central Arabia. The Arab world is a region of great social change, and large areas are already highly westernized.

The New Order. Those who know the Middle East will realize from this young man's *tarboosh* that it is not a new picture. It was taken twenty years ago when he was one of only a handful in Amman receiving full secondary education. Today the city is full of impressive schools. This passionate desire for education is one of the most attractive features of the Arab world.



The New Challenge. The drive and enthusiasm of the young men of Israel is well-shown in the face of this Israeli student, who should be compared with the Arab student opposite. It is this dynamic zeal which seems to the Arabs so to threaten their existence and to the Jews to be their great hope for the future.

The Bewildered Victim. A child of this age, born to refugee parents, would have known no life but that of a refugee. This puzzled small boy reflects the bewilderment of the 900,000 Arab refugees, who cannot understand the forces which have brought disaster upon them, nor see anything but darkness in the future.



The Salt of the Earth. Except in Lebanon, the Christian community is only a small minority, and is everywhere sadly divided. This young man is a Copt, a representative of one of the many minority churches in Jerusalem, and upon such as he rests the task of being "the salt of the earth" in the Middle Eastern turmoil.

The Claim of Islam. Jerusalem is for Muslims a holy city of great importance, ranking after Mecca and Medina. This graceful minaret is part of the fine mosque which occupies the site of the ancient Jewish Temple, and is a shrine of deep significance in Muslim thought.

The Hope of Judaism. The so-called "Wailing Wall" is the last remaining part of Herod's Temple and therefore profoundly sacred to the Jews. It reminds us of all that Palestine has meant in Jewish thought and life. Once the Wall was thronged with worshippers, but today no Jew can go there and so it is left desolate.

The Pride of Jordan. The Arab farmer of the Levant is far from the downtrodden peasant he is too often represented to be. Sturdy and independent, he is the backbone of the country. Therefore, the future of the Arab world is tied up with the proper use and equitable distribution of the land.

The Remnant in Israel. There are left in Israel 200,000 Arabs, of whom these two children form part. Much has been done to integrate them into Israeli life, but there is still much that is unsatisfactory and their position is uneasy. Of course, not all are as poor as these two village boys.



The Light of the World. Christian hope, the spread of learning, partnership in the work of the Gospel—such are the things symbolized by these pictures of St. George's Cathedral against a stormy sky, and of Arab and Armenian students at St. George's School in Jerusalem.



martyrs is the seed of the Church." Thus it has followed that it is essentially unchristian for any followers of Christ to be allowed to cloke their faith in order to escape death, as has been permitted at times to the faithful in other religions. At his baptism a Christian child is marked with a cross as a sign "that he shall not be ashamed to confess the faith of Christ crucified," and for this reason martyrdom has constantly been proclaimed as an ideal, and at times has been set forward as being the essential mark of a Christian.

Naturally, it must be admitted that Christians have often fallen short of this ideal, both in the Middle East and elsewhere, and that at the present time the churches in the West appear to the impartial observer to have forgotten their Lord's injunctions, and to quote with approval the fact that all men speak well of them. There is, moreover, a terrible irony in the fact that Christians, who claim rightly that a readiness for martyrdom is an essential part of a true Christian's life, should so often in history have permitted themselves to have persecuted the Jews and, from time to time, each other.

Nevertheless, the fact that this necessity is a part of Christianity as faithfully proclaimed has meant that those who have grown up against the background of the Christian West have grown up in a world where it is regarded as the highest duty of man to resist tyranny, to stand out against the multitude for what is right, and to give one's life, if need be, for a cause. What is often forgotten is that this conception has no continuing validity in the West apart from Christianity. It has persisted with noble results among the liberal humanists and it has shown itself to be a power in Communism, but both these have

their roots in Christianity; when they diverge too far from it, they tend to lose the concept of martyrdom as a necessity. What must never be forgotten in the West is that if the Christian Church itself neglects the concept, as it has shown many signs of doing, or if too many people neglect the Church, martyrdom will no longer be regarded as the highest service that man can pay.

THE IDEAL OF SERVICE

A highly educated Muslim of my acquaintance once said to me that if ever anything persuaded him to become a Christian, it would be the fact that only the Christians had ever gone to work among lepers and that remark of his is a useful indication of the third of our controls, the ideal of service. When we were considering the religious background of Jewish thinking, we saw as one of the controls there the very strong sense of the community which prevails among the Jewish people, and certainly one of the most striking features of Jewish society is the responsibility which Jews feel for Jews in other parts of the world, a feeling of responsibility for which it would be difficult to find a parallel amongst another people. What has characterized Christians, however, has been a feeling of a different kind of responsibility, their responsibility for people other than themselves. It is possible, and even necessary, to be extremely critical of much that missionaries have done, but nothing can alter the fact that the tremendous missionary outreach which brought schools and hospitals and clinics to countries that never had them before took place because ordinary Christian people felt called by God to the service of men and women

whom they had never seen, and who could have had no conceivable claim upon them except that one. It is an incontrovertible fact that throughout the world, in very nearly every country, the medical, educational, and social work which is undertaken today by the state or by other agencies, was begun in the first place by Christians as an act of Christian service.

This ideal has had a potent effect upon the thinking of the Western peoples in that a public opinion has been created in the countries of the West which is intolerant of international selfishness or greed and which is prepared to demand of its own government that "something shall be done" for less fortunate people in other countries. It is the driving force of this ideal which has brought about the change from the old conception of "empire" to that of trusteeship, the remarkable activity in the international sphere of such small western nations as Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, the amazing generosity of the American people after both the First and the Second World Wars, and the readiness of so many British people in 1945 to forego part of their rations in order to help feed the Germans.

It is important to understand that this Christian conception of the duty of those in power to serve the people whom they govern does exist in the West and that probably most of those who came out under the terms of the mandates to govern the countries of the Levant held this view to a greater or a less degree, since it is very difficult for those who were governed there to see it. The Arabs and the Jews who remember the days of the Mandates are often very bitter about the British and French, and regard the governments of that time as having been

guided by motives of pure self-interest. Yet there was very often among the government officials a sincere desire to be of service to the people, and one can only say to those who doubt it that, as with the salt in the bread, they would have noticed the difference at once if it had not been there.

Nevertheless, it is possible that it is just in this area that the decline from the Christian ideal has been most noticeable, and it has become most obviously true that ideals cannot long be maintained if the compulsion behind them has been lost. We are very accustomed in these days to make fun of the idea of the "White Man's Burden" and there is no doubt that there was a great deal that was arrogant about it. Yet what we forget is that, despite the insulting assumption of superiority, it did indicate that the nineteenth-century conception of the "good life" was one spent in sweating under heavy burdens with very little thanks and without receiving a salary commensurate with the size of the burden. Today that conception no longer holds. One of the more disturbing features of the past decade has been the huge salaries that are paid to the foreign workers in the various United Nations activities and which have given such great offense to the local populations, such as the Arabs, who are paid according to a very much lower scale. Apparently the modern assumption is that men and women cannot be expected to go and work abroad in the service of their fellow men unless they are bribed into doing so. It is interesting that this should be so, and it is indicative of the distance which the Western world has moved away from the springs from which it once drew its life, because the present trend in Christian institutions is somewhat

the opposite. In the older established missions in India the missionaries were paid more than the local employees, though never on a scale parallel to modern United Nations salaries, but in the mission institutions which were developed rather later in Palestine, this mistake was not made. Mission salaries were not high, because there was very little money available, but increasingly the British and the Palestinian workers tended to be paid according to similar scales.

THE REDEMPTION OF THE MATERIAL

It is essentially part of the Jewish-Christian conception of the relationship between God and His creation that the material world is neither to be despised nor to be left out of account. God, as revealed in the Old and New Testaments, cannot, by His very nature, create what is evil or valueless or without purpose. *And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good.* In the New Testament this is made stronger than in the Old, for it is insisted that all food is clean and that *the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God.* Jesus himself made considerable use of the material world as revealing the nature of God, and in his miracles he is recorded as having multiplied the loaves and fishes and as having turned the water at the wedding into wine; and then supremely, at the Last Supper, the use which he made of the bread and the wine helped to drive home the lesson that the whole of the material creation is part of God's purpose. There have, of course, been Christian ascetics who have despised the material

world, and it has always been part of the Christian teaching that the flesh must be subdued to the spirit, for the material world may well be a source of temptation to the Christian, but, if he is in the true Christian tradition, he cannot regard it as evil and as therefore something from which he must escape. Nor can he feel it to be irrelevant, as, apparently, Muslims would tend to do, since they regard both the living and the material world as being bound by the will of God. Certain Muslim theologians have been known to teach that there is no such thing as cause and effect in the physical sphere, but that a stone, dropped from the hand, falls to the ground only because there is a separate action of the will of God which requires it to do so. If God so decided, He could at any time will it to fly upwards. Such a view of God naturally leads to a lack of interest in the material world.

It has often been pointed out that modern scientific inquiry, with all its incalculable results for the world of today, has its roots in two basic acts of faith which are characteristic of the Judaeo-Christian religion, and of that alone. These acts of faith are first, the belief that the universe is inherently "good" and that it is therefore worth studying, and second, that the Creator is *the same yesterday, and today, and forever,* and that consequently He will not reverse what He has created. The scientist, therefore, can act upon the assumption that his experiments are repeatable. Apart from these "acts of faith" he could not proceed.

An unfortunate result of the Christian conception of the essential goodness of the material world has been that those who belong to the Christian West have tended to lay too much stress upon the material and to take ma-

terial success as a criterion. The Middle East today is being stimulated by the scientific attitude of the West and by the passionate love for knowledge of the material world which they are learning from them, but they are being damaged by the Western materialistic approach. This materialism is to be seen both in the humanist pride which sees dominance over the material world as the key to salvation and in the tendency to measure success by material criteria and to equate happiness with a higher standard of living.

THE TENSION BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY

The idea of tension between two apparently irreconcilable opposites is a permanent feature of the Christian Faith. It is inherent in the nature of Christ, who is conceived as being one Person and yet as being both God and Man, and in the doctrine of the Trinity, which holds that there are three Persons and yet there is only one God. One meets it again in the tension between predestination and free will, between justification of faith and justification by works, and between the justice of God and His mercy. Indeed, the tendency of Christians to split up into separate and mutually antagonistic groups is due in large measure to the inability of the normal human mind to maintain the tension, so that too much stress is laid upon one of the two opposing ideas and this leads to a revolt against it.

One particular tension, however, has had a special effect in determining a difference of approach between the French and the British in the Middle East, and that is the tension between authority and liberty. It does not

need to be labored that one of the characteristic features of the Reformation was the insistence upon the duty of the individual to make his own interpretation of the Scriptures and that this new emphasis upon liberty of thought was one of the factors which made the scientific revolution possible. Since the Reformation it has been roughly true that the Roman Catholic Church has tended to insist more strongly upon authority and upon the duty of the individual to accept the teaching of the Church, while the churches of the Reformation have tended rather to insist upon liberty of thought. Naturally, the distinction must not be pushed too far. There are some Protestant churches which are exceedingly authoritarian and are almost as ruthless in combating "heresy" as the Roman Catholics, and in the Roman Catholic church there is a great deal more freedom of thought than outsiders normally suppose. Nevertheless, in general the distinction remains true, and is very clearly to be seen in the different approach to education. This is of importance for the Middle East, because, as has already been pointed out, all the pioneering and the leadership in education in the Middle East has been missionary, the three countries most generally responsible being Britain, France, and the United States, although at one time both the Russian and the German churches maintained schools in Palestine. Now, Britain and the United States both belong in general to the Reformation tradition, while France belongs rather to the Catholic, and the result has been a difference in approach so complete as to make discussion of educational aims and methods between the two groups exceedingly difficult. The demand in the "Anglo-Saxon" type of education is that each in-

dividual pupil shall be left free to make his own judgments, which has frequently led to a lack of discipline of a nature most undesirable in the Middle Eastern atmosphere; the French type of education, however, tends to require both pupil and teacher to submit their interpretation to higher authority, and the textbooks are written accordingly. Although, there has been a certain amount of mingling between the two types in the Levant—the American University and the British Friends' School at Brumanna are both in Lebanon, and there are several Latin schools in Palestine—yet it remains true that in general the education in Syria and Lebanon has tended to be of the French type, while the education in the two southern countries has been of the British type. It is too early to say how permanent the effect of the two types is likely to be now that the Mandates have come to an end.

THE CALL TO RECONCILIATION

Christians, if they are true to their calling, must always feel that they have a ministry of reconciliation. It is true that there are many who profess to be Christians who do not feel this, yet a religion in which there is meant to be *no distinction between Jew and Greek,* and whose founder followed the way of the Cross, must lay this responsibility upon its adherents. For this reason leaders of the Church have often felt that their calling as Christian ministers required them to mediate in labor disputes and, where possible, in quarrels between nations. This is of necessity true, or it should be true, of the whole Church and yet there is a special sense in which it is true that "it hath been the wisdom of the Church of England

. . . to keep the mean between the two extremes." A variety of circumstances have combined to make the English (and one says English here advisedly, for it is not so true of the Welsh or the Scots) particularly conscious of the necessity of pursuing the middle way to such an extent that the *via media* has become a way of life. The part played by Greek thought, with its dislike of the "banausic," in English thinking and education; the notably temperate climate of the British Isles; the fact that the English plain lies at the end of the two major routes from Europe and has constantly received both Germanic and Latin influences; the dependence of Great Britain upon foreign trade so that it has been a constant necessity to her to maintain peace throughout the world, and to limit such conflicts as do break out—these have been among the factors that have helped to give the English the idea that moderation in itself is an end to be pursued. One of the most ironical features of the history of the Palestinian mandate was that Englishmen, who are brought up to regard it as almost axiomatic that the middle way can, and must, be maintained, found themselves attempting to reconcile the opinions of two peoples who saw no virtue at all in moderation.

In conclusion it must be noticed that I am in no sense claiming that the Christian Church displays untarnished the virtues we have been discussing. Indeed, part of the tragedy of the present Western world is the failure of the Christian Church to insist upon these marks of her true nature, and the consequent weakening of the controls and their redirection into less worthy channels.

CHAPTER IX

The Background of the West

FOR the purposes of this chapter "the West" must be taken to mean Britain, France, and the United States, these being the three Western countries most concerned in the Middle East. But first three basic facts must be established: (1) However great the differences between the three countries may appear to us, it is their common purpose which is most obvious to those who live in Asia, for, as Toynbee has done well to remind us, the "World" has had more reason to be afraid of the "West" than the other way round.[18] (2) Though the West draws its sources of life from the Mediterranean world in general, yet its politics come from Europe—that is, from Athens and from Rome; but her religion has come from Asia. Finally, (3) because of this divided heritage, the West has been set over against the Middle East politically for

rather more than two thousand years, ever since the time of Alexander the Great. We must view the West, then, as an entity which has endured for longer than the Christian Church has had its being, and one which has always been opposed to the East. We do right, therefore, to use the term, "the Middle East," to which certain purists have objected, since the Arab world is certainly the "East" in that it has found itself in constant opposition to the countries of Europe, but there has always been another "East" beyond, either some fabled source of wealth which the West has longed to tap, or an enemy, a Parthia or a Russia, which the West has feared and has felt driven to resist. The northern section of the Arab Island, therefore, has been either a stepping stone or a battlefield, in the middle between the West and either what the West desired or what it feared.

As one stands in the middle, as it were in Jerusalem or Damascus, one must constantly be struck by two seemingly contradictory features of the West: its lust for life and its urge for security—the explosive vigor which compels it to seek again and again to conquer the world, and the almost passionate longing for peace, to have done with the exhaustion imposed upon it by its own energy, and at the last to relax. These features are not really contradictory, for in part the recurrent vigor of the West is due to the fierce steppeland invaders, whose incursions have driven the Western world to secure themselves against Asiatic penetration. In part also the fragmentation of European geography has hindered unity, and so the new vigor has too often expended itself in strife between the countries of the West themselves, and it has been from each other that they have sought security. It

was not until the development of a Western civilization in America that any *continental* pattern of peace was developed, and then only with difficulty.

We of the West are inclined to see the center of civilization progressing steadily towards the northwest, from Egypt to Crete, from Crete to Greece, from Greece to Rome, and then, in course of time, leaping over the Alps to take root in France, to pass from thence to England and thence again across the wide Atlantic to America. We see the parts rather than the whole, and we watch, as it were, a relay race, in which the torch of learning passes from hand to hand, and as one country becomes exhausted, another is ready and eager to continue the course.

Those who live outside the West do not see it in this fashion. Instead, they see a being with a phoenix-like ability to re-create itself, and constantly reliving the terrible pattern of the past. Alexander is followed by Pompey, and Rome by Byzantium. Then come the Crusades, and after them the power of Venice. Napoleon gives way to the might of Britain, and now Britain is being replaced by America. The hesitancy about the Eisenhower Doctrine of so many of the Arab states at the present time is due, in no small measure, to the fact that they cannot help saying to each other, "Isn't this where we came in?" They have, so to speak, no great desire to see the movie through again.

We think we see the deserts growing restive, pouring forth their warlike tribes into the peaceful agricultural lands which lie around them, scorching and destroying the culture which they invade, and this indeed does happen; but we forget that the settled lands of Europe have

been equally explosive, and usually with more lasting effect. More than once the West has swept across the whole known world as irresistibly as a tide at the flood. Alexander reduced to tears because there was nothing more to conquer, the vast expanse of the Roman Empire, the huge Nestorian outreach at a time when the Western Empire was in decline, the successive waves of the Crusaders, the voyages of discovery, the growth of one empire after another, the parcelling out of the whole continent of Africa between the European nations, the subduing of the vast spaces of America, the great missionary movement of the nineteenth century, which brought into being a world-wide Christian Church—all these reflect the Western inability to be contained and the fierce dynamism which is not yet exhausted, for if Europe is gasping for breath, the United States is just flexing her muscles. We cannot understand the West, and especially not the West in relation to the World, if we do not see it almost as the Psalmist saw the sun: *which cometh forth as a bridegroom out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a giant to run his course. It goeth forth from the uttermost part of the heaven, and runneth about unto the end of it again; and there is nothing hid from the heat thereof.* It is this which most of all appalls the World when she contemplates the West, this air of blatant triumph, of self-confidence and glory, with which the West is wont to deck itself, and which, until the rise of Russia, had too long gone unrebuked.

Nevertheless, the West has seldom felt entirely secure, and the search for security is, in part, the explanation of her aggressiveness. Again it is needful to see the West as a whole, and this time to see her as she saw her-

self, surrounded by her foes and in constant need of maintaining a vigorous offense, for whenever she relaxed it seemed as if she were overrun. Greece had to resist the much greater power of the Persians, and even the vast Roman Empire never had a quiet frontier. As one country after another was gathered within the Roman rule, so it appeared that there were still barbarians without, ready to press in upon her if she did not defend herself. Picts and Scots, the tribes of eastern Europe, and the Parthians of Asia—they were all around her, and she could not bring any of them completely under her control. When western Europe recovered from the barbarian invasions it was to find herself threatened by the Muslim empire which had moved against the Byzantine power a century before. They were checked at Tours in 732, but the struggle was to continue for over a thousand years, and in its new form is still with us today.

Those who have been brought up in either Great Britain or the United States are insufficiently aware of this unending struggle, and certainly do not take into account how widespread it has been both in space and time. Charles Martel of France, and later Godfrey de Bouillon, Reynaud de Chatillon and the saintly King Louis, Richard Coeur de Lion of England, the Emperor Frederick, Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, Don John of Austria, and John Sobieski of Poland, have all in their day been acclaimed the champions of the Christian West against the Moors, and the Islamic power has advanced as close upon the peninsula of Europe as the Pyrenees, as Malta, and as Vienna.

Then every leading country in the West has had rea-

son to feel beleagured. The Alps, *splendide mendax,* have been but a poor defense for the Italian peninsula; France required centuries to reach her "natural" frontiers at the Jura and the Pyrenees, and to this day has not yet succeeded in establishing a satisfactory defensive line to the northeast; Germany has felt herself to be surrounded, and even England, mistress of the largest empire the world had ever seen, more than once found herself divided from her enemies by only twenty miles of fortunately stormy sea.

In this unending search for security each of the three countries with which we are most concerned has reacted differently. France, a continental power, exposed to the danger of sudden invasion by her immediate neighbors, has placed her trust in her army and frequently also in the leadership of one man, a Louis XIV or a Napoleon, and when she first essayed a republic, was also the first country to introduce the *levée en masse.* To this day she is far more likely to attempt the use of force to maintain her position than either Britain or the United States, as witness her bombardment of Damascus, and the severity of some of her actions in North Africa.

Great Britain is obviously in much less danger of a sudden, surprise invasion, and has therefore developed a real horror of a large standing army, which has seemed to her to be an instrument of tyranny. She has tended rather to withdraw from Europe and to place her faith in a powerful fleet, and, in later days, in an efficient air force or the development of guided missiles. This "fleet mentality" has had a curious effect on the British approach to international affairs, for a navy serves a constructive purpose even in peacetime over and above the

defense of the country to which it belongs, in that it acts as an international police force. The elimination of piracy and the fact that there is "a security for such as pass on the seas upon their lawful occasions" * have been the result of the British conception of the proper use of her fleet, essentially a British contribution to international thinking, and one which she has now passed on to the United States. It is interesting that Britain has tended to use both her army, small though it was, and her air force in the same way. The present tentative feeling towards the possibility of an international police force, e.g. in the Gaza Strip, can probably be traced to the success of the British naval policy in the nineteenth century.

It may be objected that for an Englishman to write of French acts of "severity" in North Africa and at the same time of the British "police force" is the merest chauvinism. However, it must be insisted that *vis-à-vis* the World there is very little essential difference to be made between the different Western countries, and that we are all responsible for each other's actions. Of course, the freedom of the seas has been manifestly to Britain's advantage, and Britain should certainly not claim the credit for pursuing her own interests, but it has been fortunate for the world that those were her interests, just as it was fortunate for the ancient world that Rome felt it was to her advantage to maintain peace in the Mediterranean. The British further need to remember that it was their control of the seas which led them into that "gunboat diplomacy" which is so deplored in the United States.

* It is interesting that this phrase comes from the form of prayer which it is ordered shall be used daily on the ships of the British navy.

The United States, being still more remote, has been able to seek yet a third method of security, that of complete isolation. This still exercises a great fascination for many American people, who tend to distrust the United Nations as involving them in dangerous foreign entanglements and who feel that the most profitable course for the United States to follow would be to retire into "Fortress America" and let the rest of the world destroy itself if it wants to.

What is interesting about these three methods of security, the strong army capable of aggression, the withdrawn and watchful police force, and the policy of complete isolation, each so different from the others, is not that any one policy is morally better (though the inhabitants of each country like to think that they have this added advantage), but that each country must adopt exactly the same final goal in order to make its policy effective, the goal of complete, unquestioned domination. This goal is most immediately obvious when a country has a large army, and therefore a large army has always seemed a threat to the surrounding countries, which usually unite to prevent the goal being attained. Consequently all the recent attempts at the domination of Europe by force have failed. But there are reflections of this attitude in the French desire to make their colonies ultimately part of France, and to call even the mandated territories "France outre-mer."

Britain, which has embarked upon a policy of granting independence to her colonies almost as soon as it can be managed, has seldom conceived of domination in quite this sense. Yet her policing of the seas could never have been achieved without dominating them, and the

firm determination to fight to the death any country which presumed to question that domination. Moreover, this domination itself required the possession of strategic points along the world's great sea-routes, and of these Britain has been very much less ready to relinquish her possession. To any suggestion of a change of status for Gibraltar she gives a flat No, and for Malta she is ready to do what is entirely unprecedented for her and allow it to become part of Britain; she is noticeably slow to let go her hold upon Cyprus, and does not appear to contemplate any change at all in the position of Aden or the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, though she must know that Arab pressure upon them is sure to be intensified. It is true that Singapore is soon to achieve self-government, but it is also true that World War II made it clear that Britain was unable to hold it. It is striking that her most dramatic use of force in recent years has been an attempt to regain control of part of a great sea-route from which she had most reluctantly withdrawn.

Similarly on the western side of the Atlantic, the isolation of the United States required not only the strength of the British fleet behind which she could shelter, but also the unashamed domination of the New World by the United States itself. This has been made abundantly clear on more than one occasion, and, though the policy of the "big stick" has given way to that of the "good neighbor," the purpose is still domination, though admittedly domination which is accepted with reasonably good grace because at present it takes the form of leadership. However, when the United States feels that the unity of the Americas is at stake, she is not averse to coercing any recalcitrant republic into demonstrating it,

as when she brought strong pressure to bear upon certain South American countries to make them vote for the partition of Palestine in 1948. Equally, it is not to be supposed that she would allow the South American states to do just what they liked. Certainly, her concern for their independence is not mere self-interest, for it is a fact which the World does not sufficiently realize that Americans seriously desire that every country shall be independent. However, their independence is to her advantage, and she would almost certainly find some way of taking into "protective custody" a South American country which voted, however constitutionally, in favor of being admitted to the Soviet Union. Likewise, she could no more tolerate the growth of one South American country into a position of absolute authority than Britain can permit a powerful and possibly hostile country to gain control of the channel ports.

We have had to spend considerable time on this because Western people find it difficult to believe that they are in this position and that they must dominate the world or go under. They point out that many small countries of Europe manage to exist without bending anyone to their will, and that Canada and the United States continue side by side without either dominating the other. However, these examples are illusory, for the smaller European countries exist only because the West has been dominated in the recent past by Britain and at the present time by America. They could not live without this defense. Canada and the United States likewise co-exist because they have grasped the tremendous importance of not acting in opposition to each other in any essential matter. Yet, it was clear during the war that

Canada would never have been permitted to accept occupation by Nazi troops, even in the very unlikely event of her having wanted to. There are limits to her freedom of choice.

If, therefore, this domination by the West is a fact, and almost a necessary part of her existence, is it then evil? The great majority of people, both in the East and the West, would probably reply that it was, that it is quite intolerable that any country should dominate another. Self-determination is the watchword of the present age and one which seems to have the authority of Christian sanction behind it; the claim for independence and self-government has had the widespread support of the Christian Church, both in the East and the West, and rather particularly of the Protestant churches. Nevertheless, it is an assumption that must be questioned, for it is far from certain that the Christian Faith does give this support.

Ideally, of course, domination is not a proper relationship and can never characterize the Kingdom of Heaven. However, the Kingdom of Heaven, whatever large sections of our hymnal may encourage us to believe, is most unlikely to come into being here on earth, and in any case it is not here yet. Meanwhile, in every country the government must continue, doing the best with the situation that it has. In this situation there must be leadership, and leadership to be effective must be both capable of decision and have the power to bend the recalcitrant to its will. However soft the velvet glove, the hand that is in it must be made of iron, or there will be anarchy. In fact we recognize this, for though we may talk a great deal about self-determination, in practice our enthusi-

asm for it is limited. The people of Eire, for instance, doubt the right of the northern Irish to choose to be governed as part of Britain, and the Greeks in Cyprus deny the Cypriot Turks the same privilege. The most striking example is perhaps the American Civil War, in which the right to self-determination of even so large a group as the southern states was ruled out once and for all, so that today, though there may be argument about whether certain territories should be allowed to join the Union, a decision by, let us say, Texas to withdraw and form her own government would be regarded as inherently wrong. It is idle to pretend that this decision was taken without the dissenting group being dominated by the others, and even to this day no small part of the resistance of certain sections of the South to desegregation lies in the fact that they feel it is being imposed upon them by a still dominant North. Christians must surely work for the removal of segregation, but they would be blind indeed if they imagined that this could be achieved by sweet reasonableness alone, and without the imposition of authority, any more than the slave trade could have been brought to an end without the strength of the British fleet.

So true is it that *the kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them* that it is also true that *they that exercise authority upon them are called benefactors,* for some form of authority and domination is built into our way of life here on earth. Were the present rulers to abdicate, there would soon be found those who would take their place. Indeed, they are waiting at the door already. It is puerile to suggest that this is not so.

Furthermore, there are degrees of domination, and to

group them all under the same head would be absurd. It is therefore nonsense to speak, as some are found to do, of the triumph over slavery and oppression which took place with the establishment of the State of Ghana. One may be, and one must be, deeply critical of the ill effects of the lordship of the West, but the fact remains, and should be deeply pondered by the people of Africa and Asia, that very few people ever run away from the West because they are afraid of it, whereas hundreds every month flee the Soviet domination. Moreover, it is also true that the challenge to Western lordship has come largely from *within* the West, for such ideas as trusteeship, education for self-government, and the rest are Western concepts, and a complete reversal of any theory of empire previously held. Of course, over against this, as a grim and dreadful warning, stands *apartheid,* and behind that again the bestialities of the Nazi tyranny. They should be taught in every Western school, not, as alas they are so often taught, as examples of the evils we have put behind us, but as examples of the evils of which we in the West are capable.

In face of this defense of some form of "domination" the Christian reader must be tempted to object that it is all very well, but surely it is specious, for did not our Lord, when he spoke of the kings of the Gentiles exercising lordship, go on immediately to say, *But ye shall not be so*? Certainly he did, but the mistake is to believe that the evil rests in *being dominated.* We tend to argue that it is quite wrong for one country to be governed by another, and that therefore every country must govern itself. Consequently, many feel that whenever a group of people have opted to pass under the govern-

ment of another country, the only possible explanation must be that they were in some way coerced into making this unnatural decision. Now, there is from the Christian point of view absolutely nothing wrong with *being governed,* and it will be a sad day for the Christian Church if she is found to be teaching that to serve is unfitting for the disciples of him who took upon him the form of a slave for our sakes. One is bound to wonder whether the churches of Asia, when they have felt driven to strive for independence, have always kept the faithful sufficiently aware of this, or whether the churches in the West who struggled, and justifiably, for the rights of the working people were always conscious of the dangerous path upon which they had started.

The evil rests rather in the *dominating,* not so much in the activity, which it appears must be done by somebody, but in the terrible danger of corruption which to be in a dominating position imposes upon the persons so placed. It is a curious fact of Western thinking at the present time that though domination is thought to be evil, leadership is highly respectable, and we speak of training for leadership as the goal of education. However, the Bible is noticeably discouraging about the necessity of producing leaders and speaks, in fact, of leaders only in the most disparaging sense. Apart from the use of leader three times with a military connotation, the word is used only twice, once in the Old Testament and once in the New. In the first we are told that *the leaders of this people cause them to err,* and in the second Jesus says, *Let them alone; they be blind leaders of the blind.*

The corruption of power is immediately evident when one considers the behavior of British people abroad. It

is not, I think, unfitting in me, even though I am an Englishman, to point out that in their own home the British are a fairly kindly people, not given to excesses of violence even in times of political stress, and ready to accept that definition of a gentleman which says he is one who never willingly gives pain to another. Yet when they are stationed, even for a short while, in a country of which they are the effective masters their standard of conduct deteriorates rapidly. The harm that was done in the Middle East, for example, by the British habit of using such opprobrious terms as "Wog" for the people of the country was quite incalculable. Moreover, it went further than that. I have known of cases in the army where orders were given to drivers that if by chance they ran over an Arab, they were to ensure that he was dead in order to save trouble.* It is sometimes very difficult to be proud of one's own country when one lives abroad.

Unfortunately, this is not a new thing in the relations between the Arab world and the West, for the position of leadership seems inevitably to cause the leaders to think of the others as people who are not so much to be led as to be *used.* Once this idea has gained a hold, then the ends are held to justify the means, and it must not be forgotten that, because of its lust for life, the desires of the West are insatiable. Treachery becomes permissible because it achieves its object, and economic development moves over into exploitation. So it was before the time of Muhammed, and of the Byzantine conduct in

* Lest it be thought that I have relied upon tainted sources—for the Middle East is full of unfounded atrocity stories—let me say that I gained this intelligence from sources within the British army itself. Of course, such a deplorable outlook is unfortunately not confined to British commanders, nor is it universal there.

that time it has been said, "Thus the Greeks paved the way for their own downfall. Within a century or so Muslim Arabs were at the gates of Constantinople, and its ultimate fall to the Turks in 1453 was the logical outcome of the shameful treatment of the Arab Christians by their orthodox rulers. Their policy was as foolish as it was wicked. Henceforth they stood for tyranny and injustice in the eyes of the Arabs and through them Christianity was associated with perjury." [19]

Of course, this is by no manner of means the whole picture. In saying that the West departs from its standard of conduct, it is important that we realize also that it has a standard. Moreover, this standard is from Jerusalem, and not from Athens or from Rome. Archbishop Temple, commenting on the phrase from St. John's Gospel, *We worship what we know; for salvation is from the Jews,* says, "That last phrase is of supreme importance. The difference between East and West, which we so easily regard as geographical and racial, is really, as Edwyn Bevan has pointed out, a difference between those who have and those who have not come under the influence of the Bible." [20]

Politically, the most important feature of the Bible is the prophetic conception that the rulers are under God, and therefore under the Law, and that for this reason they also will have to answer for their actions before the throne of grace. This concept alone might have been of little avail, if it had not been accompanied by the understanding that God Himself had placed here in this world men whose duty it was to call the rulers to account. Terrible though the occasion of it might be, Samuel's judgment upon the first Jewish king laid down a principle

of the utmost political importance, *Hath the Lord as great delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the Lord? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams. For rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft, and stubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry. Because thou hast rejected the word of the Lord, he hath also rejected thee from being king.* The part that this concept played in Hebrew thinking is clear from the fact that Nathan's stern rebuke to David was preserved as part of Scripture, even though the king rebuked was a man who was looked back upon later as the very ideal of what a king should be.

For this reason government in the West has differed from government elsewhere in that it has been troubled by a conscience. Admittedly, there have been periods, even extended periods, when it has seemed to be little restrained by this uncomfortable possession, but these periods have all had their end. Sooner or later there have arisen people who have spoken out boldly and have said that this or that policy is not of God, and though they may have been little heeded at the time, or may even have been martyred for their courage, their word has in the end, as is usual with the Word of God, accomplished that whereunto it was sent. Sometimes, it is true, these prophets have not spoken openly of God, but they have spoken within the biblical tradition, and to people whose hearts could be touched because it was the biblical tradition which they knew.

We may see the results of this when we consider even the events of the last two hundred years, the abolition of slavery, the factory acts, the organization of trade unions, and in the international sphere the tremendous

change involved in the disappearance of the old concept of "empire" and its translation into the theory of government on behalf of the people who are governed.

As one looks round on those countries where the majority of the Christians belong either to the Roman Catholic or the Orthodox branches of the Christian Church, one is tempted to say that this is a feature of Western life most noticeably characteristic of the Protestant countries, and this may be right. The idea, after all, derives from the Bible, and it is in these countries that on the whole the Bible has been given greater prominence. However, one must not forget that the Roman Catholic Church has a noble record of resistance to tyranny and has a much longer list of martyrs for the Faith in Communist countries than Protestants can claim. At the risk of generalizing, it might be true to say that Protestants are more ready to stand in judgment upon an ordinary government, and thereby prevent the growth of tyranny; but if tyranny does occur, then the witness of the Roman Church is more thorough and sustained, since she has a greater understanding of the place in God's purposes of suffering. It is worthy of note, for instance, that Protestant missionaries, though no less utterly devoted, tend to withdraw if a situation arises in which they can do their work no longer; Catholics are more likely to stay on, and prepare to bear witness, if no other way is open to them, by their martyrdom.

The results of this "conscience" within the political structure of the West have been twofold. First, there is an inner tension, not merely the clash between church and state, but the tension in the minds of the "practical" between the clamor of the world and the demands of

God. Thus, one has compromises, plateaus as it were, between the heights and the abyss, upon which it is possible to move with some comfort and freedom, and which show themselves in such ideas as the "Truce of God," the "just price," and "equal but separate facilities." Sometimes, the compromise is but a breathing space and the tension is renewed, since those who speak in the name of God cannot rest content with compromise. Sometimes, however, the tension is relaxed and it is the world which, equally impatient with compromise, is triumphant. What would one not give today, for instance, for a "Truce of God" to mitigate the horrors of modern warfare? Even so, everything is not necessarily lost. The growth of the Red Cross, the work of Florence Nightingale, and the Hague Convention, are all evidences of this. So accustomed are we to this tension with its sometimes illogical results in the West that we tend to think that it is universal, and are shocked when, as in the war in the Pacific, we come up against people who have not been nourished in this tradition.

The second result is the accusation of hypocrisy which the world is bound to level against the West, since those who live outside the West must be impressed by the difference between her claims and her actions. She seems to them to prate a great deal about freedom and justice and the like, but to be singularly unwilling to grant them when they are asked for. If the West points out, with considerable reason, that the World would know little of freedom and justice if they had not had the West as their teacher, the World is apt to reply that a great many areas would have known nothing of colonialism either.

The West is inclined to resent these accusations, since

she is bound to be conscious of so much that the World has gained by her influence. Heads are hot in Asia and Africa at the present time, but it is to be hoped, for their souls' health, that in course of time the people will come to assess their heritage in due proportion, which, one is tempted to think, they might do more readily if the West did not remind them of it quite so often. The World needs to remember that it has been characteristic of Western countries, and of Western countries only, that occasionally the people have been persuaded to rise above self-interest and pursue a policy of real generosity. Such events have been rare, very rare, but they have occurred. The abolition of slavery in British possessions, the Marshall Plan, the readiness of the Bonn government to pay reparations to Israel are examples. It is easy now to point out that it was in the self-interest of the countries concerned to do these things, *but it did not appear so at the time.* They did them essentially because they believed them to be right. The World is justified in pointing out, however, that each of these "righteous actions" has to be considered as an act of reparation for some evil that the West had committed, and this the West should never allow itself to forget. Yet it remains true that on these rare occasions the reparation was made, and, it is to be noted, always by a generation which had reason to regard itself as not responsible.

These, nevertheless, were rare occasions, and the World is right to point out with vigor that they are not typical of the West; they are, at the very most, typical of a possibility within the West. It is dangerous for the Church to dwell upon these things, however much they may be part of Western history. It is more urgent that

she should keep constantly before the public view the opinion of the West which the World has—strong and lusty, incorrigibly arrogant; capable, it is true, of great generosity, but often of that kind of generosity which is worse than a blow in the face, the insulting bounty of the potentate; dangerously aggressive and terrifyingly able. The technical ability of the West is an insult to the World, which for this reason will hate even while it admires. The Church must keep this picture before the public mind because this is the situation with which they must live.

CHAPTER X

The People of the West

ONCE again we must view the West as a whole. Obviously, the statements that will be made here can be at best only a rough approximation and must certainly not be taken as true for any one country in particular. With this warning, however, it is possible to suggest that the attitude of the Western people to international affairs in general, and therefore to the affairs of the Middle East, can perhaps best be described as one of "polarity." That is to say that their complex and lengthy history has imposed upon them a number of attributes that can be grouped together in conflicting pairs; and all these the people display, though entirely unconscious of the tension, at one and the same time. Thus, they are free because of their democracy, and yet the same democracy imposes upon them limitations of which they are often

unaware; they are at the same time complacent and fearful; they are generous and selfish, idealist and materialist.

The first of these conflicts arises from the fact that democracy in its modern form is a mature political system which nevertheless imposes immaturity upon the policies of the countries where it obtains. It is mature because it can properly be reached only by a process of natural growth, and in a country with a sufficiently long history to give the necessary stability to what is, after all, an extremely unstable, even seesaw, system of government. No undeveloped country, and equally no young country, can be truly democratic, because in the one case the people are unable to perform their part, and in the other the legitimacy of the government can too easily be called in question. It is therefore a necessity that a young country, or even an old country which is undeveloped, shall have some form of personal rule. We can see this demonstrated today in the personal ascendency of such national leaders as Ben Gurion, Nasser, Nuri es-Sa'id, Nehru, and Kwame Nkrumah, even though in the majority of these countries the form of government is theoretically democratic. It is idle to expect such countries to adopt more than the trappings of democracy; and the seriousness of the British-French mistake in the autumn of 1956 lay not so much in their use of force, but in their attempt to overthrow, rather than to contain, President Nasser, who is as much a necessary part of the Egyptian development as Kemal Ataturk was to the Turks. Their violent opposition could serve only to confirm him in his power.

Government by the people in any effective sense must

be a later development, and the universal suffrage which really does elect governments in an orderly alternation must come last of all, because it requires a population with, at the very least, universal education in a more than rudimentary form. In this sense democracy, as we understand it today, is "mature." However, the very fact that the government is responsible to the mass of the people, and must satisfy them as to its policies, means that the policies are ultimately in the hands of the immature, for at any stage of a nation's development those in the population who can be described as being politically mature must be fewer, very much fewer, than those who have as yet given little serious thought to political questions. These last form the mass of the electorate.

This fact is a very serious limitation of Western freedom because it makes the population of a Western country slaves to themselves. It effectively limits their freedom to choose their own government because it almost compels them to choose the mediocre, or at best to choose good men for shoddy, superficial reasons. The inability of the ordinary people to appreciate great issues requires that these issues shall be presented to them in short, deceptive slogans, such as "the war to end war" or "a just and durable peace." A national election certainly gives the people the leaders they think they want, but it very seldom gives them great men, since the people cannot understand greatness. It is only in times of extreme stress that they elect a Franklin Roosevelt or a Churchill, and it is this fact which sometimes causes democracy to destroy itself; for if the stress is unduly prolonged or unduly severe, the people may be so relieved

by the presence of a great leader that they thrust all power into his hands, thereby making him a dictator.

Another serious limitation upon the freedom of the people is their inability to get rid of someone who proves to be ineffective, or, what is even worse, an outstanding man who has been exhausted by the strain of office, so that he loses his power to assess the essentials of a situation. Because of the immaturity of the electorate they obviously cannot be given the power to expel a leading member of the government, or they would be clamoring for the resignation of anyone who took an action that was momentarily unpopular. Security of tenure is essential if the government is to continue, and if there is to be any real policy at all, as is amply demonstrated by the inability of French governments to stay in power (though fortunately it is not in the hands of the French electorate to dislodge a government). However, the fact that the minister is not easily forced to resign can have very serious results indeed, and especially in international affairs. Ernest Bevin, Franklin Roosevelt, and Sir Athony Eden are three recent examples of men who had been outstanding in their time, but who became so worn out by office that their insight became blurred and their judgment unsteady. Roosevelt's inability to see the imperialism of Russia, and the impatience of both Bevin and Eden with the intractability of the Middle Eastern situation are tragic examples of the price which the West must pay for the limitations in the sphere of foreign policy of a democratic system.

In this situation the West is quite alarmingly complacent. Confident of its immense technical ability, the very

much greater extent of its education, and the long history that it has had of managing the World's affairs, it assumes that the present situation is also within its orbit, and that all the factors of a crisis can somehow be made amenable to Western control, and all the powers involved be dragooned or cajoled into accepting the intentions of the West. A very disturbing feature of the popular Western attitude at the present time is that the people of the Middle East are constantly spoken of as if they were children. Consequently, one is told that Nasser or Ben Gurion, according to the sentiments of the speaker, must be "taught a lesson," or perhaps "be left to stew in his own juice until he comes to his senses," as if all that was involved was a decision whether the child should be smacked, or docked of his pocket money, or possibly be told to stay in his room until he is sorry.

In part this is the result of certain well-nigh indestructible myths which belong to the thinking of every country. Thus the British are convinced, despite massive evidence to the contrary, that the spirit of a Lawrence or a Gertrude Bell is part of the British heritage, and that they possess a certain "Arab know-how," which is not part of the make-up of other nations. The Americans in their turn believe that no one in the West but they can really appreciate the thoughts of young nations struggling to be free, and that for this cause the older "colonial" nations should be elbowed out and the one nation that really understands be given a chance to speak. Finally, France rests upon the certainty that the French alone know what civilization really is and that any adventure undertaken by Britain and America without the benefit of her mellow advice is likely to come to

disaster. In part also it is the result of the deplorable habit of fitting people into patterns, and especially into that pattern which the speakers know. Every country tries to repeat in the Middle East, therefore, some policy which has appeared to them to be successful in another situation, and is certain that for that reason it will succeed.

Nevertheless, the West is afraid, and the fear that they have is of what seems to them to be the ultimate evil, another war. For this reason very little that is done by politicians or statesmen is assessed on its true merits. It is judged rather by whether it *appears* to have reduced this danger, and any action which has this appearance is applauded, though very few people stop to ask whether in all seriousness it has done so or no. Thus, the "meeting at the summit" in the summer of 1955 can hardly be said in retrospect to have made war less likely, but it was generally credited with having done so at the time, and so it was hailed as a "diplomatic triumph." Similarly, the events of November, 1956, seemed to bring a major war so close to reality that people discussed openly whether it was a matter of months or only weeks. The widespread condemnation of the British-French action in the West was based on the assumption that it was a reversion to colonialism and that colonialism is a major cause of war. In fact, as Sir Norman Angell has pointed out, "All the combatants of both the world wars of this century were sovereign and independent; none was a colony 'rightly struggling to be free.' They fought *because* they were independent, clung to sovereignty with such passion that they were unable to form any sort of international collective defense." [21] Colonialism may,

it is true, extend the *area* of the conflict, because the colonies are dragged in at the heels of their protector, but those who start wars are always independent, and as we increase the number of independent countries, we must face the possibility that we may also be increasing the likelihood of war.

So severe is this fear of war that the people of the West seldom stop to ask whether those whom they fear are themselves equally afraid, though it is possible that we have here the true explanation of the sharpness of the Russian reaction in the fall of 1956. The tactless note which spoke openly of the possibility of guided missiles being dropped on Britain was more probably an effort to prevent a war which Russia thought was about to happen, than an attempt on the Russian part to use the opportunity to start one. Because of this haunting fear the West is constantly prevented from seizing the initiative, and tends to interpret every action that it takes in the international field as being taken to counter the permanently aggressive intentions of the Soviet. The Western peoples, who cry to their leaders all the time, "Don't annoy the beast!" would do well to consider Premier Monnet's dictum, "If Russia is bluffing, then we should call the bluff; if she is not bluffing, there is all the more reason to strengthen our position."

Once again, this is *not* to say that Britain and France were right, but if they were wrong—as I believe they were—they were wrong because they had misinterpreted the situation. If the assertion of the British government is true (though it does seem to be increasingly clear that it is not entirely true), that there was no collusion with Israel, then surely both Britain and

France should have acted in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement, even without the United States, and have issued an ultimatum to Israel alone, since Israel was undoubtedly guilty of the very kind of action which the Agreement had been designed to prevent. Of course, she had been very greatly provoked and the activity of the *fedayeen* undoubtedly constitute another form of aggression. However, by the effective restraint of Israel they would have strengthened their own position if they had wished at a later date to restrain Egypt. The folly was to try to combine the restraint of Israel with the punishment of Egypt for an entirely other activity directed against themselves. By this attempt to telescope their purposes into one resounding action which should achieve everything, they made it possible for Russia to pose openly as the friend of the Arabs, they exposed themselves, and with good reason, to the fury of the Arab and the Asiatic world, and they failed lamentably to achieve any of the goals they had set themselves. It is not the taking of strong action in itself which is necessarily wrong—it is doubtful, in fact, whether a *government* can ever be pacifist—but the taking of strong action for the wrong reasons.

Naturally, if there was collusion between the three countries, then the British-French action can properly be described only as damnable.

The third contradiction in the West is the illogical combination of generosity and selfishness. Generous they certainly are, though the world is not fond of admitting it, and it is a feature of the West which should be more generally recognized. The Arabs may think at times that they hate America's guts, but for all that, not

only is it every Arab boy's longing to study in an American college, *but he assumes as a matter of course that some kindly Americans will pay for him to do it, not merely because he thinks they ought to, but because he knows from experience that this is how the American people do behave.* A great deal of the help thus given may be unwise, but it still remains that it is given, and given constantly, even to those whom the donors have never met. It is one of the great facts of the present time.

This generosity of the West shows itself also in a genuine concern for those whom they describe as the "underdog," and this concern is one of the more admirable features of Western thought. That the Western peoples, and surprisingly the peoples of the dominating countries most of all, should show this instinctive sympathy with the less fortunate is a strange and remarkable fact, for Dives does not normally bother himself with Lazarus. Nevertheless, the varied history of the three Western countries with which we are concerned has caused each of them to interpret this sympathy differently. The Americans have had maintained before their eyes the plight of the Jewish people, and have had a more persistent background of literal interpretation of the Bible than the European countries (the "Bible Belt" is essentially an American phenomenon), and for this reason are conditioned already to see the Palestine problem as one of the Jewish people struggling to enjoy their own again. Moreover, the "frontier" is still a potent myth in America and it is in terms of this myth that they interpret the Middle Eastern situation. The *Halutzim,* or Zionist pioneers, shine forth as the heroes of the untamed waste, bringing law and order and the benefits of civiliza-

tion to an area which is visualized by Americans as the sort of "Wild West" they see on their television sets.

The British, on the other hand, have a somewhat different biblical heritage, and almost nothing of the "frontier" in their history. It is true that they began by being generally pro-Zionist because of their biblical upbringing, but they were forced to reconsider this sympathy in the light of their imperial heritage, for whatever charges may be brought against the British colonial administration, it aims at being a serious attempt to train backward nations to govern themselves. A very large number of conscientious, faithful colonial officials have been guided by this principle, and see themselves as charged, so far as in them lay, to serve the people of the country in this sense. In this respect it is instructive to compare the British administration of Palestine and Transjordan. In Transjordan the British felt "at home." It is true that the situation there ministered to their pride, for they had the feeling of the squire striding upon his domains and caring for the grateful peasantry. Yet this is not necessarily a bad relationship at one stage of a nation's development, and the very few British officials who were there, men of the calibre of Cox and Peake and Glubb, served the country well and with a deep and abiding affection.

In the Jewish immigrants of Palestine, however, the British faced people who were in no sense at all more backward than they were, and who resisted impatiently the kindly, protective role of the British administration, so that the sympathies of the British in the country became increasingly pro-Arab. The operative word here is "protective." It is the police-force role once more, and

especially the role of the English "bobby," unarmed even with a baton, trained to be courteous and helpful. The British colonial conception is to protect their charges from every external danger, and even from external stimuli which may be too great for them in their present formative stage. Those who tend to think on these lines are bound to see the Arab as the "underdog" and Zionism as the external pressure from which they need to be defended. Part of the importance of recent events has been that they have forced both the British and the Americans to ask whether their traditional sympathies may not have to be reversed.

In France the biblical heritage is replaced by that of "the Church," and there is no tradition either of "frontier" or of protective administration. There is, however, a tradition of charity, of care for the fatherless and widow, for the outcast and oppressed. The tradition of "the Church" as opposed to the tradition of "the Bible" may lead to a weakness of the prophetic voice, and therefore to a certain inability to forewarn and to prevent oppression, but those who know what it is to belong to the Fellowship of Christ's Body do a wonderful job of relieving the *effects* of oppression. Their tradition is rather to stress the welcoming arms of "Mother Church," ever ready to receive into her love and affection those who are without. It is interesting that though French people speak of "la patrie" and the English of their "motherland," their conceptions of colonial government are exactly the opposite. The British try to perform a father's role, and train the colonial "children" to stand on their own feet and live their own life, the educational function in fact which is the ideal of the English "Public School."

But the French think of France as a mother to the children, giving them her love and making a home for them, where they may live and be at peace, and from which they will never want to stray. For this reason the French are always more distressed than the British when a colonial people demand independence. The British tend to dispute not the intention but the date. France's fury with Nasser for his support of the North African rebels stems from the conviction that he is thereby fomenting an activity which they see as not only wrong but unnatural.

Yet with this generosity goes selfishness, deep, pervasive and compelling, a selfishness, moreover, which is essentially Western. It might almost be said that the most serious crime that the West has committed is that it has taught the World to want. This it has done by its very charity, by its concern with man's welfare, by its raising of the standard of living, not only its own but that of the World. It is obvious, of course, that poverty must be relieved, and so must any serious deprivation of those things which, quite as much as food, supply the means of life itself. The conscience of a country must be roused and the dogs stirred with sticks until they bark to wake the dead, if there be any in the land who are starved or overworked, or who have no work to do, any who are sick or homeless or ignorant. It is right, deeply and fundamentally right, that these things should be fought and that men should be organized to fight them. The part played by the English Methodist Church in the creation of the Trades Unions is a glorious page in her history. It is moreover right—right because it is necessary—that the wheels of production be geared to this

purpose. Whatever we may think, and write, about the conformist pattern of life which industrial civilization has forced upon us, it is merely sentimental to wish that none of it had happened, that cheap clothes, cheap transport, the supermarket and the drugstore did not exist. Every invention which relieves poverty or drudgery must be hailed as an advance.

The trouble is that once begun the process cannot be stopped, or even checked, or at least we cannot see how this can be done. Two results happen, apparently inevitably: the things which we have now become the things which we *must* have, and the things which we do not have yet, and which possibly we could perfectly well do without, are presented as the things which we *should* have. Worse than this, the process is thought to be both natural and proper, and even the thoughtful Christian seldom wants it changed. If in a Church discussion group, for instance, one suggests that the Madison Avenue method of persuading people to want a television set, even if they have been managing quite nicely without one, or of persuading those who already have a set to want two, or even three, is contrary to the whole biblical attitude to property, the response to the suggestion is not to discuss it but to state quite flatly that our economic system is based on an expanding market. This, apparently, is our "way of life."

This involves us in a double argument. First, there must never be any slipping back, no suggestion even that we may have to *reculer pour mieux sauter.* Second, that other people must be involved in the process in order that this slipping back may be prevented. This is known as "maintaining our standard of living," and it is indeed

remarkable that every reformer, every pleader for either international or local charity, must argue that what he proposes will not lower the Western standard of living. The West, to do it justice, is both ready and anxious to raise the standard of living in less fortunate countries, but never at the cost of its own standard. It is taken for granted that the Western standard of living will remain firmly pegged to its present position—at the very least.

At the very least! Here is the rub. The West, while promising so vehemently that the standard of living shall not be lowered, is forced to give the impression that it should in fact be raised. Here a further comparison of Britain and the United States is useful, because it will show that though they seem to differ in their goals, their processes of thought are the same and they are both, essentially, *Western* countries. The difference of approach is to be found in their respective opinions of the welfare state, the Americans so strongly critical and the British on the whole favorable. Americans tend to think that it is really an aberration, a false move, a betrayal of the Western way of life, a smothering, in fact, of that "lust for life" which was examined in the previous chapter. The British answer that it is a fulfilment of the Western way, of the urgent concern for the underdog, which has been part of the glory of the West. Both arguments are not without truth.

As a person who has lived under both regimes, I am bound to say that of the two I would rather have socialized medicine (this apparently being the reddest rag to the American bull) than what went before in Britain or what pertains at the moment in the United States. However, I must also most certainly recognize the seri-

ousness of its effect upon the British people, and especially upon the Labour Party. The battle for the underprivileged is won, and even the most extreme of Tories have accepted this, with the result, though this Americans find *very* difficult to believe, that there is often less privilege and more equality in British society than there is in American. Nevertheless, so conditioned are the people to the battle that they look round for where it can be renewed. The present result of freedom from want is that those who have been freed say, "What next can we fight for? What can we find to want now?"

If it were on these grounds that American critics based their objections, one could find much with which to sympathize in their protests, but it is not. The American objection is in essence the same as the British effect, in that it is a determination not to lose the standard they have fought for, and achieved for themselves, and if possible to make it yet more agreeable. The welfare state is presented as a lowering of the American standard of living and it is feared, not because it is "wrong" or "unchristian" or "wicked," but because it looks so very uncomfortable. It is, of course, very possible that a welfare state would be a great mistake in the United States, but as things stand at the moment, both the reason for wanting to maintain it in Britain and the reason for not wanting to introduce it in America are selfish reasons. And that is an even greater mistake.

This combination of selfishness and generosity in the West has caused men to seek an escape in a combination of idealism and materialism, in an attempt to satisfy the demands of both God and man, and thereby live comfortably in both worlds. Idealism suggests that the Western

people should follow a policy of great generosity, even of abnegation, and materialism insists in return that they should do it at no great cost to themselves. Hence the extraordinary temptation of pacifism.

One of the most urgent pieces of thinking which needs to be done in the West is a clarification of the pacifist position, since a large part of Western ideas on the subject are unbelievably woolly. That the Almighty God, Creator of heaven and earth, lays His strong hand upon certain men, and says, "I want you! I want you to give your life to this witness, and never at any time to indulge in violence, even at the cost of all you possess"—this is true, and even those who have not experienced such a call should never deny it. However, violence is not the only evil of which men are guilty. There are others, and there are therefore other absolutes to which the call is no less imperative. God is just as likely to say to men, "I want you to live in absolute poverty, or to give yourself entirely to prayer, or to be entirely silent save to sing my praise, or to shut yourself off from the world, or never to marry." The West, however, and rather particularly the Protestant West, is less inclined to recognize these absolutes, and is tempted to say that a man who gives himself to one of them is not living a full life. It is certainly true to say that no man should commit his life to one of these absolutes, except because he has learnt that this is God's call to him. Yet this is not to say that therefore the call never comes, or that there is only one absolute to which God will ever direct a man.

The Christian must always be humbled and rebuked by the true pacifist, as God intends that he should be by any saint, but he must also ask seriously whether the

present popularity of the pacifist answer in certain parts of the Western church, and more especially among the young who are by nature given to idealism, is soundly based. He must be the more disturbed when he finds the question asked, as it is from time to time among college students, "Wouldn't it be better if the government stopped spending $45,000,000,000 on defense and spent money instead on raising the standard of living in the underprivileged countries?" The question is disturbing because it represents materialism in the guise of idealism. The thought behind it appears to be so generous and is, in fact, so selfish.

It is selfish because it seems to the questioner, as always becomes apparent in later discussion, that the proposal is unlikely to cost the American people anything beyond what they are spending at present, and this price he knows from experience can be paid and still permit a life of reasonable comfort. The trouble is that the questioner seems unable to grasp that by spending all these millions on defense the nation is buying something, and something which it would have to go without if the money was transferred elsewhere. What it is buying is a measure of security and the postponement of armed conflict. In other words, it is buying its way of life. The would-be pacifist finds this difficult to understand because he does not really believe that the Communist world would proceed to dominate this country if it were unarmed, or at any rate underarmed. However, there can be no doubt at all, but that this would happen, probably not by immediate attack, but by a process of whittling away, here a country and there a country, until the United States stood defenseless and alone, ready to be

drawn within the Soviet orbit. The other suggestion that another gigantic sum, additional to the defense budget, should be spent on foreign aid is less popular, or is made with reservations, since this is felt seriously to threaten our standard of living.

Obviously, this does not apply only to the United States. The argument often advanced for the present reduction of armaments in Britain, that she can no longer afford to maintain such a large army, really means that she cannot maintain both the army and the standard of living; and for a Conservative government to suggest any deliberate limitation of the standard of living at the present time would undoubtedly provoke serious labor troubles. It must not be forgotten, of course, that the British people accepted "austerity" with greater willingness probably than any other Western country, and would probably accept it again if they were convinced of the need for it. Also the burden of defense is unusually heavy in Britain, which is one of the most severely taxed countries in the world. Nevertheless, what is much to be questioned is the motive in the popular mind.

The fact is that the question before the West is not a matter of helping the underprivileged nations, and, as we help them, choosing between maintaining or endangering our standard of living. The choice is quite starkly between helping the poorer nations and thereby risking our high standard of living, or alternatively maintaining our standard of living, and thereby failing to help the poorer nations. If we decide to try to do both, and to help the other nations by sacrificing our expenditure on armaments, then our way of life will be destroyed from without, for we shall lie at the mercy of the Communist

world. If we maintain our armaments, and still desire to help the other nations, we shall have to sacrifice our standard of living voluntarily. That is the choice, and when we say that the West is free, we mean that she can in fact make the choice. Neither possibility is forced upon her—or at any rate not yet!

Another road has seemed to many to provide an escape from this dilemma and that is to give foreign aid, massive and gigantic aid if need be, but to give it in such a way as to build up allies for ourselves. By this means, it appears, though we may certainly have seriously endangered our standard of living, we shall have so strengthened our defenses that in course of time we shall be the more secure and shall be able to reduce our armaments accordingly. We can look forward, therefore, to a reduced taxation, if not at present, then certainly in the long run. This method is equally selfish and equally specious. If we adopt this principle, we shall be bound to ask ourselves whether the object is being achieved. Obviously, if it is not, the money is being spent unwisely and to no profit. If any country is so unpersuaded by the West's assistance that it has dealings with the Communist world, then clearly the assistance would be better directed elsewhere. This sounds very reasonable in the council chambers of the West, but it has the disastrous result of making those who are helped imagine that they are being bought. Not unreasonably, they resent it, especially when they seem to receive not only thirty pieces of silver, but also a little note with them explaining how generous the West is being in giving this timely and much-needed aid. They therefore turn elsewhere for aid, and the West is worse off than before.

The West is being faced today with the same battle on the international field that she has already fought, and to a large extent won, on the national scene. During the first half of the present century the West was challenged by inequalities in the national income so gross as to make a real cleavage between the classes, between those who had and those who had not. Marx's able study of the situation was based upon the argument that since the rich would never tax themselves in order to benefit the poor, it would be necessary to take the money from them by force and distribute it more equitably. Hence the inevitability, according to Marx, of a violent revolution. The reason why the expected revolution did not take place was not so much because Marx was wrong about the situation and the certainty of a revolution, but because he was wrong about the necessity for violence, and he was wrong about that because he was wrong about the people. The rich have taxed themselves (it must be remembered that a very large part of the bloodless social revolution in Britain took place under a Conservative government), and in some countries of the West have taxed themselves almost out of existence. That they did so is to be explained by the peculiar Western phenomenon of the "political conscience." Sufficient of the wealthy were persuaded that it was actually wrong for them to have wealth when others were poor, that the various governments of the day could carry through the reforms, without there being formed a political party of the wealthy strong enough to block them. Even those parties in the West which are normally associated with the rich now accept these reforms, and do not set about repealing them when they come to power.

In the second half of this century this crucial problem has been shifted to the international scene, and the question before the world is not, "Will there be a revolution?" but, "Will the coming revolution be violent or peaceable?" The answer to that question does not lie with the Soviet powers, as we are tempted to think, but with the West, because it rests upon another question: "Is Marx, in the person of the Communist world, right or wrong in supposing that the rich countries of the West will not deprive themselves to benefit the poorer countries of Asia and Africa?"

Before, however, we allow the history of the first fifty years to make us too complacent about the probabilities of the next fifty years, let us remind ourselves that the task before us is beyond measure more difficult than the task we had before. It is more difficult (1) because the West has taught the World to want, and it wants now even more than the West at its most self-denying could provide; (2) because those who want are no longer our own flesh and blood, to whom we can speak in the market place in a common tongue, but strangers whom we do not undersand, and (3) because in the West we have no longer to touch the hearts merely of a relatively small wealthy class, and moreover a highly educated class who were capable of appreciating the problem, but the hearts of a whole electorate, capable of thinking only in slogans, and of whom the majority are people who have not yet realized that they have ceased to be "have-nots."

Certainly, there is no place for optimism.

CHAPTER XI

The Ecclesiastical Pattern

NOTHING is simple in the Middle East, not even the Church. Perhaps one should say almost least of all the Church, because there the Church began. There she has stayed; thence she has gone out; thither from time to time she has returned, for as Christians have gone up and down in the earth they have seldom forgotten Bethlehem, Nazareth, Galilee and Jerusalem. This has not been entirely to Palestine's advantage, for each new return of the Church has formed another layer in the pattern, not marrying it into what was there already, but depositing it unconformably on the pattern of the past. This pattern was itself sufficiently complicated, because the ebb and flow of history had never ceased, here depositing, there eroding, forming through the centuries a complex structure which confuses and sometimes shocks

the visitor. The pattern is at its most intricate in Palestine itself, whose tragedy is not lessened by the fact that it is the "Holy Land," loved and revered throughout the world, a land which Christians from every country long to visit, and in which they hope to have at least a chapel where worship according to their forms is offered. So it is that Palestine, in addition to all its other problems, must bear the burden of a divided Christendom in a measure which no other country knows. The same pattern, though somewhat less confused, is repeated in the other Middle Eastern countries.

In most countries which are predominantly, and even self-consciously, Muslim, the total Christian population is but 8 to 10 percent of the whole. In Israel it is a mere three percent, but in Lebanon the Christians form very nearly half of all the Lebanese. The great majority of these people, in whatever country they are to be found, are not converts, or descendants of converts, from Islam, of whom there are very few indeed, but descendants of the original Christians of the Levant. For centuries there has been, in fact, a drift away from the Christian Faith towards the predominating religion of Islam, and the most urgent task of the Church in those parts has seemed to be, not the spread of the Gospel, but the maintaining of itself alive. It was perhaps in the mercy of God that the stimulus of contact with the Western churches should have come at a time when it did, since the dead weight of Muslim fatalism and lack of concern for the well-being of the Church had been borne for centuries, but it is a question which we ought seriously to ask ourselves whether the stimulus has yet been to the good of the native churches of the Levant.

The Christians of the Eastern Mediterranean are, alas, extremely divided among themselves and in part, as we shall see, this is the fault of the West. Yet there are also cleavages which took place centuries ago, and the results of these divisions are still apparent today. The pattern is threefold. There are (i) the ancient churches of the East, (ii) the churches which are in communion with Rome and (iii) the churches which for convenience we may call the Protestant churches of the West, which during the last century and a half have sent missionaries to the Levant in three important waves. None of these major divisions is simple, for each is made up of many diverse parts.

The chief of the ancient churches of the East is that which we know in the West as the Greek Orthodox Church, but which is known to the Arabs as *Kanīsset er-Rūm* or the "Church of Rome." It owes this name to the fact that it is the direct descendant of the original Christian Church in the eastern half of the Roman Empire, which had its capital at Constantinople, and for this reason what we know as the Church of Rome in the West is always called the Latin Church in the Middle East. The Greek Orthodox Church of the Levant is part of the world-wide Orthodox Church which is said to number some 150,000,000 people. It is formed of the Patriarchates of Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria (in our area) and of Constantinople and the Metropolitan Church of Cyprus, together with the seven branches in Russia and the Balkans which were formed later and which today make up the largest part of the Orthodox Church. These divisions are self-governing churches which are equal to each other, although Constantinople

is recognized as being the leader, small though the numbers of that group are today, and Moscow as also having a primary position in view of the great numerical superiority of the Russian Orthodox. All these churches are in communion with each other. For our purposes in this study we are concerned only with the Patriarchates of Jerusalem, Antioch and Alexandria, which, in theory, accept the primacy of Constantinople, although in the nineteenth century Moscow also played an important role in claiming to be the protector of the Orthodox Christians in the Turkish Empire, a role which the Moscow Patriarchate would probably be quite happy to play again today.

The Patriarchate of Antioch is almost entirely Arab in character and the Patriarch is himself an Arab, though living today at Damascus rather than at the historic city of Antioch, which is just over the borders of Turkey. The situation in the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, however, is unfortunately different. There the tremendous importance of the two centers of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, with their great churches of the Holy Sepulchre and the Nativity, has caused the Greeks to cling to their traditional right to provide the Patriarch and the higher clergy, and they have always resisted the demands of the local population that the Patriarch of Jerusalem should be, like his brother of Antioch, an Arab. One has thus, alas, today the unedifying quarrel between the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre, who are almost wholly Greek, and from whose number the Patriarch is traditionally chosen, and the Arab population, forming the vast mass of the Orthodox faithful, who provide all the

lower clergy, and who often resent the authority of a Greek Patriarch.

The last Patriarch died at the end of 1955 and there was a delay of thirteen months before the election of his successor, Benedictos Papadopoulos, previously Archbishop of Tiberias. This was a much shorter delay than on the previous occasion, when four years elapsed before the election, and another four years before the Patriarch was finally recognized by the civil government, who this time gave their consent within a month. Both delays were occasioned by an argument over whether the State ought to change the electoral law to give the Arab laity and clergy a larger voice in the final stage of the election, which, at present, is controlled by the Greek higher clergy. The argument is unlikely to end immediately in view of the strong nationalism both among the Greeks and the Arabs, but both sides have shown signs of being more amenable now that they find themselves once more under a non-Christian government.

The difficulty is, of course, the special position of Jerusalem, because though the Arabs have a strong case, the Greeks maintain that they hold Jerusalem in trust for the whole Orthodox Church and for the world. A somewhat similar problem exists in the Anglican Church, though the numbers of the Arab congregation are there much smaller. The Anglican Bishop is appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, and here also there has recently been a new appointment and once more an Englishman, though he is the son of a previous Bishop and a life-long friend of the Arabs. However, many had hoped for at least an Arab assistant bishop, and the Arab

clergy feel that they are at present somewhat "second-class citizens." The objection to the appointment of an Arab is the fear that he would not find it easy in these days to represent properly the whole Anglican communion and perform the ecumenical functions of the Bishopric. Probably in both churches it will prove necessary to recognize the dual function and appoint two men, an Arab to have the pastoral care of the local congregation and another to perform the special responsibilities of the head of a church in the Holy City. The Anglicans could perform a striking service if they gave this second position to an Anglican from outside Britain, e.g. from India. Ecclesiastical positions in Jerusalem should never be thought to be national prerogatives.*

Though the Orthodox Church is undoubtedly the original church of the East, and traces its lineage right back to Pentecost, there broke away from this parent body at various times in the early centuries other groups which were held to be heretical. In order to understand what happened it is necessary to know something of the world in which these divisions grew. Since the days of the first Persian Empire, before the time of Christ, the people of the Fertile Crescent had come to speak Aramaic, that is in the area which now includes Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. This language was a Semitic language of a rather simpler type than the Assyrian, Babylonian and Hebrew which it had supplanted, and was in very common use in the early Christian Church. Egypt at this time had its own language, but the Semites living there

* Since the manuscript of this book was completed, I have learned that the appointment of an Arab Bishop is in fact contemplated as part of the reorganization of the Anglican Church in the Middle East. This is excellent news.

also spoke Aramaic. After the conquests of Alexander the Great, Greek was introduced into the towns of Egypt and the Levant coast, where it became very important, but it was much less strong in the villages and had very little effect east of the Euphrates. Its use in Palestine might be compared with the position which French later attained in Lebanon and in Cairo and Alexandria. In Egypt the villagers and the people of the upper Nile valley continued to speak their own language, though they started to write it with a modified Greek script. This became known as Coptic.

Consequently, in the period of the early Church there was more than one language. Greek was the *lingua franca* of the educated classes, but it was associated in the popular mind with the imperial power. Therefore, Syriac and Coptic began to assume greater and greater importance as the revolt against Greek control developed. To this we must add the permanent tendency of the people of the Middle East to form separate groups isolated from each other in their thinking. This is reflected in the separatist character of Lebanon, which ever since the days of the Phoenicians has tended to turn its back on the Arab Island, and in the comparative isolation of Mesopotamia and Egypt, each forming a strongly separate entity. Conditioned by differences of language and outlook, the various groups were often, it is true, deeply suspicious of each other, but each was also caught in a very real inability to understand the other's point of view. It cannot be denied that the main branch of the Church was fighting a real and important theological battle, for it was urgently necessary to maintain the true character of the Incarnation. Nevertheless, those whom

they opposed were seldom as heretical as they imagined.

However, the separations did take place, and there exist today Assyrian, Jacobite, Coptic, Armenian and Maronite Churches which are all descended from groups that decided to form different churches when their views were condemned as heretical.

The oldest of these groups are the "Assyrians." This name, though very commonly used, is incorrectly applied to the descendants of those who followed the teachings of Nestorius, (who was held to have maintained that there were two persons in Christ.) Although the Nestorian Church was at one time very widespread indeed, the "Assyrians" today number less than 100,000, and are divided between a group who still live in the mountains of Kurdistan round Mosul, and those who took refuge in Syria and were settled on the Khabur River.

The Council of Ephesus, which condemned Nestorius, took place in 431, but twenty years later it was necessary to deal with a tendency in the opposite direction, the Monophysite heresy, which maintained that there was only one nature in Christ, the divine and human natures being indistinguishably combined. The Council of Chalcedon in 451 condemned the Monophysites and this led ultimately to the secession of the Coptic Church of Egypt, the Syriac or Jacobite Church of the Antioch region and the Armenian Church, though the argument was to go on for some two hundred years.

The Coptic Church has about 1,000,000 adherents in Egypt and is closely connected with the Church in Abyssinia which was evangelized from Egypt. There is in Jerusalem a Coptic bishop and a small Coptic commu-

nity who are pugnaciously jealous of their rights to an altar in the Holy Sepulchre.

The Monophysite Church of Syria, variously called the Old Syrians or the Jacobites, after Jacob el-Bardai who struggled to build up this church in the sixth century, after the condemnation of their views by the Council of Chalcedon, resembles the Nestorians in being very small in numbers and in being partly a refugee church. The two main groups are some 20,000 in Syria and about 30,000 in the southeast of Turkey, though there are other smaller groups in Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan. The Patriarchate today has been moved to Homs, north of Damascus, but the church is also represented in the Old City of Jerusalem. The language used for the liturgy is Syriac, a language very close to Aramaic.

The Armenians take their origin from the people of the country of Armenia, which, they claim, was the first nation to become Christian. This once great country is represented today merely by the tiny fragment of Soviet Armenia, and the Armenians themselves have been driven out in many directions. They may well be compared with the Jews in their persistence as a nation, despite their dispersion and their many persecutions, and in the fact that they are bound together by a common religion and a common language. The Catholicos of Etchmiadzin is still regarded as the primate of the Armenian Church, but there is a very large refugee Armenian population in Syria and the Lebanon, and there is a magnificent convent at Jerusalem, which is the headquarters of the Armenian Patriarchate there. The Armenians are a numerous and vigorous people in the

Levant, rightly famed for their great skill in every kind of craftsmanship, and they are the best educated and most developed of all the "Eastern" Christians.

The last of the ancient churches of the East is that of the Maronites of Lebanon. This became separated from the main body of the Orthodox Church at the end of the seventh century, after the Third Council of Constantinople, when an attempt was made to reconcile the Orthodox and Monophysite views by what was known as the Monothelite approach, by which it was held that Christ had two natures but one will. This view was not accepted by the Church as a whole, and therefore the Lebanese Church, which had adopted it, broke away to form a national church on its own. In the twelfth century, at the time of the Crusades, the whole Maronite Church accepted the leadership of Rome, and therefore became part of the Latin group, to which we must now turn.

The split between the Eastern and Western branches of the main body of the Church finally came in 1054, but it was not long before the Crusades brought the Western branch into the Holy Land in an attempt both to recover Palestine from the Saracens and to restore the union. When they failed to do the latter, they installed their own bishops and Patriarch and drove out the Orthodox clergy, until they themselves were driven out when the Franks were forced to leave. The Lebanese, always the most "Western" group in the Levant, were the only church to go over whole-heartedly to the Latins.

From the time of the Crusades onwards the Roman Catholic Church of the West, and particularly the church in France, has claimed a special interest in the Levant. In the early seventeenth century Pope Gregory XV en-

couraged the attempt to persuade the ancient Eastern churches to accept the authority of the Pope, and in the course of the nineteenth century the French government supported Latin work in Palestine as a counter-blast to the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Franciscans today still claim the right to protect the Holy Places, which leads them into conflict with the Orthodox Church, and in the middle of the nineteenth century the Pope appointed a Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. The Latin convents, convent schools and hospitals are now very numerous throughout the Levant, and their influence has been correspondingly strong.

The Latins have always adopted the principle that reunion can come only by submission to Rome, and therefore they have felt perfectly free to proselytize among the Orthodox and other Eastern churches, though not necessarily to the extent of persuading them to become completely Latin. As a result there have been formed what are known as the Uniate churches, groups which have broken away from the Eastern churches and have joined the Roman communion. Apart from the Maronites a division always took place. Thus there are today the Greek Catholic or Byzantine Uniates, the Chaldeans who broke away from the Assyrian Church, the Syrian Catholics, the Coptic Catholics and the Armenian Catholics. These continue to have their own liturgies and their own church order in a modified form under the general direction of Rome. Both the present Armenian Catholic and Syrian Catholic Patriarchs are cardinals.

The Protestant groups are the product mainly of the last century and a half. It was inevitable that in the course of the great outflow of missionary endeavor the

Holy Land should not be forgotten. It was not, of course, at that time divided as it is at present, but was all under the domination of the Turkish Empire, and to this region came many missionaries, Anglicans, Presbyterians, German Lutherans, and representatives of various groups from the United States. Schools and hospitals were started and churches were built. In this first missionary wave the original purpose was that of evangelism of non-Christians, and in the schools the teaching of the Bible formed the principal activity. These missionary efforts differed from those of the Latin and the Russian Orthodox churches in that they were supported entirely by voluntary contributions and received no backing from their home governments. It soon became clear that Muslims were not going to respond in any numbers to the call to leave their religion and become Christian, though they were ready to attend the schools and hospitals, but another field appeared to be open to the missionaries. This was the field of the Eastern churches whose adherents seemed to the Westerners to be ignorant and backward and to be guilty of a great many practices from which they themselves had been set free at the time of the Reformation. They therefore felt no compunction in urging the Eastern Christians to accept the purified Protestant faith and many, indeed, did so. Thus there were created the native Anglican, Presbyterian, Lutheran and Baptist churches of today. The largest of these groups is the Protestant Armenian church with a total of some 10,000 members, mostly in the north of Syria. The Arab Anglicans and Presbyterians each number about 4,000. However, it became apparent in course of time that this was not producing the best results. The

Eastern churches showed no signs of coming to an end, but the most vigorous Christians and potential leaders were being taken away from them, and they were thus being further weakened and made less capable of reform from within. Consequently, it was generally decided to undertake no further proselytizing among the Eastern Christians, but to concentrate upon medical and educational work and upon the unrewarding job of evangelism among the Muslims and the Jews.

The second wave of Western missionaries arrived after World War I, when a new stimulus was given to missionary work, both Latin and Protestant, by the establishment of the mandates for Syria and Palestine. Almost all the missionary groups who had then obtained a foothold in the area extended their activities, and other groups arrived from the United States and Europe to start work in the countries of the Levant. By 1948 the following countries were represented in Protestant work: Great Britain, the United States, Germany, France, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland. The great variety of Protestant churches in Britain and the United States also found its reflection in Palestine and Syria, and some of the major groups which had work there were the Anglicans, Presbyterians, Baptists, Society of Friends, Methodists, Assemblies of God, the Church of God, the Church of the Nazarene, Seventh Day Adventists and American Lutherans who had taken over the work being done before the war by the German Lutherans. As if this were not enough, some churches were represented by more than one missionary society. The Anglicans, for instance, were working under the auspices of the Church Missionary Society, the Church Mission to the Jews and the Jeru-

salem and the East Mission. There were also many individual missionaries who had set up work on their own because they had a yearning to work in the Holy Land. It is true that something was done on the field to remedy this confusion and there was, and still is, a United Missionary Council (today the United Christian Council) which struggled to integrate the work done by the various Protestant groups, but the home committees were less amenable, because even those whose major work was in other parts of the world were unwilling entirely to relinquish their foothold in Palestine. This is not surprising in view of the place that Palestine holds in the affection of Christians, but it is most unfortunate. There is no country in the world where the disunity of Christians is more apparent or more tragic.

The tendency of this wave was to do much less direct evangelism and to concentrate upon the witness of "Christian service." The watchword of the period was, "Christianity is not taught, but caught." There was also considerable questioning among the missionaries themselves whether it was right to attempt to convert children while they were at school, or sick people while they were helpless in bed. It was felt to be taking advantage of them. This attitude was encouraged by the growing uncertainty in the West as to whether it was ever right to preach one's own religion to followers of another. More and more the tendency began to be to try to be friends with the Muslims and Jews, and to do nothing in the schools or hospitals which could possibly hurt their feelings, as for instance by avoiding specifically Christian forms of prayer, and even by not teaching the New Testament at all in school. Among those who still felt that

direct evangelism was right, usually among the more extreme Protestant groups, the tendency was still to seek adherents among the Eastern churches, since they could be found more easily there. It must be admitted that Western missionary activity was not always seen at its best in the period between the wars, but it must not be forgotten that, whatever judgment one may pass upon their policy, the missionaries continued to give a very great deal of loving, selfless service, and to create little oases of peace in what were often embittered lands.

The third wave has come since the fighting in 1948 and the creation of the State of Israel. The end of the mandates for Syria and Palestine have, on the one hand, inevitably led to the curtailment of some of the missionary work which developed in the favorable atmosphere of a Western government. Some of the institutions which were flourishing in 1939 have now come to an end, with at present very little sign that it will be possible for them to be restarted. The diminution of institutional work in Israel is particularly notable. However, the establishment of the State has caused certain fundamentalist groups, particularly in the United States, to see in this new country the direct fulfilment of prophecy, and they have therefore felt moved to open up work there, though it must, of necessity, be of a limited character. More than one American church is now represented in Israel by one missionary or, at best, by a very small group. New work has also been started by certain European Protestants from the Continent. Some of these newcomers have arrived with a surprising ignorance of the country to which they were coming. It is reported of one group which is active in Jordan that they came thinking that they were

going to work among Jews and discovered their mistake only when it was too late to change.

The plight of the Arabs also has stirred the pity of the Western Christians, and the Mennonites, for example, have started very valuable and devoted work among the refugees. It has already been pointed out that all the clothing of the refugees is provided by voluntary agencies, which, in effect, means the Western churches, both those who already had work in the area and those who are newcomers to the scene. Evangelism is forbidden by law in the refugee camps, but workers in other parts of the Arab countries are less hampered. Unfortunately it has once again taken the form of proselytism from among the Eastern Christians, and also from among the more moderate Protestant groups, sometimes, alas, by very dubious methods. It is to be feared that there are still some missionary groups in the Middle East who have not yet learnt the unwisdom of making "rice Christians." Those missions which have institutions of long standing still carry on the work, but the future is uncertain, for the most that they can hope for now is tolerance rather than real friendship from the government.

In the Eastern churches there is, of course, much that is unsatisfactory. The ordinary parish clergy are often shockingly underpaid and receive little or no training. Many of the people are uninstructed, superstitious and ignorant, and the churches dirty and uncared-for. In Palestine the fact that the higher clergy in the Orthodox Church are almost always Greek and frequently uninterested in their Arab brethren has led to a most unfortunate and bitter state of affairs. The various Eastern churches are often a great deal too concerned with the

sterile quarrels over the Holy Places, which also occupy the attention of the Latins, and the arguments and bad feelings which are promoted by the lighting of one lamp more or less in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre have rightly shocked Western visitors. The fact that the church itself is very nearly falling down because of the quarrels over who has the right to restore it is a disgrace to those churches which have rights there, and, incidentally, a disgrace also to the Mandatory government which dared not take effective action in the face of these quarrels. As a result Westerners have often felt that the Eastern churches must be written off as a dead loss. That would be a mistake. That these churches in the Levant are, many of them, at a low ebb their best friends would be unwise to deny. Yet in this, as in all things, a sense of proportion is needed, for it remains true that there are still *seven thousand in Israel, all the knees which have not bowed unto Baal, and every mouth which hath not kissed him.* Those Western visitors and tourists who are shocked by the state of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the many disputing sects within it, forget that Protestantism has also sinned against the truth in the deliberate creation of a rival "holy place." The so-called "Garden Tomb" is a quiet and admirable place for meditation, but the archaeological evidence is solidly against its being the actual site of Calvary, since it is undoubtedly a tomb of later date. Yet there are many Protestants who are ready to maintain firmly that it is the genuine site merely because they want it to be, and there have been those, alas, who have not been above producing the necessary pieces of evidence. It sits ill upon any to point the finger of scorn at the others.

Moreover, such enthusiasts for pure reformed religion do not usually give themselves time to learn of the deep devotion which day by day is to be seen within the walls of the church they so much dislike. Those who were in Jerusalem in the early part of 1950 and remember the two days when the Church of the Holy Sepulchre had to be closed on account of a fire which had damaged the roof, will remember also the deep depression which settled on the city like a dark, confusing cloud, and the relief which was to be seen on everyone's face when it was learnt that after all the church itself had not been damaged. In those days one could go into the church, when it had been opened again for worship, and see the people on their knees patting the floor and saying over and over again, "Thank God for the Church! Thank God for the Church!" There is also probably more joy among the angels of Heaven over the Cypriot peasants who make the pilgrimage at Easter than over the many Protestant visitors who are there at the same time and throng the Easter ceremonies.

It must be remembered that the local churches have a long history of frustration and neglect, tempered by persecution. The "millet" system, to which reference was made in a previous chapter, confirmed them in their separateness from each other, while their insecurity and their inability to win over the Muslims turned them in upon themselves. It seemed as much as they could do to maintain the Christian Church alive amidst the overflowing scourge of Islam, and it is to their credit that they have done so. It is true that they have paid the penalty that must be paid by all churches that fail to obey their Lord's command to go out and preach the Gospel

to all nations, for it seems to be true that a church which is not reaching out to those who have not known Christ ceases in time to be a living church. Yet we must not make the mistake of imagining that the Lord's arm is shortened that He cannot save. There were once large areas of the medieval Church in Europe of which a modern observer would have been tempted to say the same as he now says of the churches of the Levant, if he had been privileged to travel among them, but who will now deny that the *breath came into them, and they lived, and stood up upon their feet, an exceeding great army?*

The Armenian Church has been stimulated by persecution and by the challenge of new ideas from the West to a new life and a new growth. "The popular mind tends to think of Armenians as 'poor refugees' but forgets that they are a people whom even catastrophic disaster cannot down. Thirty years ago Syria and the Lebanon were flooded with Armenian refugees, compelled for a time to live in huge encampments of tin shacks near Aleppo and Beirut. Today the main business streets of these and many other towns seems almost to have been taken over by Armenians, and in professional life, especially medicine, they have a reputation second to none." [22] Among the thousands who crowd the Armenian convent in the Old City of Jerusalem—refugees once again from what is now Israel—there is a vigorous life and very little of the repining that one finds among many of the Arab refugees. They run a large and excellent school and they have a first-class library. They are extremely hard working, and active members of their church where their young people receive sound instruction.

Among other groups change has been slower in coming. The Uniate churches have been stimulated by their contacts with the Latins, and both the Maronites and Greek Catholics are members of what are obviously living churches with a thoughtful and educated clergy and laity. Yet the other Eastern churches still seem far behind. Nevertheless, even here stirrings of life are not wanting. The Patriarch of Antioch, who, it will be remembered, is an Arab, has recently started to send an occasional priest to Paris to study, and this may well be the first beginnings of a revival among the clergy. Elsewhere amongst the Eastern Christians, as with the Orthodox in other countries, the educated laity have been taking the lead, and it is possible that their demands may provoke the creation of more educated clergy. These are but signs, it is true, and it is always possible that they may lead to nothing. God will never save a church for the honor of His name, if the people in that church fail to respond to His calls to repent. Churches have indeed disappeared in the past. The pulsating life of the North African Church of Roman times is as if it had never been, and much of the vast missionary work of the Nestorians has vanished almost without a trace. Yet where there is a spark, it can be fanned into a flame. The revivifying wind has only just begun to blow in the Levant, and we do not know yet what will happen. The renaissance in Greece must make it clear that the Orthodox Church as such is by no means dead, and new life may still come also to Orthodox churches in the other parts of the Mediterranean. Only a fool would dare prophesy at this stage.

What is important to us, however, is our responsibility in this matter. It is a fact that the secondary and higher

education of the Christians of the Levant has been almost entirely in the hands of the missions, both Latin and Protestant, though the local churches themselves often run primary schools, and it is a fact also that the percentage of literacy among the Christians is very, very much higher than it is among the Muslims. It is probable that this condition will not long continue because the end of the missionary institutions, at any rate as we have known them in the Middle East, is now within sight. If the lessons of other parts of the world are any guide, the day of "foreign schools" is almost at an end, and the great and urgent question is whether the Christians of these lands are to receive a Christian education at all in the future or whether they are to be taught in the schools of a non-Christian state. If they are to receive Christian instruction, they must give it to themselves, which as yet they are not always able. It is the duty of the Western missions to prepare their own departure and not to wait until they are pushed out. Even in Jerusalem this is so. Christians may think they have a right to be there, and so, on any showing, they have, but Christians are surely forbidden by the Faith of Christ Crucified to demand their "rights."

CHAPTER XII

Unresolved Tensions

A VERY large part of the Middle Eastern problem rests in the inability of either the ordinary person or the statesman to see what kind of problem it is, for it is usually presented as in some way soluble. There are very few political problems which have produced such a mass of literature as the Palestine crisis alone, and very nearly every writer has had his suggested solution to put forward. A surprising number of these proposals belong to the "if only" class, a type of solution which is only too popular with reformers. Thus it is maintained that *if only* Palestine were to be given to the Jews, or *if only* Israel were confined behind the frontiers outlined in the Palestine partition scheme, or *if only* Britain would keep her hands off the Suez Canal, or *if only* the refugees were returned to their homes, the problem would then become tractable. There are, of course, others who are less naive

and who warn us that there can be no quick solution. They realize that something must be done immediately to prevent complete disintegration, but they point out that this "something" can do no more than pave the way for a long term policy. Nevertheless, they still seem to envisage this policy leading to a solution of some kind, and to imagine that should the policy be adopted, then at the end of perhaps ten, perhaps twenty, years the area will be pacified. One gets the impression that most of the writers seem to think that by the time their youngest children have graduated from college there is reason to hope that the world may no longer be plagued by the Middle East.

Admittedly, none of them suggest that this happy result will come to pass if their policy is not followed. Indeed, they normally prophesy disaster in such a case. Yet, the very variety and contradictory character of the proposals should indicate that this problem belongs to that group which must be lived with, and whose end cannot be foreseen within the lifetime of any who may read this book. Fifty years from now the Middle East will still be an area of crisis, and even beyond that time.

This kind of judgment may seem to be pessimistic to some people, an intolerable confession of failure and of political bankruptcy. Yet optimism is of no value if it does not accord with the facts, and the facts of the Middle East hardly encourage optimism. It is not as if there were one cause of tension and one area of conflict. It is not as if there were two, or three, or four. It is rather that the very character of the area is productive of torment, and so many and so varied are the strains and stresses that many of them are kept within bounds only

by the existence of others. In this kind of situation a relaxation of tension in one area promotes tension in another, and the very stilling of a conflict sets free those forces which produce another conflict. Thus, we had no reason to rejoice when Moussadeq was overthrown or an armistice signed between the Arab states and Israel, nor yet when the British left the Suez Canal or Israel vacated the Gaza Strip. The premature excitement at the "triumph" of King Hussein, as if this were a step forward, indicates how little the fundamental divisiveness of the Middle East has been understood in the West. The easing of tension by the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone in 1954 encouraged the development of those forces within Egypt which produced the crisis of November 1956. Yet, for the British to have remained would have been equally productive of violence. Such is the nature of the problem.

Most prominent among these conflicts at present is clearly the Arab-Jewish struggle, and the existence of Israel is both the most important *single* fact in the Middle East, and also a continuing fact. That is to say that there now exists within the Arab world, a world which in all conscience is confused and diverse enough, a tiny state "antagonistic" to that world, and which must by its very nature continue to be antagonistic. Many people conversant with the Palestine situation, it is true, have urged from time to time that the Arabs and Jews can live satisfactorily together if only they are given a chance. Admittedly, in a situation where some of the tensions have been removed or moderated, individual Arabs and individual Jews can come to an agreement. This was clearly to be seen in the days of the Palestine mandate in those

mission schools which had both Arab and Jewish pupils, and again in the comparative readiness with which the Arab and Jewish representatives who met at Lausanne in 1949 came to an agreement. However, both these experiences were misleading, because the people concerned were living in a fictitious, relatively tensionless, world. Collectively, the Arabs and Israelis seem quite regularly to get on each other's nerves, and this is not likely immediately to change.

This is not anybody's fault. There is little anti-Jewishness about the Arabs, and indeed they have a far better record in this matter than most Western nations. Nor are the Jews by nature anti-Arab. A great deal of sentimental nonsense has been talked about their being "cousins," but it is equal nonsense to suggest that they are natural enemies. No more is it the fault of foreign machinations, of that policy of "divide and rule," which has been said to be the cause of so many colonial conflicts. Both Britain and France have certainly been ready to make use at times of existing bitterness, even unscrupulously, but to suggest that Whitehall can create such conflicts *ex nihilo* is to attribute to it demonic powers which it does not possess. The conflict here springs from the fact that the Arabs and the Israelis stand for different things, believe in a different way of life, and are at a different stage of development. Each at the moment stands in the other's way. It is inconceivable that Israel will subdue the Arab world, or even reach a point where she dominates it. Every venture in that direction must be doomed to failure, for the Middle East shares with Russia and China the ability to swallow up intruders. It is possible, of course, that the Arab world will absorb and

"tame" Israel, gradually changing it into a Levantine country. But that cannot begin to happen for at least a generation after the end of immigration into Israel, of which we are not as yet within sight. It is conceivable also that the Arab world itself could ultimately become so westernized that the tension between the two ways of life would disappear. But such changes do not take place overnight, and the more rapidly they take place, the greater strains they themselves create.

Yet, there are other conflicts which are thrust into the background by the prominence of this Arab-Israeli struggle, and whenever it shows slight signs of some temporary abatement these other conflicts come to the fore, only to retreat again when fears of Zionism make it once more necessary for the Arab nations to stress their unity.

Some of these tensions are permanent. That is to say that they are part of the geography of the region which very nearly imposes division upon the people who live there. Of these tensions the most persistent is that most ancient political struggle in all the world, the tug of war between the Nile Valley and Mesopotamia. The present tendency of Jordan and Saudi Arabia to side rather with Iraq than Egypt is a reflection of this struggle, and in a sense it is an effort on their part to go where they belong. This is especially true of Jordan and has nothing to do with the accident of the two Hashemite rulers. However, at the moment the pivot is missing. This is Damascus, which Iraq must win to her side before she can hope to challenge Egypt effectively, for Damascus is the key to the Levant.

Nevertheless, we have here another indication of the complexity of the situation, for every strengthening of

the Iraqi position in the Middle East must involve a weakening of Egypt, and a consequent increase in the danger that she may seek Soviet support, for "he that stands upon a slippery place makes nice of no vile hold to stay him up." The West, therefore, should resist the temptation to weaken Egypt on the grounds that Iraq is a truer ally. Naturally, they are bound to support their friends, but not at the expense of another Arab country.

These geographical tensions are to be found also within each country, and are the result of the extreme channelling of movement in the Middle East, which tends to follow very definite lines and to avoid deserts, mountains, marshes, lava belts and other difficult terrain. Such areas lie to the side of the major roads and are not easily penetrated even at the present time. Within them is to be found the flotsam of history, ancient languages, strange religions, and other remnants of previous cultures and societies. They form regions of refuge into which are gathered all who are discontented and oppressed. Untouched by the great waves of new thought and new peoples which have surged up and down the immemorial roads, they tend to be in permanent opposition to those around them and to exist by their separateness. The intensity of their independence makes them a continually disruptive influence.

Two of these regions of refuge are Christian, and are found at either extremity, upon the mountains of Lebanon and Abyssinia. Each tends to stand aloof from the rest of the Middle East, because each is upon the very edge, but neither can be allowed to go entirely its own way, for Abyssinia is the source of the great Nile floods, and the coast of Lebanon is a gateway to the West. Other

religious minorities are the Druzes of the Jebel Druze volcanic area, the Nuseiriyehs of the Nuseiriyeh mountains north of the Lebanese frontier, and the Yezidis of Jebel Sinjar in the north between the Tigris and Euphrates. So resistant are these mountain districts to outside penetration that the rugged 'Asir district of Arabia, despite its relative closeness to Mecca, did not become Muslim until about a thousand years after the time of Muhammed, and in the Anti-Lebanon, close upon the metropolis of Damascus, are still two villages where Aramaic is spoken. Other regions of difficulty and refuge are the mountains of Kurdistan, Oman and the Yemen, the marshes of southern Iraq, and the deserts of Arabia and the Sahara, the homes of the Wahhabis and the Senussis.

Some authorities on the Middle East write as if it were the religious differences which have kept so many of these groups apart. This is not so. Their religious differences are in large measure the result of their isolation, and whoever lived in such unvisited tracts would be bound to develop a separate way of thinking. The conversion of all these different groups to one common faith would not destroy the tensions.

Other geographical islands are of exactly the opposite nature, for they are centers of population surrounded by regions of difficulty. Examples of this are the two inhabited parts of Libya, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, divided by a broad area of desert reaching to the very edge of the sea. In Iraq there is the densely peopled district of the Shatt el-Arab, the land of twelve million date palms, and centered round the port of Basra. In Syria there are Damascus and Aleppo, two rival claimants to commercial

leadership, and away on the Euphrates the district of Deir ez-Zor. Even in the little country of Lebanon there is the "island" of the Beqa'a, the central plain between the two great ranges of mountains.

Every country in the Middle East contains more than one of these sharply differentiated zones, and this fact goes a long way to explain their instability of government and their tendency to seek for a strong leader who can control them, but the country of Syria is, as it were, made up of these regions, and has for this reason thrown up more aspirants for the position of dictator than any other. Within its borders are the three "islands" of Damascus, Aleppo and Deir ez-Zor, and the four regions of refuge of the Jebel Druze, the Anti-Lebanon, the Nuseiriyeh mountains and Jebel Sinjar. At no time has the Damascus government succeeded in holding the loyalty of all these different groups, and the traveler may find that he requires police permission before he enters some of them. The Jebel Druze, for instance, has a long tradition of opposition to the government, as readers of Gertrude Bell's letters will remember; the French were faced with a war there, and as late as 1954 there was a serious Druze rebellion. The Nuseiriyeh villages also smoulder with revolt and the river dwellers along the Euphrates, Arabs though they be, resent the leadership of Damascus. For this reason one should be hesitant to accept the stories that Syria has become wholly Communist. The present Syrian government may be seeking to strengthen itself by Soviet support, but it is excessively insecure and may topple any day. Naturally, should an anti-Communist government take over, it will inherit this tradition of enmity, and Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo may then think more

kindly of Communism because it will be opposed to the Damascus authority.

Other disputes exist which are not predominantly geographical, but conflicts in which a natural separation has been strengthened by historical developments only partly connected with geography. Thus in Jordan the two sections of the country are divided from each other by the river and by the great over-heated trough in which it flows, but this geographical separation, whose effects can be traced right back to Old Testament times, has today been emphasized by the recent accidents of history. After World War I the eastern bank, separated from Palestine to the west, progressed more gradually and developed a certain loyalty to the Hashemite rulers. The Palestine Arabs, however, were more stimulated by the Mandatory period, had made greater progress in concepts of self-government, and felt no loyalty at all to King Abdullah, whom they rather despised. They were apt to dismiss the Transjordanians as "mere Bedouin" and were sometimes even afraid to travel there. Above all, they suffered most from the Palestine partition, and from their number came all the refugees, who form today about half the total population of the country.

Similarly in Egypt there is a geographical distinction between the wide, flat plains of the Delta and the constricted valley south of Cairo, but this distinction has been strengthened by history, for the Western influence has penetrated to a much less extent south of Cairo, where the people have been less affected by modern ideas, so that there is often a lack of sympathy between the two areas. Again the existence of a large Christian group in the Lebanese area is due to geographical rather than

historical causes, but it was an accident of history which created the modern state of Lebanon in which nearly half the population were Muslim, and another accident which poured in a flood of Muslim refugees to threaten this delicate balance. The refusal of Lebanon to admit to citizenship the refugees or to permit them easily to gain work has been due to the necessity of maintaining the original proportions.

The similar refusal of Egypt has risen rather from the pressure of population within her own borders, and the desperate problem of the *fellahin.* The *fellah,* or peasant, exists in every country in the Middle East, but it would be a grave over-simplification to imagine that his position is the same everywhere, and one must not confuse the crowded masses of the Nile valley with the farmers of the Palestinian and Syrian hills and plateaus. The rich valley of Egypt spawns population, which is increasing today faster than the land can support the people, and there has always been a tendency for the cultivable land to be concentrated in the hands of an extremely wealthy few. But this has not happened in every Arab country. East of the Jordan, for instance, though there were one or two rich Bedouin sheikhs, such as the head of the Beni Sakhr, the agricultural wealth was reasonably well distributed, and there were few important merchants before the recent rapid growth of the town of Amman. There has thus always been an independence about the *fellahin* in Palestine and Syria which one does not find in Egypt.

Unfortunately, Egypt has been unable to concentrate her attention and energies upon a fair distribution of wealth within the country because their attention and energies were already concentrated upon other, and, as

it seemed to the Egyptians, more urgent things, the struggles with the West and with Israel. However, the internal result of this has been an accumulated disproportion between the rich and the poor. Egypt has been accused of profiting from two world wars, and in one sense the country inevitably grew rich because of them, and yet within the country the poor remained poor, and to be poor in a land of plenty is a frightening experience.

In Palestine the wealth was better distributed. There was little of the grinding poverty which is to be found in Egypt, or even more acutely in India. By the end of World War II most of the Arab farmers were free from debt; many had prospered; all had profited. It would have been stupid to have compared them with the *fellahin* of Egypt. But then came 1948 and the tragedy of the Palestinian war. Many then became refugees, living in real destitution. All suffered deprivation. Their cry is that of Job, *Oh that I were as in months past, as in the days when God preserved me . . . when I washed my steps with butter, and the rock poured me out rivers of oil . . . And now my soul is poured out upon me; the days of affliction have taken hold upon me.* It may be frightening to be poor in a land of plenty, but it is maddening to be poor where once you had been rich.

None of these tensions will be lessened because the external political problems find solution. Rather they will be the more clamorous and the cause of further tumult to tax the energies of tired men.

Then there are the conflicts which are mainly historical. Many of these are better known, such as the old quarrel between the Hashemite and Sa'udi families to which newspaper reporters draw continual attention.

There is the history of enmity between Arabia and Egypt, of the subduing of the earlier Wahhabis by Muhammed Ali. There are the ancient religious conflicts, the division between the Christians and the Muslim majority, and the division within Islam between the Shi'as and the Sunnis. Too much weight has often been attached to these rifts, as if they were the fundamental *cause* of conflict, as if, that is, the Shi'a-Sunni division was the basic reason for the Egyptian-Iraqi tension, and as if the suspicion between the ruling houses quite prevented an alliance between Jordan and Arabia. It is time that less prominence was given to such struggles which have often less permanent importance than has been supposed. Yet, these strains undoubtedly exist, for it was the looming peril of Communist revolution which brought the Hashemites and Sa'uds together, and the experience of Europe and America after two world wars has shown how many are the ancient cracks which appear when present fears are lessened.

Most purely historical are the tensions within Israel, for there is nothing at all in Israeli geography to explain the inherited antagonisms which have gone up with the people to the Land. Too little attention has so far been paid to this problem which has often been treated very much as Americans tend to treat ecumenical difficulties, apparently feeling that if only we concentrate upon what we have in common, our differences may disappear. Almost any conflict *could* develop in Israel, though this is not to say that conflicts will. It is only to say that should some pacification of the Middle East take place, Israeli developments should be treated with the same circumspection that is given to those of any Arab country.

Beyond, surrounding and including all these smouldering grievances, each so ready to burst into destructive flame should opportunity be given, are the conflicts of the world. Of these, five may be mentioned as potent sources of trouble: the familiar clash between the American and Soviet systems, the struggle between the World and the West to which some attention has already been given in a previous chapter, that peculiar aspect of the battle for power which is usually known as "colonialism," and finally two major conflicts of Israel and the Arabs *contra mundum,* in which one of the warring powers sees itself isolated with every man's hand against it. These last two differ from the struggle of the World against the West in that the West has only a limited sense of being hemmed in and of fighting with its back to the wall, whereas the thinking of both Arabs and Jews is conditioned by the overwhelming feeling that they are alone. The conflicts, however, are connected, for in the desperate search for friends the Jews seek rather to win the sympathy of the West, while the Arabs try to enlist the support of the World. Of course, in one sense this is the old Arab-Israeli struggle over again, but it is more than that, for here each of the contestants is convinced that it is fighting not merely the other side, but battling off everybody else as well.

In this feeling both are right. Israel, disillusioned by long memories of persecution, of cruel pogroms in even the most enlightened countries, of discrimination, suspicion and contempt, knows full well that as a nation it exists only on sufferance. It is not merely that she knows that Russia would not hesitate to wipe her out and give her inheritance to the heathen, if occasion should arise

and if the result should seem to promise a sure profit to the Russians, but she knows also that she cannot trust the Western nations which brought her into being. She has heard a British premier solemnly propose that some of her hard-won territory be given to the Arabs and she believes that, whatever they may say now, both Britain and America would allow her destruction in certain circumstances. And so they might. Neither has been ready to defend Czecho-slovakia, whether before or after World War II, and a situation could develop in which the British and Americans would both convince themselves that the disappearance of Israel was a tragedy, but one which might be all for the best in the end as it would remove a major irritation from the area.

The Arabs in their turn know only too well that there is not a major power in the world which would not be content to have and to hold some portion of their territory—if this could be done without trouble and with decency—for there are some areas which have become, for one reason or another, strategically so valuable that reasons could even be found to justify the taking of them into custody. Both the Arabs and the Jews, it is true, have often greatly exaggerated the danger in which they stand, but they have some justification for their fears. Each of them is in a real sense engaged in a struggle of this nature, at bay against the world, fighting to preserve their identity and existence against the will of nations which in the last resort do not care much about either. Both the reality of these struggles and the exaggeration of them have fostered tensions and bitterness which will persist, and may even be magnified, whatever happens in the struggle between the Arabs and the Jews themselves.

Peace may be signed and trade begun across every Arab-Israeli frontier, but each will have its scores to settle with the World, and the World will have its scores to settle with them.

The "colonial" war is clearly allied to these two struggles, but in this conflict no nation feels itself entirely alone. In particular the nations of southern Asia and all Africa stand shoulder to shoulder against the great powers. At present, admittedly, their animosity and suspicion are directed against those nations to which the label of "colonialist" most easily attaches, to Britain, and France, with the lesser ogres of Holland, Belgium and Portugal. The American peoples, and indeed the American State Department also, sincerely believe themselves to be anti-colonialist, but the people of Asia think of the American occupation of Okinawa and are less convinced. Of the reality of the Russian colonialist policy it is unnecessary to write for Western readers, though at present some Asian and African people are less frightened of it. It should be pointed out, however, that "colonialism" does not necessarily mean the domination of an Asian or an African nation only. Soviet colonialism involves the domination of such Western countries as Czecho-slovakia, and Asiatic countries themselves have pursued frankly colonialist policies. Neither China nor Japan can claim a history free from this.

This fact renders the "colonial" struggle different from that of the World against the West, which to a large extent it overlaps, and with which it has very often been confused. In the "colonial" conflict Russia is really set firmly over against the African and Asiatic countries, as will almost certainly become clearer in the course of the

next fifty years, but she is allied with them in the other struggle, for all of them belong to the World. It is because of this that she has been able so successfully to pose as their friend in the "colonial" struggle.

Russia, however, has her own quarrel with the West, or rather with the United States, and in this conflict the Asiatic and African countries are neither allies nor opponents. They are merely pawns. Both sides woo their friendship, it is true. Both sides, in fact, maintain that there is pressing necessity that they should proclaim openly to which side they belong in this, the "real" world struggle. Yet this is in no sense because there is a valid community of interest between the Asiatic and African nations and either Russia or the United States. Undoubtedly, if either is to dominate the world and to spread its way of life, they are likely to find the domination of the United States very much less painful than that of Russia, but it is fantastic to assert that there is such real community of outlook that they ought to *want* to be dominated by either.

It is necessary to emphasize that the Middle East is involved in all these conflicts, not merely superficially, but deeply and inextricably. It is not always of their own will that this is so, for the overwhelming desire of the Arab world is to play no part at all in the struggle for leadership between Russia and the United States and it is a source of fury to them that they cannot extricate themselves. Again it is necessary to grasp that none of these conflicts is exactly the same as any of the others, and this in itself leads to instability and to a continual shifting of alliances. Thus, in the "colonial" struggle the United States finds herself unable to take a definite

stand on one side or the other, since the demands of the other conflicts make themselves felt in her deliberations. For the same reason Russia cannot come down unequivocally on the side of the Arabs against Israel.

Such a melée is not the kind of situation to which the words "soluble" and "insoluble" apply, because there is not so much as a suggestion, a hint, of the end of the conflicts. Some of them may wither, certainly, but not all. There is no inherent necessity that Russia and America shall stay at each other's throats, for there cannot be entirely ruled out the possibility that one may so weaken that the leadership passes by default to the other. It is also entirely possible that either Iraq or Egypt should establish such a pre-eminence that it would not be disputed. It is, moreover, possible that for a time the Middle East might be partially cordoned off, or rather bypassed, so that some of its conflicts were less disturbing to the world. Thus, the building of ocean-going tankers might reduce the importance of the Suez Canal or the development of atomic power render the Middle Eastern stranglehold upon the oil supplies less dangerous. All these things might happen and others beside. Yet even these would in themselves not always reduce tension and might in some areas actually enhance it. The reduction of the Suez Canal traffic, for instance, could increase rather than diminish the economic conflict within Egypt and thereby might increase also the growth of Communism in that country if nothing was done to offset it.

A further problem is the utter impossibility in the world today of isolating any important political crisis, and it is this which makes them all so impossible of solution. France feels that she could probably devise some

kind of answer to the North African question if she could isolate the region from Egyptian interference, and Britain is tempted to think the same about Cyprus if only it could be cordoned off from Greece and Turkey. Jewish opinion was strongly critical of the British government for inviting the counsel of the Arab states on the Palestine question and accused her of merely wanting to weight the balances against the Jewish claims. But, whatever may have been her subsidiary motives, Britain was at that time recognizing an unpalatable fact about Palestine which it would have been folly to have neglected.

Sometimes the ramifications are less obvious than this. The Hungarian revolt of the fall of 1956 did not seem at the time when it began to have had any immediate connection with the Suez Canal crisis. Yet it was a legitimate accusation for the Hungarians to make against Britain and France that by their action in that crisis they had ruined any chances the revolt may have had of achieving success. Indeed, the connection was there at the beginning, for it was not by accident that the attack took place a week before the American presidential election. Israel was gambling on this week, in which she would be free to break the Egyptian army, but in order to have it she had to be reasonably sure that the United States would not intervene against her for in the face of that intervention she would have been powerless. The American government's behavior in the previous summer had given her some assurance that no move would be made, at any rate until after the election was over, but if in the Hungarian crisis the United States had shown that her freedom of movement was not to be limited by the imminence of the election, it is doubtful whether Israel would

have challenged her to take that very action which she had sworn to take when she signed the Tripartite Agreement.

So it is that we must recognize that the Middle Eastern problem is with us to stay. Since no conflict in the sphere of international politics can now be reduced to manageable proportions by being fenced off and dealt with separately, it follows that the extraordinary complex of tensions which make up what we call the Middle Eastern crisis is likely to be at the very best a semi-permanent feature of the world's affairs. Even those conflicts which may wither, or be lessened by wise treatment, will not do so immediately, and many of them not in the foreseeable future. When they do, they may by their very decay release those other conflicts which by their strength they have kept in check. Any proposal for a "solution" must forthwith be condemned.

Two things remain to be said. First, the whole situation has been rendered even more embittered by the deep sense of betrayal which now pervades almost every aspect of the problem. The shock to American opinion at the time when Britain joined France in bombing Egypt cannot easily be expressed in words, for though others might have expected it of her, America had begun to hope that she had set "gunboat diplomacy" behind her. They were therefore horrified to see their closest ally doing what they could not but condemn. *It is not an open enemy, that hath done me this dishonour; for then I could have borne it. Neither was it mine adversary that did magnify himself against me; for then peradventure I would have hid myself from him. But it was even thou, my companion, my guide, and my own familiar*

friend. We took sweet counsel together, and walked in the house of God as friends.

The Arabs, of course, have felt betrayed over and over again by the Western nations, and Israel would agree with them only in this, that neither Britain nor America can be trusted to keep the most solemn promises. Israel regards British policy ever since 1939 as a retreat from the promises she made in 1917 and in accepting the Palestine Mandate after World War I, and now she sees America, upon whom she placed the strongest reliance, courting the friendship of her enemy. Betrayal also haunts those associated crises, from which, as we have seen, the Middle East cannot be divorced. Americans may feel betrayed by Britain, but the Hungarians throw in their teeth the condemnation which the Philistines hurled at Egypt when she failed to help them against Assyria: *Behold, such is our expectation, whither we flee for help to be delivered from the king of Assyria: and how shall we escape?*

Finally, we must recognize for how much we in the West are responsible. It is not only what we have ourselves done in the Middle East, though that has often been bad enough, but we have also by our example set terrible events in train. Only too often the Arab world looks at the West and says, "Let us do likewise." So when America demands that nations take sides against Communism, they demand the same support in their struggle against Zionism. When trade with Red China is forbidden, they forbid the passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal. When they remember Churchill's stirring defiance of Nazi Germany, they say, "We also will never surrender. We shall fight a second round." And so it

goes on. Unconditional surrender in 1945 creates in the Arab mind the idea that they would be wrong to accept anything less, however long they may have to wait. Two blacks, it is true, do not make a white, and the Arabs cannot always therefore be justified in their demands. But they were our demands first, and therefore we must bear the burden of them.

"We do but teach bloody instructions,
Which, being taught, return to plague the inventor."

CHAPTER XIII

The Judgment of God

IN FACE of the situation described in the last chapter many people are tempted to take refuge in some form of isolationism. To admit that no solution is so much as within sight seems such a message of despair that the only result can be either a complete failure of nerve or else that kind of pietism which says the only hope rests in the seeking of personal salvation.* One is bound to admit that this kind of reaction is not to be ruled out by

* There is a form of intellectualism, only too common at the present time, which condemns pietism as such, dismissing it as blind to the needs of men and essentially selfish. This is entirely false. The true Pietists have provided the greater section of the missionary movement and have been passionately concerned about their fellowmen. Selfish is the last thing one could call them. However, in their concern for individuals they have often failed to see the pattern of mankind as a whole, and have therefore a defective understanding of the role of the Christian in politics. Their teaching, however, remains a valuable corrective to any form of activism.

the events themselves, for one could envisage a situation so beyond all hope that the only possible behavior in face of it would be to retire into some "fortress," either political or spiritual, and there maintain oneself as best one might until the inevitable disaster engulfed even this last refuge. It is true that the human mind usually rejects this explanation of events, because some kind of hope seems necessary to existence itself. Consequently, even the retreat into the fortress is justified as giving us a measure of hope for the future, limited though that future may be. With hope also goes courage, and if the mind cannot dwell long with despair, it tends equally to refuse the suggestion that we are helpless, that there is literally nothing we can do. So there are always to be found men who rally the flagging forces to go forth to battle outside the fortress, and many are the suggestions about how best to cope with the crisis.

Obviously, if one rejects the "fortress" conception of the isolationists as false, it is wrong to belittle the efforts of those who propose something else. Action of some kind there must be, and one must be grateful to all those who examine the possibility of it. However, every political proposal is based upon two serious assumptions which are seldom properly examined. The first of these is the belief that men will in fact respond to the proposals in the manner which is expected of them, and the second is the belief that we are acting within a closed system.

According to the first assumption men will, on the whole, behave reasonably. To deny this would seem to involve saying that they will behave unreasonably, and therefore make nonsense of any suggestion. On this ba-

sis it is assumed that, though undoubtedly much wickedness and stupidity have characterized the past, things may be expected to change in the future, always provided, of course, that the right measures are taken. It is true that this assumption is not always held in its pure form, and it is sometimes argued that members of certain nations, or possibly their governments, are at present blind or sometimes actively evil, and that we may even have to base our policy for years to come upon the expectation that they will continue to behave in this way. Thus, most Arabs hold that the Israelis are being deliberately wicked and that Arab policy must take account of this fact. A similar belief is held in many parts of the West about the Communists. Israelis on the other hand tend to accuse the Arabs of crassness rather than evil, a pathetic blindness to their own real good. The supposed stupidity or wickedness of these groups is held to be an important factor in the situation. Nevertheless, it is generally considered that in course of time, whether as the result of containment or punishment, they will come to their senses, and in any case it is not usually thought that their behavior is normal for mankind. Rather they are taken to task for transgressing the accepted standards of human conduct, and by contrast the other groups which are involved in the situation may be expected to behave "normally," though to achieve this it may be necessary for certain pressures and obstacles to be removed.

The second assumption is that there is no outside power involved, and reflects our dream that problems could be isolated in order that they might be dealt with, a dream which has led various nations again and again

into a misunderstanding of the Middle Eastern problem. It has, for instance, been far too long assumed that the question can be discussed without relation to Russian interests. The refusal of the Israelis to admit the interest of the Arab states in the Palestine question or of the Arabs to recognize the concern of American Jews are other examples of the same thing. On a wider scale we find almost every discussion proceeding on the basis that no extra-human power is concerned or active in the matter, and that either there is no reality outside the present universe, or that if there is, it is totally exterior to this world, and does not in any effective sense penetrate into it.

In short, there is a theological aspect to the problem which is usually overlooked, and any understanding that one may have of a situation of this nature is conditioned by a basic understanding, both of Man and of God. These questions of whether men will necessarily behave in the way in which we think they will and whether we have to admit the existence and interest of any One besides ourselves are not only relevant, but actually necessary, to any discussion.

Experience, if nothing else, should suggest to us that men do not behave entirely rationally. Their inability to comprehend the whole of a complex problem, and their consequent tendency to wreck their own attempts to deal with it, are such frequent occurrences in history that we have no right to suppose that the same thing will not happen again. Furthermore, the accusations and counter-accusations which surge to and fro in any international problem on the scale of the one we have been considering cannot be without some part of truth in

them. If the present survey has had any validity at all, it must surely have demonstrated that in this matter no nation is guiltless. We have all sinned and fallen short.

The Christian is bound to go further than this and complete the quotation. For him, to have sinned is to have fallen short of the glory of God. He is bound to take account of God's existence and to take account of it in every aspect of his life. He cannot accept the argument that we are living in a closed system and are entirely and solely responsible for the management of our own affairs. He must of necessity so order his behavior as a thing for which he will some day have to give account; and to this extent, at the very least, he believes that God is interested. However, he goes beyond this. He holds that God is not only interested in what we have done and are doing, but is Himself at work inside this system in which we live, and that our activity must take place within the framework of His.

This is very easy to say, and most Christians would probably assent to it intellectually. However, when they face it in practice, they have considerable difficulties. In the first place many Christians base their thinking upon the New Testament to the exclusion of the Old, and many Christians in the West would not accord the Old Testament the same authority as the New. Even those who do often interpret the Old Testament *purely* in the light of the New Testament thinking. It is, of course, highly dangerous to read the Old Testament without an understanding of the New, as the justification for *apartheid* in South Africa makes evident. Yet the Old Testament had a separate existence and has, in fact, an authority of its own so that if it must be read in the light of the

New Testament, it must also be read for its own sake, and must equally serve as a guide to understanding the New Testament which from beginning to end presupposes it. There is, it must be insisted, no such thing as a Christian idea which is not rooted and grounded in the Old Testament.

The importance of all this for the realm of international politics is that the New Testament is essentially concerned with *persons;* God's dealing with the *nations* is a matter for the Old. Inevitably, those whose understanding of the Christian life is confined to a study of the New Testament tend towards a certain moralism. The urgent question for them is, "In the light of this astounding new fact that Christ has died for us, what must we now do? How must we behave? How must we now live?" These are very proper questions, and no Christian should ever be found to speak lightly of the moralist. Yet, they become unreal questions when they are applied to international, or even national, politics. They presuppose that the person who is asking these questions has been "born again," to use the biblical phrase, and that he is already a "new man in Christ." This assumption cannot be made about whole nations. The fundamental principles of justice, righteousness, mercy, love and self-giving remain unaltered, for God is the same, yesterday, today and forever. But the application of them may have to be different. Thus, the true Christian, faithful to his calling, must ever hold that the ultimate crown of his life is crucifixion, to die a martyr if that be God's will. It cannot be otherwise if Christ lives in him. Yet this must be thought out again in national terms, for no nation can embrace martyrdom in

quite the manner in which a true Christian freely offers himself, a sacrifice for Christ's sake.

There are, naturally, those who have understood this, and who by a patient searching of the Prophets in the light of their New Testament understanding, have sought to interpret the events of the present time on the basis of that study. Yet they are faced with the second aspect of the difficulty, the problem of connecting the revelation of God in the history of Israel and Judah with the events of our present time. It is unfortunately necessary in these days to point out that this is not *primarily* an intellectual problem. No understanding of this matter is even remotely possible without the utmost humility of spirit, a constant sense of nakedness before unutterable majesty, a refusal at any time to dominate the subject, to essay "brilliant conjectures," and a complete submission to the mind of God that His will may be made known.* This is an understanding which seems today more characteristic of the laboratory than the theologian's study and, though this may be an unjust judgment, commentators on the Bible seldom give the impression of having approached their material with the same awe that a true scientist always urges upon his pupils.

Nevertheless, it is also an intellectual problem. The facts must be collected, arranged and studied with the same integrity that one expects of any other intellectual research. But it is these facts which are so repulsive. The study of any serious problem of international poli-

* I hasten to say that although I write out of this conviction, it is not as one who had already attained it. God forbid that I should pretend otherwise.

tics reveals the most revolting mixture of chicanery, double dealing, hypocrisy, aggrandizement, brutality and treachery. Inside this horrid picture there can be discerned notable contradictions. As one dissects and probes, there comes to light again and again some detail of astounding brilliance, some record of a quite selfless life, it may be of a statesman or of some lesser person. Yet the other impression remains. The full account of such historic events as the Versailles conference at the end of World War I or the United Nations discussions which led to the establishment of the State of Israel reveals such a sorry story of wire-pulling, cynicism and jobbery, relieved only by a few persons with a concern for justice that one is compelled to ask, "Is this catalogue of corruption really the story of God's mighty acts?" Similarly, when we see a picture of Arab refugees in their sodden tents, or the shattered corpses of those who have been killed in a border raid, we cannot but say, "This is not what the Bible is talking about."

But it is. This is the stuff of which the biblical record is made, and the measure of how little this has been really understood is the tendency throughout the Interpreter's Bible to treat "exposition" as the drawing of moral lessons. What is not felt to be morally stimulating is given most inadequate treatment. Here is the value of a lectionary in the services of the Church, the steady reading of the whole of God's revelation of Himself in the ears of the people. It is not necessary that they should understand it immediately; it is certainly not necessary that they like it; but it is beyond question necessary that they *hear* it. This ceaseless recitation must

be maintained *until the cities be wasted without inhabitant, and the houses without man.*

God's revelation, as the Old Testament conceives it, has a triple character. It is to be seen, obviously, in the proclamation of the Word of God by the Prophets, but also in the events of the time of which the prophet speaks, and in the response of that *band of men, whose hearts God had touched.* For the moment, it is with the first two that we are here concerned. The third aspect of the revelation must be reserved until later. It has to be understood that the prophetic message does not have the character of God's judgment upon the events of the time. Rather, the events are themselves the judgment, and the message is part of the events. These events are the whole activity and experience of man and there is nothing which can properly be left outside. Thus a plague of locusts or a flood may be as much the vehicle of God's revelation as either a massacre or the unlooked-for deliverance from the enemy. The picture is normally presented in bold masses of black and white in which the details are often difficult to discern. But it must not be imagined that therefore they were absent. Isaiah speaks of the Assyrian army as the rod of God's anger, and Habakkuk of the Chaldeans, *that bitter and hasty nation,* as having been raised by God Himself. Yet they were not for that reason better behaved than other armies, nor was the council of the good King Hezekiah conducted with the solemn hush that we would associate with divine service. Not only were the Assyrian troops quite inexpressibly brutal, but there must have been all the normal unpleasantnesses that go with occupying ar-

mies. There is equally no reason to think that the decisions of even the greatest of the Judean kings were taken without a large amount of "palace politics." God's creation of man with real freedom to make decisions has resulted throughout history in the fact that decisions are made in this kind of atmosphere, and the activity of any nation contains a staggering amount of which any thoughtful individual would be heartily ashamed.

The biblical assertion is that God does not despair of this, but instead He uses it so that these same events which seem to us so murky become the vehicle of His activity. This activity is relentlessly the same. It is primarily and fundamentally to save mankind, though in point of time this is not the first aspect of His revelation which is grasped by men themselves. This saving is done by facing men with reality, by forcing them step by step to understand the true nature of their own existence and the necessary outcome of their present actions. Consequently, the first thing which is seen by men is of necessity the judgment, the reality of disaster. If, of course, they are chastened by the awful warning which the events of their time present to them, it is possible that they may so reconsider the whole basis upon which they live that the threatened disaster either does not take place, or proves less calamitous than had been feared. However, if it does come upon them, it is found to be the means of God's mercy, and from the very disaster something may be produced of such value that those who come after look back and say, "It was worth it."

Obviously, the danger of this is that by emphasizing the extent of God's mercy and dwelling upon that, we shall thereby minimize the horror of the disaster. Thus,

we tend to look back today upon the French Revolution as marking the judgment of God upon tyranny and privilege and the dawning of a new era for the ordinary man, but in doing so we gloss over the ghastliness, even for the ordinary man, of the Revolution itself. Similarly, when we read the triumphant prophecies of the Second Isaiah, that cataract of consolation, we must never allow ourselves to forget the dreary beastliness of the Exile.

The judgment is not a simple act of God, but a process, and a process of great complexity. One event reacts upon another, and the use of one nation to bring judgment upon another is itself the judgment upon the nation that is so used. So in the famous tenth chapter of Isaiah, the Assyrian army is used for the chastisement of Judah, and yet this same action is the cause of the judgment of Assyria itself for their pride and self-seeking. The constant interplay of God's judgment brought to bear, not merely upon one nation after another, but in a great variety of ways upon different nations at the same time, results from the complex character of the activity itself. Man's freedom to decide upon his own actions is a reality and not a shadow, and therefore every nation is in some measure able to make a choice between one policy and another. And yet man is not free. He cannot escape the love of God which pursues him, and, for his own sake, blocks him continually. Man is, as it were, in a maze. At every point he is free to make his own decision—really and truly free since no compulsion is laid upon him—and yet he cannot reach the center by any but the one way. It is this combination of real freedom at any given moment with the over-ruling fact of one

right way and no other which makes for the great complication of the maze. We must, therefore, not seek for any simple pattern of God's activity in international affairs.

Before we turn to consider how this is being worked out at the present time in the Middle Eastern situation two further points need to be touched upon. The first is the suggestion in the Prophets that what God requires from His people is a withdrawal from the world's affairs. Thus both Hosea and Isaiah condemn the futility of the treaties which Israel and Judah made with Assyria and Egypt, and the impression that they give is that it would have been better to have had nothing at all to do with either of the great powers. This might conceivably have been a possibility for Judah, which stood somewhat apart, but it is hard to see how Israel, lying across the great Trunk Road in one of its most strategic regions, could have held permanently aloof from the struggle for mastery which took place upon it. Naturally, one must always be careful about a comparison of one historical situation with another, but it would seem at least possible that what was being condemned was not the taking of sides in itself, but the considering of this to be a sufficient policy, and therefore a substitute for any further action.

Secondly, great attention is paid by the Prophets to the question of "false gods," of which the modern parallel is usually held to be the setting up of something, often good in itself, which is nevertheless other than God. So we are held to be worshipping false gods when we elevate peace, or patriotism, or worldly success into ends in themselves and serve them. This is, of course,

a valid and necessary interpretation, and one which we do well to consider. However, there is another aspect of the prophetic condemnation which is equally important at the present time, and that is the matter of *misplaced trust.* Any true conception of God must involve the belief that either His authority is absolute in every sphere of life, or else He is just not God. If God is truly who He says He is, and who we, as Christians, believe Him to be, then it is quite impossible that there is anything which is outside His control, or any part of the affairs of the universe where His methods are not effective. To doubt this is to deny the very basis of the Faith. Nevertheless, we have a strong tendency at the present time to argue that God is effective in the personal sphere but not elsewhere, and we act as if we thought that economics, national unity and international affairs were too serious to allow out of our own hands. The results of any failure in these areas would, we feel, be so catastrophic that we would rather not put the matter to the test. We have consequently refused any serious criticism of our whole economic structure, since we feel that the Western way of life is based upon it; we have strengthened the authority of the state as a thing beyond real question in matters of our security (e.g. in matters of atomic information); and we have tended to argue that in the last resort the interest of our own country is always the basic criterion in international affairs. We have therefore at least three spheres in which we doubt the ability of God, and each of them has its own standards of morals and behavior.

Against this background it is now possible to look once again at the complex pattern of the Middle East, and

in the tradition of Amos it will be necessary to examine both the judgment of God upon the "nations," and also the special judgment which comes upon those who have had the special privilege of the revelation of God's purposes. *You only have I known of all the families of the earth,* said God, and *therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities.*

There is a very real sense in which this can be said of the nations of the West. When one considers the tremendous heritage of the Western peoples and how they have been, as it were, the schoolmasters of the world, it is difficult not to see them as in great measure privileged beyond the other nations. In so far as this is realized in the West, it is held to be either a matter for self-congratulation, or even more blatantly the result of our own energies and of our own inherent skill. However, no one instructed in biblical thinking could take this attitude and he must look for judgment upon the people that do. Nevertheless, not as if he himself did not belong to them, as if there were a separate group at Washington or Westminster from whose follies a true Christian could dissociate himself. A Christian must never at any time speak of the government as "they," nor must he accuse other nations of the West as if he were not part of them. He cannot ask that he shall not be involved in their judgment.

This judgment would seem to be taking the form in our day of the destruction of our security. Step by step in the last twelve years we have watched it shaken and collapse. Immediately after the war, as Churchill, in his famous speech at Fulton, sharply reminded us, only the atomic bomb stood between us and Russian aggression.

We have managed since then to build up other bulwarks, and even seem to have finished the decade stronger than when we started it. Nevertheless, careful examination shows us how unreliable each of our defenses is. We no longer have the monopoly of the atomic bomb, nor that of the hydrogen bomb. We are uncertain whether we are maintaining our lead in research, though we have reason to believe that our stockpile is greater. We are certainly producing less technicians than our opponents. The vital alliance between Britain and the United States has cracked and is being rebuilt only with difficulty. Britain has made public statement of the fact that she cannot be defended against an atomic attack. It is true that there is much to set against this, the moves towards European unity, the revolts in the satellite countries, the military alliances, etc. However, beyond all these things are more serious weaknesses. Until now the Communist world has been contained by an immense natural barrier of mountain ranges, usually double, extending completely across the Old World from the Pyrenees to the Pacific. It is this vast wall which the military pacts, NATO, the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, have been designed to strengthen, enclosing the Soviet power within a ring of steel, so that until the present time there has been no Soviet dominated country to the south of these mountains. In those areas of weakness where the mountain ranges provide a less adequate defense there have been Russian efforts to strike outwards: along the North German Plain through Berlin, in Indo-China where the mountains run from north to south, and in Korea, which has been described as "a pistol pointing at the heart of Japan." There was also a further attempt

to extend across the northern range of mountains in Iran. Now, however, a new and greater danger has arisen, because there is today the possibility that Soviet domination will leap completely over the mountain barrier and establish itself in the countries of the Middle East. It is hard to think of any area in the world where more harm could be done to the Western cause, and it is doubly dangerous because in a sense Russia needs to do so very little to gain this influence. The follies of the West have been on such a scale and so continuous that for at least ten years she has been, as it were, handing the Middle East to Russia on a plate. Moreover, whatever we do there now is bound to infuriate many people, and those whom the West has incensed are Russia's friends. Such is the stark situation with which we are faced.

When we turn to consider what the events of the past forty years have meant to the people of the Middle East themselves, we see the double judgment of which Isaiah spoke. Only those whose enthusiasm for the Arab cause has blinded them to the facts should fail to take account of the tragic weakness of the Arabs. Their complacency, their certainty that they are the people and that wisdom will die with them, their rigidity, their high-sounding words, their inability to combine, the lack of courage of most of them save the Bedouin—these are the weaknesses which have put them at the mercy of Israel. Three things have been given to the Arab world at once: independence, the stimulus of new and exciting ideas and the possibility of quite overwhelming wealth, and with them at the same time has come the necessity of decision. The question is now what they will do with

all these gifts. Will those in power use the new wealth for their own aggrandizement or for the benefit of the people? Will Egypt use her position of power for the benefit or the control of the other Arab nations? Will they struggle to overcome their past history in face of the need for unity? Will the oil-countries consider their riches as something to be kept entirely within their own borders? Are the refugees always to remain a pawn in the game? These are the kind of questions of which the judgment is made, and the presence of Israel is the spur. Had there been no Israel, the questions would have come less sharply and the need for unity have been made less apparent. No one can deny the troubles of the Arabs. The West has not treated them fairly, not even with so much as common courtesy, but that is not now the question for them. Their crisis is now to know whether any of their own number will arise to tell them their own shortcomings, and, bluntly, whether they would rather listen to him or shoot him.

We must not, however, make the mistake of believing that the chastisement of Arab follies means that Israel is therefore justified. It is the tragedy of Israel that she has found no peace, and no peace is likely to be granted to her for a long time. She has gathered in those who were afraid, and they are afraid still. The security they longed for most earnestly is the thing which is still beyond their reach, the crock of gold at the rainbow's end. *Wherefore it shall come to pass, that when the Lord hath performed his whole work upon Mount Zion and on Jerusalem, I will punish the fruit of the stout heart of the King of Assyria, and the glory of his high looks. For he saith, By the strength of my hand I have done it, and*

by my wisdom: for I am prudent: and I have removed the bounds of the people, and have robbed their treasures, and I have put down the inhabitants like a valiant man.

It is surely in some sense as this that judgment is coming on the world in the Middle Eastern situation. There every country stands faced with the loss of the very thing it most desires. The Arabs will forfeit their independence, if the tide of history should bring in the Russian forces, and Israel her existence as a state. Britain and France, the schoolteachers of democracy, would be reduced to political destitution and, lacking oil, to economic servitude. The United States would be deprived of her security and thrust back, despite herself, into isolation. These are the possibilities which loom before us.

The alternative would be to fight it out, and we should certainly have to try, but what would that profit us? The Western powers might well defeat Russia, but it could not be a quick victory, and there would be no more Western way of life when it was over.

The terrible thing is that we have no idea at all of how long we have been given. It is possible that we have some time left, and there are certainly signs that the West has the same kind of choice which is set before the Arabs, with new wealth and new opportunities laid before them, for it is not a necessity that the Middle East should for ever have a stranglehold upon the West's economy. The development of atomic power is only in its infancy and methods of transport may be brought into play which reduce the pressure of the Egyptian vise by rendering the Suez Canal less vital in the world's affairs.

Nevertheless, much depends upon the purpose for which the West intends to use these new resources. If their intention is to snap their fingers at those who now hold them to ransom, we shall be in no better state than we are in now, and it is greatly to be feared that this, at present, is their mood. They find it intolerable that such a country as Egypt should be able to dictate its terms and, by flirting with their enemy, keep them in a constant state of nervous tension.

It is also possible that we have already passed the point of no return, and that we are now moving with the terrible inevitability of a Greek tragedy towards a cataclysm which will engulf the world. This is not a development which can be ruled out as impossible for a merciful God. There was such a point in 1938 at the time of Munich when Churchill could say to Neville Chamberlain, "You had the choice between dishonor and war; you chose dishonor and you will get war." From that time forward at the very least, though it is probable that the point had actually been reached earlier, there was no possibility that war could be avoided. It is entirely possible that 1956 was such a time and that future historians will look back and say, "That was the critical year. From that time onward the tragedy was certain." One is uncomfortably reminded of the meeting between Isaiah and the ineffective Ahaz which is so vividly described in Isaiah 7. At that time Syria and Israel had combined to force Judah to take sides with them against Assyria, and the terrified Ahaz turned to Assyria for help. For this act of political folly Isaiah told him bluntly that he had brought disaster on his kingdom since the king

of Assyria, whose aid he had sought, would bring an overflowing scourge which would reach to the very gates of Jerusalem. Admittedly it did not happen for another thirty years, but the point of no return was Ahaz' decision. Are we to see any form of parallel with the attempt by Britain and France to force Egypt's submission and Egypt's turning for help from Russia?

For the next thirty years after this incident the people of Judah watched the inexorable approach of the Assyrian power. In 734 Damascus was taken and in 722 Samaria. In 711 the Philistines were conquered, and in 701, when Hezekiah was king, came the long awaited attack on Jerusalem. Isaiah had always insisted that Jerusalem itself would be saved, as it were by a miracle, though the country round about would suffer terribly. This actually happened, but the people learned nothing from it. When the Assyrian army withdrew from Jerusalem, they went wild with joy, but gave no thought to reform. They paid, as Isaiah said, no respect *unto him that had fashioned it long ago,* and so, in almost the direst sentence of Scripture, the judgment was pronounced: *Surely this iniquity shall not be purged from you till you die, saith the Lord of hosts.* What are we to say to this? Is there any chance that perhaps Dunkirk had this character, the unexpected deliverance whose lesson we never learned?

A century and a quarter later the final judgment came upon Jerusalem, and Jeremiah, in the greatest distress of mind, had to proclaim that the Jewish way of life and all the worship of God as they knew it could no longer be preserved. Jerusalem was destroyed and the city that was full of children sat solitary.

But in whose time do we live? In that of Ahaz, or Hezekiah, or Jeremiah, or some other time altogether? *We see not our signs: there is no more any prophet: neither is there any among us that knoweth how long.*

CHAPTER XIV

The Battle for Men's Minds

THIS is a further aspect of God's judgment in the Middle Eastern situation of very great importance, for, as was emphasized earlier in the book, what people think is itself a political fact, even if they think wrong. The Christian can have only one allegiance, that which he owes to God Almighty, as revealed in Jesus Christ. Yet, as he looks on the world around him he sees other systems so powerful that they are gaining rather than losing in the face of the Christian witness; and against the compelling persuasiveness of these philosophies he can make not so much as a dent.

The simple explanation of this is to say either that all philosophies are really working towards a common end, or that the non-Christian philosophies are of the devil and will in course of time be overthrown. Neither of these explanations is satisfactory, for the first assumes,

quite unjustifiably, that the "political" religions have a common end with what we may call the "real" religions, and the second does not explain the imperviousness of these other systems. The devil may be both a doughty and a crafty warrior, but his followers seldom show the cohesiveness with which we are faced here. We are forced to ask instead, therefore, whether there is not some deeper explanation, some place for these philosophies in the purposes of God, so that in fighting head on against them we may be found fighting against God Himself.

It would seem that God's practice is to reveal Himself first to individuals, solitary men and women who have placed themselves at His disposal, and to whom He has granted some understanding of His truth. By means of such men, though long years may be needed for this to be achieved, the people of God are challenged in their thinking until at last they grasp the importance of what these "prophets" were saying. Such people are not confined to the Old Testament. Those early Christians who first saw the necessity of taking the Gospel to the Gentiles; the courageous pioneers within the Christian fold who instituted the monastic reforms; those early friars who from within the body of the Church condemned her practices; the lonely individuals who first began to rouse the conscience of the nation to examine the iniquity of slavery—these are the people who stand in the great prophetic tradition.

However, it is always possible that the people of God may either neglect or forget the truth, and the teachings of the Prophets be allowed to moulder unconsidered. In such a case God is not limited to the prophetic message,

to the revelation from within. Instead He seems to raise up outside the people of God another people who hold this aspect of the truth, as it were to the n^{th} degree, exalting it above other aspects. Herein lies the tremendous power and the extraordinary fascination of these philosophies. Since they contain within them truth, they must always attract the loyalty of honest men, and since this truth, partial though it may be, is an aspect of the truth of God, they cannot be overthrown. They will endure as long as God wishes them to endure and will come to an end only when they are no longer necessary to His purposes. So it is that we must consider these rival philosophies also as the "rod of God's anger" and ask what neglected aspect of the truth they have been created to proclaim. In the Middle East the Church is faced by four: Islam, scientific humanism, nationalism (including Zionism) and Communism.

The earliest and most enduring is Islam, the most resistant system in the world to Christian missionary endeavor. Its strength lies in its simplicity, and the truth which it proclaims above all others is the authority and unity of God. Originally God's rebuke to the corrupt teaching and disunity of the Church of Muhammed's day, it has endured because in their modern forms these things still persist. As long as Christians permit themselves the luxury of their divisions, as long as the West rejects the absolute demands of the Creator, as long as a major section of Christendom toys with the idea of a "co-redemptrix," * so long will Islam endure to throw back

* This goes back to the original protest of Muhammed, who was so impressed by the excessive devotion paid to the Virgin Mary that he understood that she formed a member of the Christian Trinity.

the falsehood in their teeth. Christian missionaries all over the world have borne witness to the impossibility of preaching one God from within a divided Church, and this has been one of the two major roots of ecumenical thinking. If this is true where men believe in gods many and lords many, how much more true must it be in lands where the unity of God is proclaimed to the housetops five times a day! In this the complexity of what we have called the "ecclesiastical pattern" is seen in its true seriousness.

Second in point of time is scientific humanism, which exerts a great fascination for the Middle Eastern student. He sees it as the secret of the vast technical skill of the West, of which he is extremely envious, and as being the key to the future. In part, of course, his fascination with this kind of thinking is extremely shallow, for very few Middle Eastern students can be said to have probed it at all deeply, and in part also it has resulted from the fact that modern education, even in so-called "Christian" schools, is itself essentially humanist. Yet this second fact is evidence of the strength and vitality of scientific humanism because even Christian institutions have as yet found no way of giving classroom teaching which is any way different from that given in purely secular schools. The scientific philosophy has this vitality and strength because it proclaims what the Church has forgotten—the absolute primacy of truth itself.

Far too much has been made of the quarrel between science and religion and far too little attention has been paid to the great army of deeply committed Christians who have furthered the cause of science. Nevertheless, the rebuke still exists. It is characteristic of Christianity

alone that it takes its stand upon a statement of historical fact (*If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain*), and it falls to pieces if it is treated as a system of moral teaching only. The nature and importance of truth are vital concerns to the Christian and he should surely maintain that if (*per impossible,* as I am persuaded) it should somehow be proved that the things upon which he bases his faith did not really happen, then it would be actually wrong for him to continue to hold the Faith. Deeply concerned though the Christian must be with moral questions, the primary decision of whether one becomes Christ's faithful soldier and servant is not a moral question at all. It is in no sense *morally* better to be a Christian than to belong to any of the other great religions. It is a question of validity, of who has the words of eternal life.

However, it would be difficult to learn this from the preaching of almost any branch of the Christian Church in the West. In the Middle East also, most of the Eastern churches teach a literal interpretation of the Bible, and the Protestant churches likewise often tend towards the same, since they represent for the most part that side of Protestantism. This is true even of the Arab Anglicans who are the product of the devoted work of low-church missionaries. The result is that the great majority of boys in Palestine to whom I taught geology were troubled about how to equate it with their religious background.

This is an extremely serious question and might be said to go to the very heart of the Middle Eastern problem. What is needed there almost more than anything else is a ruthless intellectual honesty which will break

every barrier of emotionalism, sentiment, tradition and nationality, so that at the last people will be found able to question their own motives and behavior. Hardly anywhere does it exist, and neither Islam nor the type of Judaism which is found in Israel encourage it. The importance attached to the verbal inspiration of the Quran and the strict legalism of Israeli Orthodox Judaism are such insurmountable barriers that one finds Jewish and Muslim students even more convinced that "science" and "religion," as they imagine them, cannot live together and that therefore they must make a choice between the two. They usually choose "science," but the lesson they should have learnt by that choice is lost, because they come to think that intellectual honesty belongs only to those things which "science" studies, and see no necessity to apply it to politics. Only if the Christian Church can regain this passion for truth, whatever it may cost, will they begin to see it as a way of life.

There is little need to emphasize how strong a hold nationalism has on Middle Eastern minds. However, perhaps one personal reminiscence will illustrate how far it has penetrated. I once discussed the Suez Canal problem with a class of Arabs in Jerusalem, and I asked how many of the students thought that Great Britain was in the wrong. The whole class put up their hands. I then asked what attitude they thought that I, as an Englishman, should take and only half the group thought that I ought, on the grounds that it was wicked, to oppose the British attitude. The other half said that it was my duty to support my country even though I thought that its behavior was indefensible. When one realizes how strongly the Arabs feel that the British attitude on

Suez has been entirely selfish, it becomes clear that for many of them nationalism is not merely an emotional enthusiasm for their own country, but a philosophy.

At first sight any form of nationalism as looked at from outside appears so essentially selfish that one is inclined to attribute its strength to the natural self-centeredness of man and leave it at that. However, it is not so simple. It does at least give an outlet for such virtues as loyalty, which are wholly proper. Moreover, the most ardent nationalists are seldom selfish people. Indeed, nationalism wins the support of those who wish to give themselves utterly and completely, without thought of self, and the more selfish a person is, the less enthusiasm he tends to have for the nationalist cause. This can be seen most clearly in the Middle East in the passionate idealism and self-sacrifice of the true Zionist, but it is not lacking elsewhere. The source of the nationalist attraction must therefore be looked for more profoundly.

One must admit, certainly, that of all philosophies it has the simplest and most elemental appeal, and it can hardly fail to be a popular way of thinking. It therefore gathers a large number of hangers-on. Yet this alone would not explain it. One should perhaps see it as God's judgment on His Church for two failings: her sloth and her neglect of international justice—the form that His judgment takes when He comes to *search Jerusalem with candles, and punish the men that are settled on their lees: that say in their heart, The Lord will not do good, neither will he do evil.* One may sympathize with the Eastern churches in their struggle to maintain themselves beneath the crushing weight of Muslim fatalism, but one cannot pretend that they show forth the zeal and passion

which are proper to the Gospel. Yet, equally one must say the same of the churches in the West. Even the missionaries in the Middle East have set few people on fire for the cause of Christ.

Naturally there must be a cause to die for, since even the most hotheaded youngster will not sacrifice himself to no purpose. The cause of nationalism is "justice," perverted though it may have become in the heat of the struggle. One can see the truth of this when one considers the fact that the early nationalists so often started in the Christian schools, when they began to compare the ideas which they were learning there with the reality as they saw it all around them. The same thing is apparent in Zionism, for so much has it been true that where there is little persecution Zionists are few, that there have been enthusiasts for the Zionist cause who have even provoked persecution of their own people so that they might show the same enthusiasm.

The British may be inclined to question this, for they have some reason to think that they have been concerned about justice in their colonies. So they have, but there has often been less than justice when white supremacy has been felt to be at stake,[23] and it has usually tended to be justice for persons rather than the nation. This is shown by the British government's illogical response to the Greek Cypriots' demands for *Enosis*. So long as these demands were made in words only, the government argued that this showed they were not being made seriously, but when the Cypriots followed the Palestinian example and backed their demands with action, the government called them "terrorists" and said that they must be put down by force. In fact, there are few countries

where nationalism has not begun among the moderates and taken violent forms only when moderation proved ineffective. It would be unfair to say that the Church has been silent about this, and there have probably been in the West more Christian protests than any other. However, it would be equally untrue to say that the whole Church has ever allowed herself to get excited about the matter.

The fourth of the Middle Eastern philosophies is Communism, and here the Western Christian finds singular difficulty, for it so often appears to be the incarnation of evil and utterly destructive of the human personality. None of the other philosophies can be said to have built slave-labor camps or practiced brain-washing, and few other people wish to stamp out not merely Christianity but every other form of religion. Surely here is the work of the devil rather than God, for what place will there be for God if no religion at all is suffered to live? In answer to this question the following points have to be borne in mind:

(a) It is a great mistake, as Archbishop Temple pointed out, to imagine that God is primarily interested in religion. This was the mistake of the people of Judah who based their resistance to Babylon in the time of Jeremiah upon the assumption that God could not permit a situation in which He was not worshipped. They were doubly wrong, since they believed that God counted His worship more important than righteousness and justice, and also that the worship of God was such a fragile structure that it would collapse if Jerusalem were taken. In view of the Jewish experience in Babylon and the strength of the Russian Church under the Soviet

domination, we have no right to assume that the Communists would in fact succeed in stamping out the worship of God.

(b) It is always difficult for us to believe that God can and does use wicked people, since we usually think that He should use good people first; but we have to remember the undoubted brutality and barbarism of the Assyrian army which Isaiah said He was using. The cruelty and frightfulness of much of the Communist methods are therefore *not necessarily* an argument against the Communists' being God's unwitting servants.

(c) The complete disappearance of the Communist menace would not be certain to prove beneficial to the Christian cause. Honesty surely requires us to admit that the efforts towards European unity, the foreign aid programs of the various Western nations, and our concern for the weaker peoples are kept alive by our fear of Russia. Whatever high-minded individuals may think, the danger of Communism is the strongest possible argument with which to convince the great mass of doubters; and, of course, it is the fact that this is a real and terrible danger, instead of a bogey, which makes the argument so convincing.

(d) Along the same lines we must ask ourselves a difficult and searching question: "Would we still feel *responsible* for the Middle East (apart from protecting our oil-interests) if Russia were not involved there? Would we, for example, have the same concern for the integrity of Jordan?

(e) Then we must look at the power of Communism to win the minds of men, and not only to win them, but to hold them. The Hungarians may revolt with fury

against the domination of Russia, but they show little desire to adopt the Western economic system; Yugoslavia remains firmly Communist, despite its opposition to the Soviet authority; the Chinese Christians have shocked the Church in the West by appearing actually to prefer Communist rule to that of Chiang Kai Shek; and it is a commonplace that Communism spreads most rapidly among the destitute and oppressed, whom once the Christian Church claimed as her very own. The only possible explanation for this would seem to be that Communism also has a place in God's purposes, and is likely to endure until it shall have been rendered unnecessary, until, perhaps, we have learned to pay less attention to "democracy" and more to land reform. As long as there is economic injustice and privilege, as long as there are poor in a land of plenty, as long as the Church is not afflicted by these things, so long will there be another philosophy to give hope to the hopeless.

(f) Finally, we have to remember that, however terrible their political system may be, and however much it may be true that to pass under their system would be *darkness and not light; even very dark and no brightness in it,* nevertheless, they are all men for whom Christ died, and men for whose salvation God is even now at work. Indeed, if we think that they have wandered further into the wilderness than we have, then we should probably believe that God is more concerned about them than He is about us. We can have no idea of how His judgment and His mercy are being shown to them, but we must never allow ourselves to think that they have cut themselves off from either, nor to imagine that God will not use us to bring them home to His fold.

There is a story that when the barbarian hordes ravaged the Roman Empire and sacked the city of Rome itself, Pope Leo IV said of them, "We were not ready to take the Gospel to the Barbarians, and so God has brought the Barbarians to the Gospel." It is not impossible that we may find ourselves in the same position, for it cannot be said that God would *never* permit the Christian Church in the West to pass within the Soviet Empire, if that would achieve the ultimate conversion of the Communist rulers to Christ's religion.

The danger of writing in this strain is that the casual reader may gain the impression that I actually want events to take the course I have outlined. It needs to be stressed, therefore, that the very thought of it terrifies me. The possibility of being under Communist rule is appalling, and in any conflict between East and West I cannot but pray fervently that the West will win. But I know that I think like this as one who loves life and length of days, for though it must always be a Christian's hope that disaster shall not come, there can be no Christian guarantee that it will not.

In order to understand how Communism and the other philosophies will endure until they are no longer necessary to God's purposes it is advisable to go back a century and a half to the time when the Christian Church was as frightened of Democracy as it now is of Communism. The French Revolution seemed to them to have proved that Democracy struck at the very root of their way of life, and was to be equated with deliberate godlessness, with terror, secret police and the guillotine. Even in 1818 the British Parliament passed Young's Act, by which they gave the Church of England a million

pounds for building churches, since they felt this was the greatest possible defense against democratic ideas.[24] It may seem strange to us that they should have failed so singularly to discern the signs of the times, but that is because we cannot see with their eyes nor fear their fear. Their example, however, should be a warning to us not to speak of Christianity as "a bulwark against Communism."

Democracy seems harmless to us now, and even presents itself to us as *the* Christian way of life, because the Christian Church, stimulated especially by the Wesleyan revival, did in course of time absorb that part of the democratic philosophy which it was God's purpose that they should learn, and having digested it, proclaimed it as the Word of God, which indeed it was. Democracy was thus shorn of its instruments of war, which were then seen to be mere temporary weapons, fit to be beaten into ploughshares and sickles. What is needed now is that Christians should examine themselves, demanding of each other, "What is God saying to us through these philosophies? How much of what we see and hear is terrifying accident, the outward trappings of the system, and how much is there of an inner core, the valid and indestructible Word of God?"

But what is the duty of the Church while she is learning? It is what it has always been: to be valiant for truth. To do this she must challenge hypocrisy and deceit wherever they may appear, and she must prepare that climate of opinion in which the truth can be told. If there is any aspect of the truth which has been neglected, she must see that it is heard, even if it is not a "religious" truth, rather than keeping silent until God raises up men from

without to proclaim it. That is always tragic for when it happens the truth is not seen in proportion. Finally, she must keep men aware of the possibility of disaster and prepare them to *withstand in the evil day, and having done all, to stand,* since this is the aspect of the truth which those who speak to please men will never tell them.

To challenge hypocrisy and deceit means to demand that men think what they are saying and examine the slogans by which they live. As an example of this, which is very applicable to the Middle Eastern scene, we may consider the phrase, "a just and durable peace." No peace can now be just. That is the lamentable fact, for whatever we do now will be unjust to somebody. If we confirm the Israeli immigrants in their homes, we shall be unjust to the Arab refugees, whose homes they once were, and who desperately long to return to them. If, however, we insist that justice shall be done to the Arabs, we shall be unjust to the Israeli immigrants, who cannot be held responsible for an exodus which took place before they set foot in the country. If we are just to Egypt in Suez, we shall be unjust to Israel or to Britain, but if we try to satisfy the legitimate claims of Britain and Israel, we shall have dealt unjustly by Egypt. There are those on every side, it is true, who demand that justice be done to them and never mind about the others. But it is not this that "justice" means.

The Middle East is admittedly not peculiar in this, for in any problem area of the world, in Kashmir, in South Africa, in Germany, in Indochina and in North Africa, the issues have become so complex, and so much unrighted wrong has been done, that justice is no longer

feasible. To pretend that it is is to make any forward step impossible, because if we have proclaimed that justice is our purpose, then we shall unfailingly be condemned for the inevitable injustice, and we shall have added to the number of those who feel themselves to be betrayed.

It is equally true that no peace can be durable, and this for three reasons. In the first place, the complicated pattern of tensions and conflicts which was examined earlier means that any peace that is made cannot be more than temporary. In the second place, the character of men themselves forbids it. Sooner or later their natural carelessness and self-seeking will cause them to break the peace, especially if circumstances have so altered that the peace which once was profitable to them now seems inconvenient. It is not, perhaps, that they will destroy it wantonly, but for purposes of immediate gain they will nibble away at it until in a moment of strain it collapses altogether. So it was with the Anglo-American alliance. Constructed by two leaders with vision under the compelling pressure of the war years, it appeared immovable, one of the undoubted constants in a world of change, and for this reason the statesmen and politicians of neither country grasped that it had to be remade again in their generation. They took it for granted, and all of a sudden it was not there.

In the third place, we ourselves are not to be trusted with an unbreakable peace. In the absence of danger we grow lax and complacent; we assume that all is well with the world; we take credit to ourselves for the achievements of our fathers, and we fail utterly to examine our own way of life. This is not to say that we must

therefore endure a constant series of major wars, but there is a difference between a durable and a lasting peace. When we say a thing is durable, we mean that it has a resistant nature and, once made, will not easily be destroyed. That, it would seem, is the kind of peace that we are looking for and which our leaders are promising us. This is the kind of peace we cannot have. *Then said I, Ah, Lord God! behold, the prophets say unto them, Ye shall not see the sword, neither shall ye have famine; but I will give you assured peace in this place. Then the Lord said unto me, The prophets prophesy lies in my name!*

Yet there is a kind of peace, a complex and very fragile thing, which can be built again and again, and that kind of peace men can have for as long as they are ready to take care of it. History and experience suggest that it will not be world peace. Even during the great century which followed the Napoleonic wars, when Britain ruled the waves and none was so bold as to dispute her authority, peace was only relative. Every year had its conflicts and skirmishes. Often they were more serious and sometimes there was real carnage, for this so-called century of peace included the American Civil War, the Crimean War, the Greek War of Independence, the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer War, the Spanish-American War, the Indian Mutiny, and many, many others which come less rapidly to the mind, but which none the less added to the tale of dead and wounded. However, in general, there was a sense of security, and there were no general wars. Though the structure of peace was broken frequently and sometimes dangerously, it was never irreparably wrecked because those who were in

general responsible for the structure had some understanding of the strains to which it could be subjected, and gave attention to keeping it in repair. With a very much larger number of independent, and therefore possibly bellicose, nations to hold together than existed in the nineteenth century, we should be very thankful if we achieve the same measure of only relative calm. In the Middle East, at least, it is the very most that we can hope for.

That our leaders should be ready to quote so glibly such a deceptive phrase as that of "a just and durable peace" suggests that they feel no great necessity to tell us the truth. This would seem to be the case, for in the summer of 1956 spokesmen of authority, the President and the Secretary of State among them, assured us that the situation in the Middle East was getting better, though they cannot, surely, have believed what they were saying. When the Suez Canal crisis broke at the beginning of November President Eisenhower promised the American people that he would keep them out of the Middle Eastern fighting and was rewarded by re-election with an increased majority, though the general trend in the country was away from the Republican party. Yet even before his inauguration he had, by issuing the Eisenhower Doctrine, broken the promise he had made to the electorate. It is true that the Doctrine shows signs of being a step in more or less the right direction, but that does not alter the history of the previous six months.

Of course, it may be urged in extenuation that this was an election year, and that no one takes seriously what is said at such a time. But they do, especially outside the country, and even if the explanation is to be accepted,

one may be forgiven for wondering whether, in a country with such heavy responsibilities among the nations, public misstatements of fact need to be made quite so long before an election.

This is no peculiarity of the American system. One is reminded of the "appalling frankness" speech of Stanley Baldwin, when he told the House of Commons that his lips had been sealed, because if he had told the people the truth about Nazi re-armament he would not have been re-elected. And again of Sir Stafford Cripps promising that the pound would not be devalued, or of Neville Chamberlain returning from Munich with the promise of "peace in our time." The enthusiasm which this statement set aflood was of the same order as that which swept Eisenhower back into the White House —emotional, selfish and unchristian. Nor has Britain learned her lesson even yet. The half-truths issued by the government in the fall of 1956, and repeated by the B.B.C., showed a sad falling-off from the news-bulletins of the war-years.

The sorry reality is that the people do not ask for the truth, unless it flatters them, in this or any other country. *Speak unto us smooth things,* they say, *prophesy deceits.* For this the Church must be held responsible, since Christian people, above all others, should understand the need for hearing the unpleasant truths. More, they should earnestly desire them. There are three reasons for this. First, as we have seen, the Christian Faith stands or falls by a question of truth and for this reason, if for no other, the Christian should seek to know the truth. Secondly, the Christian knows that he is called always to repentance and he must, for this cause, want

to be told those truths which shall bring him to repentance. Thirdly, the Christian should dread beyond all else the sin of pride, that paralyzing blindness which makes it impossible for him to see his own faults, and he must be ever grateful to those who, by telling him the things which his pride would rather not have disclosed, humble him before God and men. This is the Christian standard and it demands truth in every sphere and at all costs, but this standard is not at present kept clearly in the minds of the faithful. It is not necessary that this should be done in every sermon, for there are other subjects which demand the attention of the congregation, but it is *one* of the major themes of which the Gospel is made, and it is the basis upon which, according to Saint Mark, our Lord began his teaching.

Except ye repent ye shall perish, said Christ. But repentance is not merely an act; it is an attitude of mind. It is a passion for the truth, an urgent desire to know the worst as well as the best, a readiness to begin again in a new way, a constantly proceeding examination of one's way of life, and with it all an ever remade decision to put right what is wrong. This is especially true of a nation, which is an inchoate, tongueless mass, incapable of the acts of reparation which can be made by an individual. Therefore, for a nation to repent there must be a "remnant," a group who are more fervently what all should be in some measure, who burn that the rest may glow. Where can we look for this passion outside the Christian Church, and what will happen to the nation where the Christians are not aflame? If, however, they have this attitude, there will at least have been created the atmos-

phere in which the truth can be told and listened to, and that is the beginning of wisdom.

To win the battle for men's minds, therefore, the Church must create within the nation those who are angered by injustice and privilege, even when they find it in their own home, and who will not rest if truth is hidden. But the Church cannot wait until the injustices arise to consider what she will do about them. She must be awake to the possibilities and ceaselessly discussing the principles involved. Thus the Church in Great Britain cannot wait for mass immigration of Jamaicans and others to produce a color problem; she should be looking to the future and challenging men to think now before the crisis is upon them. God is pouring the people of Asia and Africa and South America into the countries of the West to work and to study. It cannot be without a purpose. We must see them as the product of His mercy and the warning of His judgment. He has sent them to us to see what we will do and say. If indeed the attitude these people find among us is humility and a passion for justice and for truth, Communism and nationalism will no more menace us. They will wither in the beds where they grew.

Yet there remain some aspects of the truth which are excessively unpopular, and we can hardly look to hear them from those who are dependent upon elections, except only when the events have become so imminent that they compel attention. Chief among these aspects is the possibility of disaster and trouble. It is not that the spokesmen of the Church need always to be crying, *Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown,* but they

do need to keep before the attention of the people that disasters happen, and that tribulation comes even upon the good, so that if it should come there are none who are caught unawares. It is no part of the Christian message that men shall spend all their lives in tranquility. Communism and nationalism may be rendered unnecessary, because we have, by God's mercy, been challenged to think out what justice really means. But if this does not happen, then disaster is inevitable. This is the Word of God, and the Church has a duty to the nation to see that it is heard.

It is for the reader to decide whether this service is being done. *If thou dost not speak to warn the wicked from his way,* says God, *that wicked man shall die in his iniquity; but his blood will I require at thine hand.*

CHAPTER XV

Neither Jew nor Greek

IN a *human* sense the situation is now beyond hope, utterly and fundamentally irreconcilable, so embittered and so savage has it become. This must be said because in any brief survey of possible action the proposals must seem too glib. I do not promise, therefore, that the suggestions made here will succeed. In fact, I think they may fail. But then, anything done in the Middle East may fail. Nothing can be done now which will actually prevent strife, though some things may be done which could limit it. Even the most enlightened activity carries with it all the possibilities of shipwreck. To the outside observer it would seem, for instance, that both the Arabs and the Jews must gain from a proper use of the River Jordan, but as yet the most patient of negotiators has found no way of persuading all the interested parties

to agree.* The most generous measures of help may breed hostility because of the suspicions which both donor and recipient now inevitably bring to the meeting.

Nevertheless, some things can be done if we know what we are doing: first, immediate measures to prevent actual chaos; second, theoretically temporary, but actually likely to be semi-permanent, plans to limit the ill effects of any explosion that does take place; third, long term policies to moderate some of the causes of tension. Both the second and third sets of plans need to be given considerable freedom of adjustment, for we need always to remember that in easing one tension we are likely to emphasize another, and so any framework of action we construct must allow great possibility of movement within it. Especially, we must never allow ourselves to get into a position from which we cannot withdraw. This has too often been the weakness of Britain in recent years, as witness the rigidity of her policy in Cyprus.

Naturally, the danger of flexibility is that it lays us open to charges of perfidy. These cannot always be avoided, and we shall make a very great mistake if we expect everybody both to understand and to like what we do. That would be too much to ask. However, such charges may be prevented in part if we are careful about the promises we make and are extremely wary of propaganda. We tend today to overemphasize both the value of our own propaganda and the danger of that which is

* Lest this be thought due only to Arab and Jewish intransigeance, we should remember (a) that it is doubtful whether we should have had the T.V.A. if the seven states had been seven independent countries and (b) the St. Lawrence Seaway was started only because one country said that she would do it by herself, after discussions between two countries had been proceeding for a very long time.

directed against us. Factual information we should provide, but we should scrupulously avoid the fault of which we have been too often guilty in the past, devising some good project and then giving it wide publicity to prove that we have generous instincts. This is perhaps a greater temptation to Americans than to anyone else. By contrast we should remember that all the expenditure of the Germans and Italians on propaganda in the Middle East before World War II did not in fact gain them very many solid friends.

Nevertheless, the greatest defense against charges of treachery is a solid basis of principle upon which the pragmatic decisions can be made. After all, we cannot pretend that we do not want allies, but they must be allies with considerable freedom of action at all normal times, but who in moments of real crisis come to our help, because, whatever surface quarrels may occur, there is fundamentally a community of interest. The strength of the British Commonwealth has been that it has had this character. Our temptation, however, is to want something more rigid, something visible we can see for ourselves, and something concrete we may explain to the voters. But the trouble with a rigid structure is that the collapse of one part weakens the whole. For this reason we should be content with the Baghdad Pact as it is, and in strengthening it confine ourselves to strengthening the countries of which it is composed. We should not—at any rate not at present—venture so much as a hope that other Arab countries will join it, because that might impose a strain greater than it could bear.

4. The immediate measures are bound to be military and strategic, because the urgent problem is to prevent a ma-

jor outbreak of armed violence. As things are, also, only the United States can take this action, which requires giving clear demonstration that any attempt by Russia to enter the region in force will be resisted. It requires also evidence that any serious attempt to alter the existing situation between the Arab States and Israel by force will likewise be resisted. We cannot prevent border raiding by this means, but any state which sent its troops across the border in force, as happened in October 1956, would have to be told that if orders for a complete withdrawal were not given within twenty-four hours their chief city would be bombed.

Obviously, these are crisis measures, and it is very urgent, therefore, that at the earliest possible moment they have the support of the West as a whole. The Eisenhower Doctrine was described in the last chapter as "showing signs of being a step in more or less the right direction." The tentativeness of this approval was based upon the fact that recent explanations of the Doctrine have suggested that America is merely repeating, almost literally, the mistakes of Britain. The same reasons, for instance, were advanced for sending the Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean as were put forward by Britain to justify the Suez escapade. Moreover, Americans seem inclined to dispense with any British and French consultation in the Middle East on the grounds that Britain and France are discredited. So they may be, but they are not powerless. Britain once thought France was discredited in the Middle East and so went ahead without her, but France had retained sufficient contacts in Syria to enable her to wreck any chance of Syrian participation in the Baghdad Pact. We have no guarantee that

Britain is less proud and less foolish than France. We must recall that not long ago the greatest guarantee of peace in the Middle East was the determination of both the State Department and the Foreign Office that they would not allow a conflict to break out in which they found themselves on opposite sides. It was this which both Eden and Dulles permitted themselves to forget.

Then our policy must recognize that the Arabs are the people of the Middle East and that in the last resort their welfare must be our primary concern. The second clause here is likely to many to be an unpalatable decision, but it is based on the first which is an enduring and and inescapable *fact*. The Arabs *are* the Middle East (in the sense in which this book has used the term) in the same manner in which the Negroes are Africa south of the Sahara. To despair of the Arabs, however infuriating we may think they are, and ally ourselves wholly with Israel would be folly.

Nevertheless, thirdly, we must insist that Israel is not thrown to the wolves. This means the strongest possible guarantee of her borders, preferably by several nations acting in concert or by NATO. Israel might probably think this very, very unsatisfactory, and it would be hard to blame her. Yet even the greatest sympathy for the Israeli people does not make it easy to see how Israel can continue to exist, except by permission of the Arab world. The best help the West can give is to struggle to promote that kind of mind which will grant the permission.

It is necessary, fourthly, to take the Arabs seriously, and equally so their development. This will involve running risks of which the greatest will be the arming of

them. The very suggestion is likely to horrify many people, but we cannot pretend that we are taking them seriously if we argue that the more they feel themselves to be in danger the less they should be permitted to arm themselves. It is certainly highly risky to send arms into such a fiery zone, but we know now that the arms can be obtained elsewhere if we do not provide them. In fact, probably the best way to persuade Russia of the necessity of an arms embargo is to keep her aware of what may happen otherwise; for though she has no particular desire that the Middle East should stay peaceful, she seems seriously afraid of a war in which she herself might be involved. Even if there is no embargo, our only vague hope of providing some kind of brake on the use which Middle Eastern countries make of their weapons is to provide those weapons ourselves. States which have already decided to seek their arms elsewhere are largely beyond our persuasion.

But fifthly, military help is only a small part of the help they need. Economic assistance is still more vital. Once again, it is extremely dangerous, partly because a rapid economic development always tends to enrich the few at the expense of the poor, and partly also because it would seem to threaten our own economic security by building up competitors where we would much prefer to maintain markets. History suggests that the second danger is more apparent than real and that the development of a country's industries, especially in such a specialized area as the Middle East, does not make them less dependent upon imports but more so. However, it needs a strong leap of faith for an exporting country to act upon that assumption.

The question of distribution is of great importance, for we are naturally not anxious that all our well-meant efforts should provide a breeding ground for Communism. Three things are therefore essential. The wealth must be distributed as widely as possible within each country; it must be distributed as widely as possible throughout the whole Arab area; and it must be as little as possible hindered in its work by the taint of imperialism. It is easy, of course, to lecture the Arab rulers and tell them that they must buy fewer Cadillacs, but we must never forget with what difficulty we tamed our own moguls, and because of the tenseness of the situation there is less time to spare in the Arab world than there was in America.

It would certainly seem entirely fitting that the wealth from oil should be ploughed back into Middle Eastern development, and in Iraq a striking beginning has already been made. However, this wealth is still being used for the countries which already possess it; and if this continues, the poverty of the countries without oil will become more and more galling. What is needed is some bold venture by the West which will excite the Arabs to respond, and the Christian Faith suggests that it should have a sacrificial character, the deliberate embracing of some policy where the cost to the people of the West seems more obvious than the gain. Surely this and not moralism is the New Testament lesson, that life consists in not seeking to live and that gain comes from giving without count of cost. If we hope that the oil-rich Arab countries will see the truth of this, we must so live first.

Obviously, this is really a question for economic experts.

Moreover, the kind of possibility which suggests itself is a small gasoline tax in Western countries (one cent per gallon would provide staggering sums), which would be paid into a central fund to be used for those Middle Eastern countries which are without oil. This would both provide urgently needed money for their development and would also give them a valid interest in the oil production. They would, of course, have to be given considerable say in how the money was to be spent. It is vital, however, that if we take some such measure, we do it because it is *right.* Nothing else will see us through. If our minds are fixed on results, we shall certainly lose patience not long after we have begun.

The importance of land-reform is axiomatic and the only thing which can be said here is that nothing, literally nothing, should stand in the way of it. The excitement of Communism is that it redistributes land by force, and the danger of our trying to overthrow Nasser is that we shall seem to destroy the one man in Egypt who has ever made any attempt at it. Nevertheless, it is not the only method of ensuring a fair distribution of wealth. An interesting example here is Jordan, an artificial creation which cannot at the moment maintain itself. Yet it is rich in tourist attractions. Within its borders are Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Jericho and Samaria, the tremendous ruins of Jerash and Petra, the great Crusading castles and the Omayyad desert palaces—an extraordinary concentration in a small place. It has fascinating scenery and a delightful climate. It would be an act of vision, therefore, to develop the tourist trade, possibly by enlisting the help of the Swiss, for not even the Arabs could call the Swiss "imperialist." By means of the gasoline tax

money would be provided for scholarships to Switzerland to study hotel management, roads could be built, hotels started, and all the rest of the provisions made for a tourist industry. It would take time, but it would give Jordan some stability of its own, and would enable her both to make money, and to spread it widely over the whole country. Syria and Lebanon have similar possibilities. So there would be built up, little by little, round the borders of Israel, a belt of countries with an important stake in maintaining the peace, for countries which depend on tourists develop a real fear of war. It is possibly the only way in which they would of their own accord consider breaking down the heritage of frontier obstacles between them.

As little as possible of this should be done actually *by* the major Western powers, even though they must continue to give massive financial aid. This is very difficult for most Western people to grasp, since we tend to hold to the simple notion that if we help people they will like us. But the terrible feeling of dependence can be avoided only if the help comes to them indirectly. Here, perhaps, we forget what a tremendous asset the West has in the smaller countries of Europe and in the independent countries of the Commonwealth, an advantage which the more monolithic Soviet system does not possess. There could be a parallel here on an international scale with the University Grants Commission in Great Britain, where, to avoid interfering in academic freedom, the government pays its university subsidies into a central fund and forgoes any attempt to say how they should be spent. For this, it is true, the World Bank already exists and also the various United Nations organizations, and

these should continue to be used, but unfortunately the United Nations is very suspect in the Middle East. Moreover, the neurotic character of the whole area demands a special body to consider its problems, a sort of Middle East Development Fund, which would administer the gasoline tax suggested above, and would also have other monies for more general use. These special monies would, of necessity, come from the more powerful countries, but they should be administered entirely by representatives of the Middle Eastern States, of the smaller European countries, and of such other countries as India, Ceylon, Burma, Chile, etc. and later Ghana and the West Indian Federation. It is here that the concept of Western unity becomes of such great importance, for by this means not only would imperialism be avoided but, equally important, it would be seen to be avoided.

It follows that, sixthly, every attempt to "play politics" in the Middle East should be avoided. Changes in the political structure are bound to take place, and we cannot lay it down that they shall not take the revolutionary pattern set by Egypt. We must therefore not try to maintain in power an existing government because we are afraid of what would take its place, or overthrow a government because we do not like it. We must recognize now that new Middle Eastern dictators will almost certainly arise (Iraq seems a likely place as soon as Nuri es-Sa'id is gone) and there will be much that is politically abhorrent to us. We shall have every temptation to intervene, but on no account must we do so. We may, however, quite legitimately give warning that we shall oppose any form of outside interference.

We should take thought for the form that these changes

in the political structure will take, and prepare to be in accord with them when they happen. This being so, it is time that Britain accept the inevitability of change in Cyprus and start to explore the possibility of it in the Persian Gulf. In international affairs it is always important to be ahead of necessity.

7. There remains the thorny question of the refugees. Here we have surely evaded our responsibilities. The refugees are a quite vital factor in the problem, but they cannot be given what they ask for, a chance to return to their own homes. Even with the best will in the world, this is now a physical impossibility. We have, admittedly, offered to help them, but we have not offered to do the thing which would prove most costly of all—to absorb them. It may properly be objected that this would never be accepted by the Arabs, and it would certainly rouse strong resentment in some quarters, because it would pull the rug out from under the feet of those who wish to use the refugees. Nevertheless, we have to remember:

(a) Only one third of the refugees are in camps. If the Western nations and the Dominions stated that they would begin to admit those who were on UNWRA ration cards, but were not in camps, the consulates would be besieged. One cannot conceivably estimate the longing of people in this position to begin again *in a land of opportunity*. One of the real reasons why they refuse resettlement in Arab countries is because so far they see no opportunity there, only the possibility of further trouble.

(b) The danger of Communism continuing among such people after they emigrate has been greatly exaggerated. There are Communists now, it is true, but they

are so by economic necessity and not by political conviction. It is a form of "Communism" which would wilt in a more friendly climate. One must admit the risk, but it is nothing compared to the risk of letting them stay where they are.

(c) Of course the West cannot absorb all the world's refugees, but there are few other refugee groups whose existence is such a critical feature of a difficult international situation. We need to ask, moreover, why our attitude to the Hungarian refugees was so very different. Did we by any chance think them racially more acceptable?

(d) The absorption of these people would not be easy, since they would bring their problems with them. We should have no doubt about that and should prepare for it accordingly. There is no question here of dewy-eyed benevolence. Yet, neither the British nor the Americans can look back on their history and regret the many waves of refugees they have admitted. Again and again they have proved a source of strength and life.

Naturally Israel should be associated with this, since her offer to admit even a small number would be of immense psychological importance, but if she feels too insecure, we should not make the offer dependent upon her agreement.

It is along some such lines as these that our plans should possibly be developing. It may certainly be objected that far too much attention has been paid to the Arabs and none to Israel who feels that her very existence is being called in question. That is just the point. It is in question. It is even, if we take the long view, seriously in danger. There are already strong arguments for be-

lieving that Israel might not exist as an independent state at the end of fifty years. Yet we are in the paradoxical position of almost having to say that the way to help her is by not helping her. The more we point to Israel's solid achievements; the more we insist upon her right to a place in the sun; the more we urge the weaknesses of the Arabs; the more we lay bare stories of slavery and of anti-Jewish regulations in Arabia, and the more we learn of those very things which our Zionist friends call to our attention, the more we have to say: Then *that* is the critical area; *those* are the people with whom we should be concerned, for *they that are whole need not a physician.* Though the decision may be long delayed, the ultimate arbiters of the Arab Island will be the Arabs, and only those other peoples will endure who never allow themselves to forget that fact.

There is, it must be repeated, no certainty that any policies will succeed. For any progress to be made in the Middle East two great acts of repentance are necessary: Israel must banish forever even secret thoughts of more territory, and therefore must renounce the concept of unlimited immigration; and the Arabs must admit the fact of Israel, and have the courage to tell the refugees that they have done so. Only those who have lived in the Middle East and count their friends on both sides of the Line can begin to estimate how great would be the cost of these two decisions. Men have died only because it was imagined that they held such opinions. Herein lies God's call to His Church.

Such an embittered and complex situation has hope only because God is even now at work, wrestling with the problem on our behalf, not wiping it out of existence,

but funneling down His great power and righteousness and mercy through the crisis to provoke men to become the kind of people He has created them to be. In their midst He has set His Church to stand for three things above all others: *repentance* for those who have gone astray, *reconciliation* for those who are estranged, and *hope* for those who are in despair.

The first is paramount. No Gospel can begin without it. For those who will not admit that they may, perhaps, have gone quite seriously wrong there can be neither hope nor reconciliation. Yet repentance is difficult, partly because it is humiliating, and partly because though a man may be quite sincerely anxious to see his own errors they elude him. To discern them he needs the help of those who are less involved, and therefore see them with greater clarity.

The Church, which, although "in the world," is not "of the world," can perform this function. But three things are necessary: she must be in the situation so that she can give the help that is needed and guide men over this narrow and frightening bridge; she must not be so closely involved that she cannot stand aside and see where repentance is necessary; and she must herself be continually repentant, marked by an inexorable humility of mind. Only thus can she call men to repentance with authority and only thus can she persuade them that repentance is effective.

Repentance, one must repeat, is not a single act, but an attitude of mind, and especially so for a whole nation. It means a ferment of discussion in which men challenge each other's thinking. It means patiently trying out new approaches and setting in train new policies, and then

considering them humbly to see where they went wrong. It means keeping in front of the people the hopes and fears of the other side as something to be examined with understanding. It means wrestling with the problems at home so that the same principles are set forward for national as for international affairs, and the nation does not find itself working for a reconciliation between the Arabs and the Jews from out of a background of segregation or economic privilege. Both the unity and the righteousness of God make it impossible that these should be isolated problems.

When repentance has begun, when the first steps have been taken on the road, then reconciliation can start also. But it is no easier, for here not one, but two, groups are asked to repent. Moreover, when two groups are at odds, there is so little contact between them. To make the contact there is needed a third group, for ever coming and going between the two, urging each of them to consider the needs of the other, and being able to urge effectively because it speaks from within each group at the same time. This is easy to say, but it is a tormenting experience. The reconciler is torn in two because he sincerely sympathizes with both sides and because each side is pulling in a different direction, each trying to lug him by main force into its own camp. Since he is a natural human being, he is tempted to join the side he finds the more congenial, and he must fight this temptation with every weapon that he has. And finally the effort drives him to the brink of despair because there are times when he feels himself cast off by both sides, rejected as a traitor on account of his dealings with the enemy.

God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself.

But at what a cost! Despised and rejected by men, Christ felt himself, apparently, cast off by God also. This is surely the meaning of the cry, *My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?* at the very moment of the crucifixion. We know, of course, that he was not forsaken, but this period of dereliction, of desperate and unmeasured loneliness, remains an inescapable fact of reconciliation.

A Church which is not reconciled with itself, and has not within its own body begun to feel the real anguish, the tearing up by the roots, which reconciliation involves, is naturally in poor shape to speak of reconciliation to others and to beseech them to endure this struggle. A Church which continues to discuss "the nature of the unity we seek" (this being the present ecumenical catch phrase) rather than the nature of the unity God requires will be tempted always to set human goals before divine. Such a Church has very little to say to those for whom it has become a condition of existence that they set aside their own dreams and wishes because of the dread judgment of the living God.

Some may object that reconciliation is less searing, less tormenting than this, because to be reconciled is to be at peace. But we must not confuse the victory with the battle. To have been reconciled is unutterable joy; it is to be reconciling that tests every fiber of your being, for to obtain the joy, men must endure the cross and shame. We have only to consider what it is that they are asked to do to see the truth of this. In a situation where justice is no longer possible reconciliation can come only if some men accept injustice. There is no other way. But the very thought of it is abhorrent, for whatever else men are ready to forgo, justice, it would seem, is a permanent

demand. This is, in fact, the root of nationalism. Only those in whom Christ lives can see the need to demand justice always for the other side and to accept injustice for themselves. But the Church does not yet so live in the Middle East. She demands still a position in Jerusalem as rightly hers and therefore cannot ask others, for the sake of reconciliation, to forgo what is rightly theirs.

Here the different parts of Christ's Church in the Middle Eastern situation have a great importance. The indigenous Christians, whether in the East or West, are those upon whom, in the last resort, all depends. It is the Christians of the Middle East itself who must bear witness to Islam, must be prepared, if the Soviet should come in, to live and die under Communism, must fight for the standards of objective truth, and must stand in judgment over against their own nation. It is the Church in the West who must battle with the West and reform it from within. Only Western Christians are in a position to ask those uncomfortable questions which their fellow-citizens do not want asked. None but they can so plague the Western world that men begin to take steps in the right direction because they have found no other way of keeping the Christians quiet. Of course, they will try a great many other ways first, and for this the Church must be prepared.

Yet, though Christians may see the *necessity* for repentance, they do not for that reason find it easier than other people. Therefore, God has sent men to help them, ambassadors from each section of His Church, missionaries, officials and businessmen to the Middle East and immigrants and students to the West. Nevertheless, it is disturbing to see how little this has been comprehended.

The missionaries, it is true, did valuable service, and the countries will be the poorer when they go. Many are those who speak with gratitude of the education or the medical help they received in mission institutions. Yet how much more they might have had!

It is not that devotion and love were lacking, but perhaps humility was. Perhaps there was need for greater moral courage, more discernment, and a more compelling sense of the overruling majesty of God. Whatever it was, the missionaries too often devoted themselves so utterly to the cause of the people among whom they lived that they were unable to interpret to them the people on the other side of the Line. They ran too few risks of being called "traitor"; they gave too little preparation for the troubles that followed 1947; they held on a little too long to their own position and thought that they had a right to stay. Therefore the Christians of the Middle East have been too little provoked and the missionaries are leaving them with too small an understanding of their task, too preoccupied with their own existence and their own "rights" in the Holy Land. Missionaries are usually very good at carrying on devotedly in the face of every difficulty, but often blind to the forces of history around them. For they are going. Of that there can be little doubt. Year by year the mission institutions find the pressure upon them greater. It is as if God were saying, "You have sat here too long. There was a time when I could have used you, but you did not understand what I was saying."

Christians in the West find it easy to condemn the missionaries for their lack of insight, and, of course, as a missionary I share the blame. But there is this to be

asked, for it was you who sent us. What did you tell us to do? What kind of report did you expect at the annual meeting? What evidences did you require that your money was being well spent? What kind of "success" did you hope that we would have? One has only to read the missionary magazines of the Church to learn the answers to these questions.

The light shifts, therefore, to the overseas Christians in the West today and the task they have before them. If the Christian mission has any meaning at all, God has not sent them here only for what they can get. They are to be used in the proclamation of His Word. If the Church in the West has any hope of making a dent upon the international situation, she must listen to them, for they *are* the international situation in her midst. Yet they are given no chance to speak beyond an occasional invitation to the Woman's Auxiliary. The continual thrashing out of political questions, the meeting round the Word of God, the endless discussion and exposing of unpleasant truths—one cannot even pretend that this is going on. Of course they also have to listen, and with great humility, for they have ultimately to go back to the Middle East to bear witness there, but this should not prevent their speaking. It is not morals that the Church must discuss with them, certainly not fascinating local customs, but the hard, repelling, brutal facts of politics. It is not of love that she must first hear, but of hatred, of bitterness, repression and despair. These are things which will explode into the first meetings of any Middle Eastern discussion, because they are the facts of the situation. Good can come out of it only if the Church refuses to bring the meetings to an end, if she says to those whom

God has sent, *I will not let thee go, except thou bless me.*

Here, and here only, lies hope for those who are in despair. It lies not in men but in God. There is first the certainty that God is at work and that therefore nothing at all is ever wasted. Any beginning, here, or there, towards national repentance is never without its effect. A sincere effort to battle with segregation, with the economic structure, with the problem of foreign workers in the Welsh coal mines, with housing for Puerto Ricans in New York, with the tensions of the North African possessions, with political discussions with overseas students, starts a movement in the log jam. None of these things is enough by itself, and there is always the temptation to concentrate on one of them, and therefore evade the necessity of a more radical approach, but none of them is ever futile.

An interesting example of this is the challenge to the national thinking on India which the British Church, in all her weakness, gave in the years between the wars, when Indian after Indian, finding himself in Britain, was given a platform from which he could say what he liked and condemn the British to their faces. It did not prevent the World War, but it paved the way for Indian independence. One could wish that Egyptians were being used in Britain in the same way now.

There is thus always the possibility that the threatened disaster may be made unnecessary. But there is always the possibility that it may not, and that our hope may lie upon the further side. We tend to think that the end of our civilization must be the end of all things and certainly *if in this life only we have hope . . . we are of all men most miserable.* Yet beyond all the tragedies of this

world is another life, more real, more vivid, almost, as it were, more "solid" than this one. As I teach political science and find myself compelled to say to my students, "I cannot promise you that you will spend your lives in peace and die quietly in your beds," I am amazed that so little attention is paid to this aspect of God's truth, as if it were something of no political importance. The sky is red and lowering and no sound student of international affairs could promise that in our lifetime it will become less so. Evil seems at times to haunt the world. Yet what lies beyond make all of this worth while and *he that endures to the end shall be saved.*

Author's Notes

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3. Z. H. CHAJES *The Student's Guide through the Talmud* (Belfast, 1952—trans. Jacob Schachter), p. 132.
4. *ibid.,* p. 131.
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8. BARNET LITVINOF *Ben-Gurion of Israel* (New York: Praeger, 1954), p. 118.
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11. From the title of a book by W. F. Boustany, *The Palestine Mandate Invalid and Impracticable* (Beirut 1936).
12. Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. (Command Paper 5957. H.M.S.O. London.)
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15. Quoted by Alan Campbell-Johnson in *Mission with Mountbatten* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1953), p. 203.
16. This is not being wise after the event. I suggested in a paper circulated privately at the beginning of the Arab-Jewish War, and also in a series of addresses given to a French student camp in the summer of 1948 that the

course of events would probably be: (1) the Arabs by virtue of their numbers would make an initial advance; (2) the Jews would hold them and would then advance and defeat the Arabs because they were in every way better prepared; but (3) they would never succeed in controlling the Arabs.

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